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ABSTRACT
Although some of the most recent work in the field of 
multicultural education has acknowledged and begun to 
theorize about what has been called the new cultural 
politics of difference, problems concerning the very, 
notions of marginality, boundaries, and their accompanying 
"essentialist" thought remain undertheorized. It is my 
intention to bring discussions about marginality and 
essentialism from literary theory, feminist psychoanalytic 
theory and poststructuralist philosophy more explicitly 
into the conversation about multicultural curriculum 
theorizing. In this study I have attempted to further 
develop this conversation around notions of "translation" 
as generated by philosophers Michel Serres (1982) and John 
Rajchmann (1991) as well as literary critics Alan Nadel 
(1988) and Henry Louis Gates (1987), and novelist and 
critic Wilson Harris (1983, 1989). These translations 
expose another kind of communication across difference—  
that is, across difference within (Johnson, B., 1980,
1987). I approached possibilities for this sort of 
communication through the interweaving of translation, 
autobiographical, and psychoanalytic theories.
Such communication theorizing, I believe, remains 
insufficient without consideration of the powerful
v
significance of place (Pinar, 1991). Through the literary, 
sometimes explicitly autobiographical, examples of both 
Black and White southern American authors as well as 
African-Caribbean authors (and, sometimes, myself), I have 
attempted to expose the ways in which encounters between 
are constitutive of and are constituted by place.
CHAPTER ONE
Cultural Studies and the Multicultural Curriculum
For this study my interests are theoretical and 
directed primarily at curriculum for teacher education. My 
project is to, in part, bring what has been called 
cultural studies to bear upon curriculum, and to do that 
through the debates around multicultural education, the 
humanities, and what constitutes "western culture". There 
is a practical reason for my choice in that it is only 
through the, sometimes forced, inculcation of what is 
called multicultural education that is taking place in 
this country that many practitioners and theorists of 
curriculum are coming into some contact, however weak, 
with the problematics of culture and marginality. For this 
reason, although I am very critical of much of what has 
been called multicultural education, I do not wish to 
destroy in my arguments that place of entry. I do, 
however, wish to provide a rationale for going beyond the 
models and approaches to multicultural education that 
currently predominate. The canon debates are debates about 
culture— its definition generally and particularly 
(particularly in the U.S., it's specific definition for 
U.S. education). These debates impact upon decisions 
around curriculum at all levels of the educational 
enterprise. Teachers, administrators, and school policy­
makers need to acquire the historical, philosophical, and 
social theoretical insights to participate in these 
debates among themselves and interested others.
The necessary insights for dealing with these 
problems, I believe, are made possible for students of 
teacher education through readings of literary works 
authored by members of marginalized groups (both in the US 
and in "third world" nations such as Caribbean nations 
which have explicit historical ties to the US and to the 
"West" generally), and by drawing these readings into 
"conversation" with philosophy, history, social theory, 
and the students themselves via reflective writings about 
their own school, life, and reading experiences. Such a 
conversation also fruitfully involves "canonized" literary 
works viewed from the perspective of encounters between 
such works and marginalized ones. Literary works of 
marginalized groups can provide a passage to a shifting of 
the discourse away from conceptions of multiculturalism as 
something we "add on" to the curriculum, or do for 
marginalized groups to a more fluid and thoughtful 
"discourse of encounters" in its abrogation of the problem 
of representation, and in its problematization of notions 
of cultural translation. Literary works can serve as a 
kind of counter-screen in a field of other varieties of 
texts that often tend to screen (simplify) societies,
3cultures, and Individual experience. Social theory alone 
does not do it, because the writings of social theory that 
we have access to are themselves trapped within discursive 
forms that privilege the language/expressions of white 
middle class academics. These texts talk about the 
marginalized, whereas literary texts written by the 
marginalized speak the marginalized.
I intend to support these claims, in part, through 
demonstrations of such ''conversations” involving literary 
works by Toni Morrison, Ralph Ellison, Jamaica Kincaid, 
William Faulkner, and others. Particular authors were 
selected for various reasons, including powerful 
attachments to place, writings that engage "canonical” 
works (or, for example, in the case of Faulkner, are 
canonical works which speak of cross-cultural encounters), 
writings that demonstrate the power of cross-cultural 
encounters and imagination (Harris, 1989). Some student 
and personal autobiographical work will also be included 
in these demonstrations.
I defend my choice to limit my discussions of 
multicultural education and cultural studies primarily to 
issues of race and gender with emphasis on relations 
between black and white by virtue of such issues being 
especially pressing in the particular time and place in 
which I have conducted my studies— in the deep South,
4Louisiana. Also, I contend that much of the theorizing 
that comes from this study is translatable to issues 
around difference and otherness more generally, however, 
particular applications must be attentive to particular, 
local contexts. The particular encounters, both historical 
and contemporary, that occur in specific places are also 
significant to these approaches to literature and theory 
(Pinar, 1991). Autobiography provides a critical 
conjuncture in exploring local context.
I will begin this task by describing the general 
shapes of the fields of multicultural education and 
cultural studies from the recent past to the present. 
Current debates around such issues as Eurocentrism, 
Afrocentrism, and the humanities will be discussed as they 
hold direct implications for multicultural education and 
cultural studies. Following that, I will outline the plan 
that guides remaining chapters and suggest ways in which 
those chapters attempt to address the problems posed in 
this introductory chapter. Current approaches to, and 
models for, multicultural education are discussed first.
Multicultural Education
Conceptualization of what is now called multicultural 
education first began in the 1960's in response to 
minority demands for more equitable school practices
5(Banks & Banks, 1989; Gay, 1990; Sleeter & Grant, 1987; 
Sleeter, 1991b). Prior to this, schools followed a basic 
assimilationist model (McCarthy, 1990, p. 39). The 
language used and form taken by much of what was called 
multicultural education "disarticulated elements of black 
radical demands for the restructuring of school knowledge 
and rearticulated these elements into more reformist 
professional discourses around issues of minority failure, 
cultural characteristics and language proficiency" (p.
41) *
In his critique of current multicultural educational 
theories, McCarthy outlines three general models 
characterizing the field to date. The first, "models of 
cultural understanding," emphasizes ethnic studies for 
"improving communication" and approach ethnic differences 
through a stance of "cultural relativism." The primary 
assumptions underlying such models involve placing 
greatest significance on individual attitudes toward 
ethnic difference. Their efforts, therefore, are toward 
cultivating respect for ethnic cultural differences within 
individual students (and teachers). Stronger versions of 
this model, McCarthy suggests, "directly target white 
students and teachers . . .  as the flawed protagonists in 
their racial relations with blacks and Native Americans" 
(p. 44). Weaker versions attempt to dispense with negative
6images of any sort, and promote instead "racial harmony 
and tolerance of social and ethnic differences" (p.44).
All versions of this model tend to neglect the larger 
social context of racial production and tend to collapse 
racial and ethnic differences into a monolithic idea. 
Indeed, some studies have pointed to harmful effects of 
programs based on attitudinal change (Fish, 1981; Baker, 
1973; Buckingham, 1984). Quoting Fish, "One semester after 
completion of a fieldwork experience, students' attitudes 
toward the mentally retarded and the physically disabled 
persisted at the pretest level, whereas students' 
attitudes toward blacks significantly worsened from the 
pretest level" (p. xii, cited in McCarthy, 1990, p.46). In 
addition, such models tend to focus on differences between 
ethnic groups while neglecting differences within groups, 
thereby promoting unintended stereotyping which can lead 
to results such as those noted by Fish (Garcia, 1974; 
Gibson, 1984; Pettigrew, 1974).
The second category McCarthy outlines consists of 
"models of cultural competence." Major concerns for 
educators operating out of these models include 
inculcation of values of cultural pluralism in the 
schools, and the preservation of cultural identities for 
minority groups. Liberal social scientists such as
7Riesman, Glazer and Denney (1969), and Glazer and Moynihan 
(1963) introduced the idea that social institutions 
represent "a plurality of ethnic interests” (McCarthy, 
1990, p. 47). Educators such as Banks (1981, 1987), Cortes 
(1973), Pettigrew (1974) and Gollnick (1980) were 
concerned with the lack of intercultural competencies, 
"especially in the area of language" (McCarthy, 1990, 
p.47).
Bicultural and bilingual programs associated 
with this cultural competence approach aim to 
prepare minority students for their social and 
cultural negotiation with dominant white 
mainstream society. At the same time, it is 
expected that white students will also acquire 
[cultural] knowledge. . . of minority groups (p.
49) .
While challenging the centrality of dominant cultural 
values as well as notions of "cultural deprivation" 
whereby minorities are viewed as "naturally" deficient, 
such programs, in their hopes of "building bridges" 
(Sleeter and Grant, 1986, p. 4), still focus on individual 
mobility rather than collective identity formation and 
action toward structural change (McCarthy, 1990, p. 49). 
Minority youth are still expected to respect social 
institutions and their rules designed to accommodate 
mainstream America.
"Models of cultural emancipation and social 
reconstruction" constitute the third of McCarthy's 
categories for this field. These models are further
8divided into two "conceptual strands" (p. 51). The first 
strand is concerned with the development of positive self 
concepts for minority youth for the purpose of boosting 
academic achievement (Bullivant, 1981). As McCarthy points 
out, "this first set of claims therefore retraces some of 
the ground of the cultural deprivation theorists in that 
it is suggested that minority students do poorly in school 
because of their lack of self esteem, among other things" 
(1990, p. 51). While this seems similar to the older, 
"cultural deprivation" theories, what makes this stance 
different is its linkage of underachievement to teacher 
prejudice and the exclusion or suppression of minority 
cultures. In this way it does, at least, value minority 
cultures as something to be respected, if only in part.
In the second conceptual strand of these emancipatory 
models the larger social structural context is brought to 
bear by way of a more direct linkage of race relations in 
the classroom to the economy. A program which generates 
greater academic achievement by minorities is viewed as a 
program for breaking "the cycle of poverty and missed 
opportunity created by a previous biography of cultural 
deprivation" (p. 51). However, this agenda, McCarthy 
asserts, ignores research that indicates a relative lack 
of correlation between educational qualifications and job 
opportunities for minorities, whereby racial and social
9connections take on the greater significance (Troyna,
1984, in McCarthy, 1990, p. 53). Major weaknesses of these 
approaches are their tendency to place the overwhelming 
majority of reform burdens on individual teachers while 
ignoring, at the same time, such issues as "policy 
formation, decision-making, trade-offs, and the building 
of alliances for specific reformist initiatives" (p. 54).
Sleeter, partially in response to criticism, outlines 
five different approaches to multicultural education, 
some of which she too is critical, and some of which 
overlap with McCarthy's models (Sleeter, 1991b).
The first, which she calls the "human relations 
approach," focuses on such things as sensitivity training, 
the "power of love, unity and harmony," and the need for 
attitudinal and behavioral change which supersedes 
concerns with social change. "Unfortunately," Sleeter 
writes, "many people equate multicultural education with 
[only] the human relations approach" (Sleeter, 1991b, 
p.11). (Here she cites McCarthy, 1988.)
The second approach, "teaching the culturally 
different," is concerned with raising racial minority 
achievement levels through "culturally compatible 
education programs" (Sleeter, 1991b, p. 11). Sleeter is 
critical of this approach for its advocacy of racial 
minority internalization of mainstream cultural values and
10
its assumption that this is all that is necessary for 
minority youth to succeed in the job market and other 
social spheres.
The third, fourth, and fifth approaches are viewed by 
Sleeter as having great potential value when 
differentially applied according to the needs of specific 
schools, communities, and classrooms. Multicultural 
education or "cultural democracy" as a third approach is 
concerned with the "redesign of classrooms and schools to 
model an unoppressive, equal society which is also 
culturally diverse" (p. 11) . Through this approach social 
criticism is taught only implicitly. Empowerment for 
social change is brought about through validation of 
minority cultures as well as through student experience of 
a pluralistic and democratized classroom.
"Single group studies" constitute the fourth 
approach. In this approach such courses as Black, Chicano, 
and women's studies are taught in order to deal explicitly 
with the "history of [the] target group's oppression. . . 
as well as the culture the group has developed within 
oppressive circumstances" (pp. 11-12). This approach is 
said to produce greater solidarity within specific 
oppressed groups to a greater degree than other approaches 
can, as well as "clearly defining boundaries between the 
in-group and out-groups" (p. 12).
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Finally, "education that is multicultural and social 
reconstructionist" is the (fifth) approach which intends 
to create spaces for the formation of coalitions among 
these "bounded" groups as well as between these groups and 
members of dominant groups. This is to be accomplished by 
way of "direct teaching" about political and economic 
oppression as well as preparation in "social action 
skills" (p. 12).
It should be noted that in laying out methods and 
approaches to multicultural education both McCarthy and 
Sleeter are suggesting a general chronology to the 
development of the field since the 1960's, but at the same 
time, each of the methods and approaches described remain 
current in practices to varying degrees.
Another conceptual approach to viewing the history of 
multicultural education has been to outline three 
generations of attempts at "curriculum desegregation", the 
last of which "is now in its formative stages" (Gay,
1990). Following is Geneva Gay's account and critique.
In the first generation of curriculum desegregation 
efforts were made to eliminate ethnic and racial 
stereotypes from texts and to include information on 
"ethnic heroes", as well as to provide compensatory 
programs to aid minority students in making the transition 
to mainstream curricula. While many overtly stereotypical
12
images were eliminated from texts, representations
remained distorted
not so much in the actual content of the books 
as in their approaches to the subject matter, in 
the questions asked, in the tone of the 
presentation, in the persistent use of male- 
dominated language to refer to general human 
experience, in the philosophical assumptions 
that undergirded textbooks, and in curriculum 
designs (p. 59).
In addition, issues such as oppression, racism, and
inequality were scarcely dealt with and, when mentioned,
the discussions around these issues were framed in such a
way as to portray minorities as the passive, voiceless,
nameless recipients of various policies and treatments. As
for the inclusion of "ethnic heroes",
Only ethnic individuals who conformed to the 
middle-class, mainstream cultural standards of 
heroism were added to the lists of exemplars for 
children to emulate. Those whose heroism 
involved fighting oppression, preserving 
cultural integrity, or combating social 
injustices in ways that were not sanctioned by 
mainstream culture were conspicuously absent 
from the curriculum (p. 59).
Furthermore, teachers were not offered the support
necessary for dealing with new materials such that many
were unprepared to approach subject matter from different
perspectives and/or held negative attitudes toward racial
difference. And even when teachers were relatively
prepared, standardized tests, to which students and
teachers were accountable, were not altered to include new
materials. Finally, the new programs designed to
13
facilitate entry into the mainstream simply became
permanent tracks for many minority students (p. 59).
In response to the failures of the first generation
reforms to effect significant change in minority school
success a second wave of curricular reforms ensued.
Its primary targets were unequal access to 
instructional opportunities, unequal 
interactions in the classroom, teachers' biased 
attitudes and low expectations, and 
discriminatory patterns of program placements
(p. 60).
As such, the emphasis was shifted away, somewhat, from
revising textbooks and other instructional materials
toward methodological issues. The two major thrusts for
this effort were to deal directly with racial prejudice
through sensitivity training for teachers and school
personnel, and through them, the same was to be done for
students, and, secondly, to assist victims of
discrimination to develop positive self concepts.
Materials that did come from this generation were largely
directed at questions of methodology and attitude. Also,
they were limited to selected subjects— such as 
social studies, language arts, reading, and fine 
arts— and were often earmarked for those 
students who were members of the groups profiled 
in the projects (p. 61).
With the institution of a third generation of 
curriculum desegregation, Gay proposes three specific 
principles for guiding efforts in its shaping.
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First, no one group or culture should have a 
monopoly on knowledge, learning, and humanity.
Second, educational equality requires the total 
reconceptualization of our views of American 
history and culture and of the ways they are 
taught and learned. Third, diversity is a 
characteristic of the human condition, one that 
education for equality and excellence must 
embrace unconditionally (p. 61).
She challenges the notions that excellence and equity
operate at the expense of one another, that mere social
contact within diverse groups is sufficient for bringing
about equity (and, therefore, excellence), and that the
present structure and frameworks around which schools are
built are sufficient for producing truly multicultural,
desegregated curricula.
There seems to be little research to date in the area
of multicultural education that would fit the requirements
of Gay's third generation, or of Sleeter's fifth approach
(social reconstructionist). This would imply that such
programs are even less represented in actual practice.
There are, however, some efforts in terms of both research
and school practices that seem to be listening to such
challenges. To provide an example which relates to my own
project in terms of the specific cultural groups involved,
I will discuss some research around, and implementation
of, an Afrocentric approach, as well as debates around
that approach.
One of the more outspoken proponents and articulators
of an Afrocentric approach— that is, to history,
philosophy, literature, psychology, and social theory— is
Molefi Kete Asante (The Afrocentric Idea. 1987, and
Afrocentricitv. 1988). He defines Afrocentricity as
"placing African ideals at the center of any analysis that
involves African culture and behavior" (1987, p. 6). This
perspective, Asante argues, enables African-Americans (and
others of African descent) to be positioned positively in
history. One project is to
re-establish the centrality of ancient Kemetic 
(Egyptian) civilization and the Nile Valley 
cultural complex as points of reference for an 
African perspective in much the same way as 
Greece and Rome serve as reference points for 
the European world (p. 9).
His argument in support of this move is that by shifting
the center away from Europe the universality of any
historical perspective is challenged. He counters
anticipated charges, of separatism by beating such critics
to the draw. It is the dominance of a Eurocentric line
that promotes separatism, says Asante, and he likens the
"seizure of intellectual space" by Eurocentrists to the
seizure and colonization of physical territories (p. 9).
Asante also notes some interesting congruences between
certain feminist criticisms and Afrocentric criticism in
terms of ways of viewing community, nature, and
relationships. However, he is critical of Marxist
16
analysis, including feminist Marxist analysis, as it
"rests on a reaction to the industrial capitalist order
and must use its language to demonstrate the opposition"
(p. 8). To summarize Asante's position:
What I seek to do here is to move closer to the 
possibility of a post-Eurocentric idea where 
true transcultural analyses become possible; 
this can be accomplished alongside a post-male 
ideology as we unlock creative human potential
(p. 8).
Afrocentric curricula drawing from the work of Asante 
and others have been implemented, albeit with many 
difficulties, in Portland, Oregon, and in various stages 
in school districts in Atlanta, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, 
Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C. (Viadero, 1990), and some 
cities in New York and California (Winkler, 1991). They 
also are in place in some black independent schools in 
Chicago (Lee, Lomotey & Shujaa, 1990). These curricula 
have been endorsed, with some qualifications, by the 
Organization of American Historians (O.A.H.) and 
unqualifiedly condemned by conservative scholars such as 
Diane Ravitch and Arthur Schlesinger (Winkler, 1991). 
Criticism can also be read in some words from "cultural 
studies" scholars Henry Louis Gates and Gayatri Spivak, 
though it takes on a different tenor from conservative 
criticism (Winkler, 1990). In the paragraphs that 
immediately follow, I will attempt to lay out the debates.
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The curriculum in Portland, after which some other 
school districts are modeling themselves, was designed by 
commissioning African-American "baseline essays" from 
noted African-American scholars throughout the country. 
These essays focus on the "contributions" of African and 
American blacks in art, language arts, math, science, 
social studies, and music. They are to form the basis or 
standpoint for all curricular content (Viadero, 1990). 
Conservative critics charge that the essays are 
distortions of the truth and that they threaten to divide 
black and white further as the essays focus on white and 
European oppression of all that is black and African.
Diane Ravitch asks, "Does this do anything to bring people 
together?" She adds, "The great tragedy of segregation is 
that it prevented us from knowing who the other person 
was" (cited in Viadero, 1990, p. 13). Schlesinger takes 
issue with "the notion that Africa was [the] source of 
everything good and Europe was the source of everything 
evil . . . [It] is not history at all, but rhetoric"
(cited in Viadero, 1990, p. 13). In a separate interview 
he claims "Afrocentrism in the schools is a symptom of a 
growing fragmentation that is threatening to divide our 
society" (cited in Winkler, 1991, p. A5). Indeed, Ravitch 
claims, an ethnocentric perspective is the opposite of a 
multicultural one (cited in Viadero, 1990, p. 11).
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Proponents of an Afrocentrlc curriculum claim that it 
is an improvement to current school curricula for African- 
American students in that African ideals become central to 
schooling rather than just an "add-on" which tends to be 
more divisive and marginalizing than helpful— what James 
Banks calls a "tepees and chitlins" strategy (cited in 
Viadero, 1990, p. 11). The Afrocentric perspective has 
been defended variously by virtue of an Afrocentric 
capacity to establish a balance to a nation with a 
dominant Eurocentric world view, by its capacity to 
bolster African-American engagement with school thereby 
bolstering self esteem and academic achievement, and by 
claiming it to be the truth— this last a gesture that 
appropriates some of the language of its critics, 
sometimes to dubious ends.
The Organization of American Historians (OAH) 
supports such a move insofar as it provides historical 
content that is "based upon sound historical scholarship," 
and rejects "a history that asserts or implies the 
inherent superiority of one race, gender, class or region 
of the world over another" (cited in Winkler, 1991, p.
A6). Still, boardmember Gary Nash is concerned that the 
word "Afrocentric has become something of a red herring" 
(cited in Winkler, p. A6). Other board members such as 
Indiana University's David Thelen, Howard University's
19
Arnold H. Taylor, Boston College's Terrie L. Epstein, and
University of Pennsylvania's Frances Berry (also president
of OAH) see conservative critics as largely coming from a
set of either/or orientations. These orientations are as
follows: either you study one distinctive group or you
study larger society; either you teach good (Eurocentric)
history or bad (Afrocentric) history (an either/or
orientation that, it could be argued, also describe some
Afrocentric proponents); either one interpretation of
history is correct or another one is; either you teach for
self esteem or you teach for critical thinking. Alas,
Diane Ravitch claims the OAH support as a victory for "our
side of the debate" in that
Many of us have always said we support teaching 
and research in areas such as black studies or 
women's studies— just not the distorted version 
being introduced into many schools (p. A6).
OAH president Francis Berry replies,
My fear is that people will say they agree with 
our statement, and then will still go off 
promoting a point of view poisonous to 
multiculturalism (p. A7).
Still, research that has been done on Afrocentric 
curricula has tended to focus solely on the effects of 
such curricula on African-American groups and individuals 
(e.g., Lee, Lomotey & Shujaa, 1990; Ladson-Billings & 
Henry, 1990) leaving an opening for critics to dismiss it 
as limited and antagonistic. It should be understood,
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however, that most such programs are intended for all or 
predominantly black schools. Some Afrocentric proponents 
intend to support and maintain all black schools, or even 
all male black schools. Such schools are deemed safe and 
necessary places in an era of resurgent white racism and 
racist national policies, and a time when young black 
males are seen as particularly at risk of not reaching 
adulthood with an education or, even, at all. Others 
intend the curriculum for inner city schools that have 
been defacto segregated for years. The debates surrounding 
an Afrocentric perspective highlight a multi-layered sense 
of confusion over such issues as the purposes of 
schooling, national cultural identity, and questions of 
truth and accuracy.
A look to some criticism of aspects of 
"multiculturalism" among proponents of multiculturalism in 
the humanities in higher education is useful, I believe, 
for extending the conceptual field around multiculturalism 
generally. Such a look also provides a bridge to my own 
project of articulating a position toward multicultural 
education that draws selectively (and in part) from 
traditions within British cultural studies and French 
poststructural philosophy.
Henry Louis Gates and Gayatri Spivak, among others, 
spoke out at the annual meeting of the American Studies
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Association last November (1990). An account of that event
was covered by the Chronicle of Higher Education (Winkler,
1990). Spivak expressed concern that scholarly emphases on
the marginality of women and minorities "has served to
reinforce their place on the margins of culture" (cited in
Winkler, 1990, p. A8). Gates extends this thought:
"Minority critics are accepted by the academy; but in
return, they must accept a role already scripted for them"
(cited in Winkler, 1990, p. A8). He also argues that
through the kinds of "oppositional criticism" that are
prevalent, impenetrable barriers are built between margin
and center. He suggests,
Perhaps we should try to think of American 
culture as a conversation among different 
voices— even if it's a conversation that some of 
us weren't able to join until recently (cited in 
Winkler, 1990, A8).
This vignette is one of many at the surface of a 
history of crises in the humanities and of "national 
identity" both in Britain and the United States. Their 
words (Spivak and Gates) in this rather decontextualized 
vignette could be read to mirror certain conservative 
critics' concerns about multiculturalism and cultural 
studies. I hope to demonstrate the difference in later 
pages. Prior to that it will be necessary to explore 
debates around the humanities in the United States which I 
will contextualize by framing the beginnings and growth of
22
cultural studies. As a preview to demonstrating my 
investment in cultural studies for this project, I should 
also mention what about Spivak's and Gates' words grabbed 
my attention. As suggested early on, I find compelling the 
notion of a cross-cultural "conversation" that neither 
reduces one culture to the concerns of another, nor 
proliferates into infinity the "multiplicities" or 
"pluralities" of human concerns.
Through interdisciplinary, cross-cultural approaches 
to studies— including studies labeled "Western"— such a 
conversation may be possible. For example, a class reading 
Melville might also read Toni Morrison's interpretation of 
Mobv Dick in an article which is also about race, culture, 
history, and an intricate phrasing of the question "what 
and who is 'Western?'" (Morrison, 1989). Indeed, I contend 
in this writing that encounters between cultures shape and 
transform those cultures, not so they all become the same, 
but such that neither exists as pure and unmediated—  
outside a conversation. That mediation is often expressed 
in literary works. A turn to cultural studies provides a 
useful frame for thinking about such a project.
My "turn to cultural studies" should not be 
interpreted as wholesale acceptance of a predominating 
philosophy or theoretical perspective or methodology 
associated at any one time with British cultural studies.
Significantly for both the content and the style of this 
work, I have drawn rather eclectically from the work of 
several people who sometimes oppose one another. In this 
sense, I model a project called cultural studies, to some 
extent, stylistically.
Cultural Studies 
To the extent that it makes sense to talk about 
origins, cultural studies can be said to have been 
conceived in its contemporary configuration in the 1950's 
in Birmingham, England by Stuart Hall, Richard Hoggart, 
Raymond Williams, and EP Thompson. All four were 
"extramural teachers," which meant that they were marginal 
to the academic centers in England where they taught such 
courses as literacy for adult working-class students. They 
were marginalized, in part, because none of the 
traditional academic disciplines fit cleanly into their 
interests. As such they were thought of as lacking rigor, 
among other negatives. Cultural studies have since gained 
legitimacy in the academy to a greater extent (Stuart Hall 
was given a chair in sociology though his academic degrees 
are in literature, and the Center for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies [CCCS] is fairly well established in 
Birmingham), but it's still not considered a full member 
in many senses as England is undergoing some similar
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identity crises to those of the United States where we 
hear calls for "cultural literacy," for "opening" the 
"closed" American mind, and for a return to "the canon". 
(More on that later.) Now there are other strands of 
cultural studies, American and French to name the dominant 
others, which influence and converse with British cultural 
studies and with one another to varying degrees. For 
example, Stuart Hall draws on the work of contemporary 
French philosophers Foucault and Derrrida in his most 
recent work, whereas earlier work was primarily influenced 
by more structuralist theoretical perspectives derived 
from Althusser, Gramsci, and Frankfurt School critical 
theory.
In the United States cultural studies as a somewhat 
organized and recognized area of scholarship is newer. A 
cultural studies perspective has existed to various 
extents and in various senses in departments of American 
Studies. One recent event marking a trend here was a 
conference called "Crossing the Disciplines: Cultural 
Studies in the 1990s" sponsored by Robert Con Davis and 
the Oklahoma Project for Discourse and Theory last year at 
the University of Oklahoma, which featured speakers such 
as Gayatri C. Spivak, Robert Scholes, Gerald Vizenor. It 
is Davis's contention that "the study of [literary] 
criticism can profitably be situated as a part— and a
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leading part— of the study of culture. . . In fact, a 
strong argument can be made that the texts we customarily 
call literature constitute a privileged site where the 
most important social, psychological, and cultural forces 
combine and contend." This has been a line of a number of 
British cultural studies scholars as well, though by no 
means a line of all of them. It is one that I adopt.
British Cultural Studies; A Brief History and Description 
Stuart Hall, one of the founders of the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham, 
England, has traced a history of British cultural studies 
at the centre in two separate writings. The first one, 
written in 1980, was called "Cultural Studies and the 
Centre" and supplied the introduction to his edited book 
Culture. Language. Media. The other, published in 1990 and 
called "The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis 
of the Humanities," (1990) provides a briefer historical 
tracing which is brought into conversation with current 
issues around the humanities, national identity, and 
national curriculum in Britain. A third article, Richard 
Johnson's 1986 piece entitled "What Is Cultural Studies, 
Anyway?" is a look at the disadvantages and advantages of 
"academic codification" for something like a discipline 
called cultural studies. He also discusses possible
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strategies for defining and describes forms of research in 
cultural studies. His concerns in this article are 
predominantly with CCCS and Britain (he is a former 
director of the center), but are not entirely so limited.
A version of it was presented at the 1988 Modern Language 
Association conference in New Orleans with a panel 
including an array of American cultural studies scholars 
including Spivak (who is a native of India and teaches in 
the United States). These three writings serve as the 
basis for my historical and descriptive impressions.
Originating texts, or what Hall calls the "original 
curriculum," include Richard Hoggart's The Uses of 
Literacy (1958), Raymond Williams's Culture and Society 
(1966) and The Long Revolution (1975, originally published 
in 1961), and E.P. Thompson's The Making of the English 
Working Class (1978, originally published in 1964), this 
last being a critique of Williams' work.
These early texts built on the work of F.R. Leavis in 
terms of his efforts to deploy literary criticism as a 
means of reading "social arrangements, the lived cultures 
and 'languages' of working class life, as particular kinds 
of 'text'" (Hall, 1980, p. 18). While they utilized some 
of Leavis' notions of cultural critique, as well as 
Matthew Arnold's, they departed from these two in terms of
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partisanship and the fixing of Culture with a capital "C."
Williams' work, in particular,
shifted the whole ground of debate from a 
literary-moral to an anthropological definition 
of culture. But it defined the latter now as the 
"whole process" by means of which meanings and 
definitions are socially constructed and 
historically transformed, with literature and 
art as only one, specially privileged, kind of 
social communication (Hall, 1980, p. 19).
In The Making of the English Working Class E.P.
Thompson produced a labor history which challenged older
versions by breaking with a limiting economic determinism
and institutional perspective, and by going beyond a
Leavisite elitist version of culture in favor of a notion
of culture situated between "social being and social
consciousness" (p. 20). It also implicitly challenged
Williams in Long Revolution in terms of his somewhat
evolutionary approach to culture. "Thompson insisted on
the historical specificity of culture, on its plural, not
singular, definition— 'cultures,' not 'Culture'"(p. 20).
Another ground of contestation for British cultural
studies was at the site of British sociology which was, in
the 1950's, "massively dependent" on American sociology
(p. 20), which Hall characterized in the following way.
American sociology was predominantly either Parsonian or
structural-functionalist in methodology, and as such was
incapable of dealing theoretically with issues of culture
as conceived by the new cultural studies. It denied the
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category of contradiction in favor of such notions as 
"dysfunctions” or "tension management." It claimed no 
ideology and even disclaimed ideology as a sociological 
concept except to attribute it to "totalitarian society" 
as opposed to the (non-ideological) "pluralist society" 
that was America. This polarity was advanced as scientific 
fact. "Culture" was dealt with only "within the terms of a 
highly pessimistic variant of the 'mass society/mass 
culture' hypothesis." Furthermore, the methodology it 
preferred was "modelled on a highly outdated version of 
the natural sciences, militantly empiricist and 
quantitative" (p. 21).
"Schools of English and Contemporary Society" was 
Hoggart's lecture introducing cultural studies at the 
Birmingham Centre. It proposed two emphases for the 
program: (a) primary concern with neglected materials from 
popular culture and mass media, and (b) deployment of 
literary critical methods as an approach to reading such 
materials for their "qualitative cultural evidence" (p.
21) .
This lecture precipitated vigorous attacks by both 
the sociologists and the humanists. Sociologists "while 
not concerned with such issues [as popular culture and 
mass media] reserved a proprietary claim over the 
territory" (p. 21). The humanists
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regarded "culture" as already inscribed in the 
texts they studied and in the values of liberal 
scholarship. Anything more modern was, by 
definition, a sign of cultural decline and 
debasement . . . They shared, in fact, with 
Leavis, the assumption that culture and 
democracy were unalterably opposed (pp. 21-22).
Finally, by incorporating history and historiography
into the sociological work of cultural studies, the
dualism of literary versus sociology was broken down.
Also, by performing historical analyses on the classic
sociology texts themselves, thereby situating them outside
of science and in history, the field of sociology began to
be appropriated from within. Through this process other
neglected sociologies were turned up as well, such as
German sociology (Weberian; hermeneutic approaches of
Dilthey and Simmel) and American "social interactionism"
(in the work of Mead and the Chicago School) (pp. 22-24).
For several years a central and ongoing debate at the
Centre and in cultural studies generally was over a
perceived incompatibility between structuralism and
culturalism. From its inception— with Hoggart's Uses of
Literacy and beyond— cultural studies was concerned with
the lived experience of real people. Yet, the problem with
this perspective, structuralists claimed, was that the
work attending to such concerns too often seemed to lack
theoretical grounding. Such work ignored the larger
conditions under which cultures were produced. The
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culturalists, on the other hand, were critical of the 
excessive determinism of the structuralists. Williams and 
Thompson in particular were concerned with the pessimistic 
outlook that dismissed any notion of human agency capable 
of resisting the power of history and ideology. (Turner, 
1990, pp. 11-13)
Structuralisms entered the conversation at the CCCS 
through the years as European works by Lukacs, Benjamin, 
Goldmann, Levi-Strauss, Barthes, Althusser, and Gramsci 
became available as English translations. Through these 
authors theoretical turns were taken and explored with the 
growing sense that early conceptions of culture and 
ideology were over-simplified and under-theorized. As a 
progression of European structuralist‘theorists captured 
the interests of various scholars at the Centre, with each 
turn, the debates over culturalism versus structuralism 
became more intricate. For example, the traditional 
Marxist base/superstructure metaphor became more and more 
radically revised to include interactions among all 
practices— economic, political, ideological, and cultural- 
-Althusser's concepts of overdetermination and relative 
autonomy were particularly exciting for this movement. 
Nevertheless, the problem of human agency, insisted upon 
by culturalism, remained inadequately addressed by 
Althusserian theory. In particular, the solutions offered
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by structuralism seemed especially lacking. As Hall puts 
it,
Its formalism and rationalism, its privileging 
of the highest levels of abstraction as the 
exclusive mode of operation of "Theory” with a 
capital "T," its obsession with epistemological 
issues, themselves constituted formidable 
barriers to the solution of problems which 
structuralism itself posed (Hall, 1980, p. 29).
The culturalism/structuralism split ceased to hold a
significant place in the Centre with the introduction of
the work of Antonio Gramsci. "Where Althusser's
explanation implies that cultural change is almost
impossible and ideological struggle futile, Gramsci
explains how change is built into the system" (Turner,
1990, p. 32). "For Gramsci, 'hegemony' is never a
permanent state of affairs and never uncontested" (Hall,
1980, p. 36).
While Gramsci "remains within the basic terms of a
materialist theory" (p. 36), Foucault's work represented
for cultural studies tendencies to look beyond materialism
to critiques of earlier semiotic models and appropriations
of psychoanalytic theories. Hall's ambivalence is once
again aroused by this theoretical turn as the problem of
determination is repressed, but, at the same time, the
problem of representation is re-opened, (p. 37)
This has also proved a crucial opening for theorizing
around gender and race. The impact of feminism in
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particular imposed a crisis on the CCCS in that questions 
of sexual difference are seen to, in many senses, precede 
social class differences. Certainly, social class 
(difference) is more complicated by its interactions with 
gender issues. Also, since the writing of Hall's essay 
(1980), theorizing around race has entered cultural 
studies in a similar manner. Still, race is grossly under­
theorized and largely peripheral. Nonetheless, all of this 
has required a radical rethinking of many theoretical 
perspectives and agendas for the Centre, with a 
concomitant need for redefining.
Defining Cultural Studies: Evasion. Necessity and 
Constraint
In 1983 Richard Johnson produced his essay asking
(and tentatively answering) "what is cultural studies,
anyway?" (later published in the 1986-87 issue of Social
Text). Many of the concerns with defining, and thereby
possibly constraining and undermining, cultural studies
remain, at this writing, the same as they were in the
beginning. Johnson writes,
A codification of methods or knowledges 
(instituting them, for example, in formal 
curricula or in courses on "methodology") runs 
against some of the main features of cultural 
studies as a tradition: its openness and 
theoretical versatility, its reflexive even 
self-conscious mood, and, especially, the 
importance of critique (p. 1).
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Critique in the cultural studies tradition has meant
critique of the disciplines which proceeds through "raids"
(Hall, 1990, p. 16) in which elements are lifted from
areas such as sociology, history, anthropology, literary
criticism, and philosophy— elements which are useful to
theorizing culture and the movements and workings of
power— and what remains is rejected. As such,
it involves appropriation not just rejection.
From this point of view cultural studies is a 
process, a kind of alchemy for producing useful 
knowledge. Codify it and you halt its reactions
(p. 2).
Yet, pressures to define are real. At the level of 
daily politics of colleges and schools is the need to 
attract resources for jobs and research. In terms of the 
larger political field, there is need for resources to 
challenge conservative assaults on public educational 
institutions, and "to decide priorities for teaching and 
research" (p. 7). Johnson also sees a need for viewing 
cultural studies not as unity but as whole for the 
purposes of "reforming the elements of different 
approaches [appropriations from the disciplines, and 
theories] in their relations to each other" (p. 7).
Johnson suggested "strategies of definition" which 
would presumably maintain the integrity of cultural 
studies critique. His strategies are as follows: define 
(a) as an intellectual and political tradition, (b) in its
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relations to the academic disciplines, (c) in terms of
theoretical paradigms, or (d) by its characteristic
objects of study. He favors the fourth one. I will not
elaborate on these for the reason that, in terms of the
CCCS, the question of departmentalization (a kind of
definition) has become a moot one since Johnson's writing
of this. Under University pressure to be reabsorbed into
the Department of English, CCCS managed a compromise
whereby they became the Department of Cultural Studies.
This meant creating and offering an undergraduate
curriculum whereas before the Centre had sponsored only
graduate students and provided only reading and research
groups without formal classes (Turner, 1990, p. 79). With
the diffusion of their (still) small departmental numbers
to preparing and teaching undergraduate courses as well as
directing graduate students, it is feared that what was
the CCCS will lose the powerful influence it has had on
the international scene. As Turner explains, prior to
departments1i zat ion,
it adopted a policy of encouraging its students 
to publish their work rather than produce 
assignments or even finish their degrees! While 
this did little for the Centre's "academic 
throughput figures," it did make the work 
visible, disseminating the fruits of its 
research and establishing the reputations of its 
students (p. 80).
The issue of definition is less settled elsewhere. In 
Ellen Rooney's article "Discipline and Vanish: Feminism,
the Resistance to Theory and the Politics of Cultural
Studies" (1990) she suggests that research and practice in
cultural studies might best survive the ravages of such
groups as the National Association of Scholars (NAS) by
emulating Women's Studies (with regard to their visible
commitments and influences outside the university). She
also asserts that cultural studies (in the United States)
must resist the pressure to being incorporated as a
discipline in order to retain its critical edge. If
incorporated, it would "abandon its position as a critical
reading of the traditional disciplines and of the
disciplinary as such" (p. 17). Rooney draws an analogy to
the situation for cultural studies in the U.S. from the
history of American Studies. Its becoming an established
discipline fragmented it politically such that "American
Studies too frequently participates in the resistance to
progressive work in the humanities" (p. 18).
On the other hand, other scholars of cultural studies
are concerned about such distancing from the traditional
academic disciplines. Rooney interviewed Gayatri Spivak,
where Spivak expresses such a concern:
if one establishes an interdisciplinary space 
which does not engage with the most important 
arena (a silent, unemphatic arena) of warring 
power in the disciplines themselves, where the 
people who don't publish much, who don't teach 
very well, engage day after day, as with 
distribution requirements, let us say, if one 
doesn't budge them, but proliferates
36
interdisciplinary, anti-essentialist programs, 
in fact one provides an alibi, once again, for 
the ruthless operation of neo-colonialist 
knowledge (in Spivak, 1989, p. 133).
The question seems to come to this. Should cultural
studies in the U.S. retain its distance from "the
disciplines," evading the "border patrol" that seeks to
constrain by a strategy of define-and-conquer, and better
avoid the risk of losing its critical capacity, OR should
cultural studies operate through "conversations" across
and within, through self-critique, remaining within the
traditional disciplines (where it has mostly been, de
facto), and, perhaps, better avoid the risk of
divisiveness and academic marginalization? This is not a
simple question. Given the complexity of the situation
whereby cultural studies scholars from many academic
departments and with a tremendous diversity of interests
are increasingly being lumped together and charged with
being "politically correct" dogmatists, I am not sure the
question is even a real one. My own hope is that reduction
to such an "either/or" can be avoided, at least in some,
important, respects.
When we look at the public ("non-academic") debates
around multicultural education, the humanities, the canon,
and "Western" culture that are directed at practice and
curricula for primary schools through higher education,
the problem emerges somewhat differently.
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The "Culture Wars11— An Analysis of Debates Around the
Humanities
The public discourse around current controversies 
over the humanities in the United States has been framed 
in large part by conservative and neo-conservative 
academics such as E.D. Hirsch, William Bennett, Alan 
Bloom, and to a lesser extent Lynne Cheney. This is not 
to say that they represent a monolithic position. Each of 
the above mentioned speaks from a different notion of "the 
good," and what is considered "good" is key to their 
arguments about what the humanities are and what purpose 
they serve. The "humanities" that they criticize do not 
teach "the good" as they conceive it. For Cheney the good 
is that which is "aesthetically pleasurable"; for Bloom it 
is that which is "true and eternal"; for Hirsch the good 
is what is shared in "common culture" and what is (thus) 
expedient for teaching; Bennett's view of the good seems 
to be synonymous with what he considers to be Western 
culture, which for him means "civilization's best thoughts 
and finest utterances" (1984, p.vii). Similar stances are 
taken by educationists Diane Ravitch and Chester Finn with 
reference to secondary education (1984, 1985, 1987), and 
later by Ravitch with reference to higher education 
(Ravitch, 1990).
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Compelling arguments against such perspectives have
come from a number of less publicly known critics, who
also hold diverse viewpoints. Despite all the diversity,
it is possible to see a major split between two rough
categories of views: those who view Western cultural
studies as both having a discernable "essence" and as
primary, and those who question such essentialism and/or
the primacy of "Western" culture to study of the
humanities.
Also at stake is the very definition of the
humanities. Does it include the "social sciences" as well
as the usual— art, music, literature, drama, etcetera?
Many seem to agree that it does, though to widely varying
degrees. A problem with this question, of course, is that
what we call the "social sciences" is not clear either.
According to Clifford Geertz in his article "Blurred
Genres," just about everything can be thought of as text
and can thus be interpreted via literary criticism. If
this is so then it would seem that nothing is completely
outside the domain of the humanities. Geertz writes,
The great virtue of the extension of the notion 
of text beyond things written on paper or carved 
into stone is that it trains attention on 
precisely this phenomenon: on how the 
inscription of action is brought about, what its 
vehicles are and how they work, and on what the 
fixation of meaning from the flow of events—  
history from what happened, thought from 
thinking, culture from behavior— implies for 
sociological interpretation. To see social
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institutions, social customs, social changes as 
in some sense "readable" is to alter our whole 
sense of what such interpretation is (Geertz,
1983, p.31).
Critics of this idea complain that such "definitions" 
reduce to absurdity the possibility of coming up with a 
core curriculum for humanities studies in the United 
States. For example, Ravitch and Finn, who advocate 
institution of a national core curriculum for secondary 
school humanities, also advocate the strict separation of 
those disciplines (history and literature, primarily) in 
high school teaching (1984, pp. 250-257). The desire for a 
core curriculum along with the rather convergent questions 
and answers about what constitutes "the good" represents 
the most striking difference between the two "rough 
categories" of viewpoints— a difference which most often 
generates an impasse to discussion about the subject among 
critics.
The Hirsch, Bloom, Bennett, Cheney contingent (which 
I will from now on refer to as the "essentialists" for 
simplicity's sake) share at least the assumptions that 
"the good" is to varying degrees knowable and is so in a 
fairly "objective" sense. Critics of this group doubt the 
possibility of an objectively knowable good that can be 
prescribed "across the board" for all curricula in the 
humanities. Particular styles and types of interpretation 
seem to be especially offensive to the essentialists.
These interpretations involve such ideas as historicizing 
literary works and re-interpreting those works on the 
basis of, for example, the social and historical contexts 
of the author. This sometimes results in readings that are 
less than flattering to authors of "canonical" texts.
(Re)interpretation is the "essence" of the critical stance 
against the sort of essentialism which has a pre-set 
definition for what is called Western culture with its 
"best thoughts and finest utterances". These critics (the 
"anti-essentialists") see re-interpretation as the only 
way change (social or individual) takes place as well as 
the only way the world is understood (Rabinow and 
Sullivan, 1987, p.27). The possibilities for multiple 
interpretations— in terms of deciding what is good work 
and what is part of a "common culture" and thus what is 
valid material for study as well as what is knowable—  
implies an impossibility for certainty that shatters an 
essentialist structure.
Psychoanalysis might reveal differences in degrees of 
comfort with uncertainty as fundamental to the conflicting 
views in question here, but I want to emphasize that such 
an analysis may have little to do with material human 
beings under discussion. It is based on a reading of their 
language use that is in print and that I have read. As 
such it is based on a reading of a cultural construction
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of these individuals. An essentialist strong sense of 
certainty implies a sense of self that is defined via 
rigid boundaries between self and other. Thus those who 
define themselves in this way are dependent on having a 
strong sense of "other” — that is, one who is not me, 
those who are very different from me— as well as a strong 
sense of identity with "those who are like me”. But the 
strong sense of "other" to which I refer does not mean a 
sense which is based on deeper understandings of the 
"other" and the very real differences between self and 
other. I mean "other" here in the psychoanalytical sense 
of one who is alien and thus threatening to the self— one 
who is despised and thus marginalized.
The imaginary order as explained by Jacques Lacan is 
the place of formation of positive self and other 
identities. It emerges from Lacan's "mirror stage" in 
which a unified (specular) image comes to be viewed as 
natural and fixed. As Whitson points out, the imaginary 
order is important to "the realm of ideology, particularly 
with respect to ideological recognition of race, class, 
gender and national stereotypes as intrinsic properties of 
the self” (1988, p. 298). There exist contradictory 
elements within such a psyche in the sense that there is 
so much need for rigidity (certainty) because of a lack of 
certainty about their own and others' abilities to act in
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their best interests. It comes from a lack of faith 
(certainty) in "human nature." This is ironic, for such 
people often rigidly define a transcendental, 
transhistorical "human nature" (as does Allan Bloom).
By this somewhat crude generalization, I do not mean 
to imply that rigid personalities don't exist among those 
to the left of "Bennettites" or that there exist no "Bush- 
Republicans" with a sense of play about them. The search 
for certainty takes many different forms along the entire 
political spectrum. Indeed, it could be argued that a 
language of simple opposition regardless of the position 
taken is susceptible to this analysis. Still, "social 
psychoanalysis" of this sort seems at least to have some 
degree of usefulness in understanding fundamental 
differences among those framing such issues and thus among 
the issues themselves. It is most useful when taken in 
conjunction with cultural and historiographical analyses.
The essentialist view assumes that Western culture 
exists and can be studied and understood in isolation from 
other cultures. This notion is exemplified by Bennett when 
he writes, "in studying other cultures it is best to begin 
with a thorough knowledge of our own." The degree of 
naivete' expressed within such a notion is of the order of 
one who misunderstands the irony of Martin Mull's The 
History of White People. This sort of thinking plays out
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at the level of practice when, for example, at one state 
university in northern Louisiana, an institution that is 
only about 7% black in a city that is 50% black, a course 
proposed on the history of black education was rejected on 
the basis that it "singles out one group and thus promotes 
race hatred."
The historiographical assumptions behind this 
essentialism are at the same time "monumental" (with 
regard to the grand "American System") and "antiquarian" 
(nostalgic for a mythical past) in nature. They fear, and 
understandably so, the dangers of a "critical" 
historiography (one which attempts to connect the past to 
the present through constant reinterpretation) advocated 
by, for example, the American Council of Learned Societies 
(Watkins, 1989), with regard not just to the study of the 
humanities, but also to what is perceived as perhaps the 
"American way of life." Such a view of history and the 
humanities strikes essentialists as "ideological" and 
"biased," and as wanting only to tear down. Again, this is 
an issue similar to that of who is "other." It is about 
notions of difference. Critical re-interpretation looks 
for differences as much as similarities/ commonalities.
The critical historian would ask, "How can we even begin 
to arrive at opinions about "the good" unless we have 
bases for comparison and argument?" This is a
contradiction in the essentialist positions except when 
they admit to believing, as does Allan Bloom, that "the 
good" has already been determined for all time— it is 
transhistorical. Most of them don't go this far— at least 
not consciously or publicly. For to admit to this belief 
is to rather automatically exclude a multiplicity of 
cultural groups which constitute American society.
Ravitch, Finn and Hirsch defend themselves to critics 
who claim their project is elitist. Their defense is 
basically that they propose the same education for all—  
that everyone has a right to become knowledgeable of "our 
cultural heritage", with culture defined by Matthew 
Arnold. What they apparently fail to recognize is that it 
is that very definition of culture that has succeeded 
historically in excluding Others from the domain of 
legitimated knowledge. The point is not to replace in the 
curriculum that which has been generated by an Arnoldian 
view of culture with another canon— another list of 
"greats." Indeed, it is critical that we know the forces 
that have shaped us, and those forces include patriarchal 
and racist ideologies. The point is that a liberal 
education is one that provides a view to transformation of 
ideologies rather than mere transmission. Still the battle 
proceeds through simple oppositional language as though it 
were a simple opposition of them versus us.
Criticisms of so-called political correctness, of 
multiculturalism, and of the humanities seem to be 
increasingly strident and erupting from the same section 
of the gallery. At a conference held by the National 
Association of Scholars in November 1988, those assembled 
were exhorted "to redeem American higher education from 
intellectual and moral servitude to forces having little 
to do with the life of the mind or the transmission of 
knowledge." Such forces were characterized as consisting 
of academic "radicals" who engaged in "oppression 
studies." Other examples of comments made were: "the 
barbarians are among us. We need to fight them a good long 
time. Show them you are not afraid; they crumble," and 
"Say to the feminists, 'what do you mean by separate 
courses? You have no methodology.' When you lose, make 
them state their agenda to the world. They haven't got the 
guts to state it, and you'll beat them that way" (cited in
Rooney, 1990, p. 15). This meeting was attended by such
media figures as John Silber (often cited in the work of
Ravitch and Finn) and Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Use of the term
"barbarian" as opposed to "civilized" is found repeatedly 
in the Ravitch, Finn and Fancher book (1984, p. 82, 240) 
where barbarians are apparently those who do not have 
anything that can be called "the humanities"— they have no 
"culture", in the Arnoldian sense.
Yet, at points, as noted earlier in this chapter, 
conservative criticisms such as those of Ravitch, 
Schlesinger, Hirsch, and Bloom, converge with more radical 
critiques. All are concerned in some senses about the 
alienation that is symptomatic of what is called the 
failure of modernity— the fragmentation that devalues a 
liberal education, one rich with the insights provided by 
deep involvement with history and literature. A 
significant difference in the perspectives of the above 
mentioned critics and my own (as well, perhaps, as those 
of Gates, Spivak, and many others) is in an orientation 
toward language, toward textuality and interpretation, 
that recognizes the power of language to shape subject 
positions— the ways in which we view the world. 
Specifically, I speak of an orientation toward binary 
oppositional language— language of hierarchy, of 
patriarchy, of domination. Conservative critics seem to 
fail to see themselves as situated within the symbolic 
order whereby "identities" are constructed and re­
constructed through language.
Finally, in looking at these debates, the problem 
(for cultural studies) emerges not so much as one of 
definition or "academic codification" as it is a problem 
of combating what Wilson Harris calls an "illiteracy of 
the imagination" (1989). That Ronald Reagan is known as
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"the great communicator" elicits the following response
from Harris:
So many things are eclipsed, so many things are 
lost sight of, and masses of people respond 
because the way he communicates allows him to 
operate within a certain sort of frame which 
seems to simplify everything and to make it 
easy, so that there is no difficulty in 
comprehending what is being said (pp. 16-17).
It is an illiteracy of the imagination among Reagan's
supporters, Harris suggests, that explains Reagan's
persuasiveness. It stems from the inability to read in any
way outside a uniform frame, a uniform kind of narrative.
"No wonder," Harris writes,
we live in a world of such fanaticism. If we 
have cultures which are locked into certain 
functions, which read the world only in one way, 
then fanaticism grows out of that, terror grows 
out of that— a total refusal, a total difficulty 
to read the world in any other way, to make any 
other kind of adjustment (p. 18).
A Map of This Study 
I have outlined the history of cultural studies and 
the debates around multiculturalism and the humanities in 
hopes of setting a context from which my work has emerged. 
My project is intended to address the problem of an 
undertheorized multicultural education in terms of 
difference and otherness as well as to explore a 
particular approach to practice in multicultural teacher 
education. The overall focus of my efforts is to expose 
the workings of an alternative to "illiteracy of the
imagination". It is hoped that such an exposure can enter 
the debates around multiculturalism as a challenge to the 
narrow vision of mainstream, dominant discourse, as well 
as to some of those views opposing the mainstream. It 
challenges those who continue to use a language of simple 
or binary opposition exclusively, thereby allowing that 
which is opposed to set the terms of the debate.
In chapter two I lay out problematics that have been 
under-theorized in the multicultural education literature: 
marginality, essentialism, and a kind of communication 
across difference which I refer to as translation. 
Marginality is viewed as a complex and dynamic interaction 
among social and individual subjectivities. It is 
insufficient to view it in simple opposition to centrality 
or dominance. Essentialism, in this writing— reduction of 
ideas, phenomena, social actors to positive transcendental 
essences— is a problem that emerges out of attempts to 
discuss oppressions and subjectivities on the basis of 
race and gender. This problem is approached from feminist 
and poststructural philosophical perspectives. Given the 
problematics of marginality and essentialism, 
communication across difference becomes particularly 
challenging. The term communication is insufficient as a 
referent for this problem as it carries connotative 
baggage from over-use in such areas as popular psychology.
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To indicate the greater difficulty, complexity, and multi­
directionality involved in the construction of an 
educational space for cross-cultural conversation, I have 
chosen to explore the notion of translation.
Such "communication theorizing," I believe, remains 
insufficient without consideration of the powerful 
significance of place (Pinar, 1991). Serres's notion of 
"local pockets" of knowledge and communication as well as 
Deleuze and Guattari's "collective subjectivity" or 
"group-subjects" will provide some of the theoretical 
support. Encounters within (translation across difference 
within) differ from but inform and are informed by 
encounters between, and are explored through the literary 
examples in the next chapter as well.
Finally, this translation can not be understood 
outside notions of love. This word has been appropriated 
(made kitsch) repeatedly such that we are afraid to use 
the term— especially in theoretic works. I intend to 
reclaim it. It is about power. If it were not about power, 
it would not be so often stolen. But it is also, 
potentially, about power that is dynamic rather than 
static and asymmetrical.
Chapter three consists of readings of literary works 
that serve as demonstrations of the theoretical 
problematics framed in chapter two. The readings are
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generated in such a way as to highlight the translation 
and subsequent conversation that takes place between and 
among certain texts. Through the literary, sometimes 
explicitly autobiographical, examples of both black and 
white southern American authors as well as some African- 
Caribbean authors I hope to expose the way in which 
encounters between are constitutive of and are constituted 
by place. These texts and readings serve as examples for 
possible inclusions in a teacher education course.
Chapter four deals with the idea of autobiography 
written in parallel with literary and various theoretical 
readings in a teacher education course. In this chapter I 
discuss autobiography theory and provide an example of my 
own re-reading of, and autobiographical writing with, a 
work of historical fiction that I initially read as a 
fourteen-year-old. The novel is set in Louisiana which is 
where I spent my childhood. This provides a passage for a 
demonstration of the significance of place to my teacher 
education project. Finally, I have included a sample of 
student autobiography produced from a class I taught for 
pre-service teachers in which my ideas for this project 
were explored.
In the concluding chapter I summarize my position and 
return to the debates around multiculturalism, cultural 
studies, and the humanities in order to situate this work
among them. From this the discussion moves to one of 
implications and recommendations for the curriculum field 
with respect to teacher education.
CHAPTER TWO
Marginality, Essentialism, Translation: The "Place" of
Love
I have divided this chapter into separate sections 
with subheadings for marginality, essentialism, 
translation, and love, but it should be understood that 
these separations are, to some extent, artificial as the 
categories function through and within one another both in 
terms of my vision of them and of my writing. The 
separations are intended to act as markers calling 
attention to key issues as they figure most prominently in 
this text. It should also be noted that the four 
subheadings are not the only problematics that emerge in 
this writing. They simply serve as organizing principles 
in my effort to promote a certain clarity. These 
theoretical categories are set up but not completed or 
enclosed in this chapter. These constructs become more 
fully developed as they are viewed in action— that is, as 
they are engaged in the literary and autobiographical 
readings that come later.
At this point my writing leaves behind, to some 
extent, the style that dominates the first chapter. I feel 
it necessary to demonstrate my project not merely through 
straightforward content, but, and perhaps even more 
importantly, through a style marked by certain
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discontinuities and leaps— a style that is itself 
interdisciplinary and, as such, analogous to the cross- 
cultural imagination to which Wilson Harris refers (1983) 
as well as to the historical tracings of cultural studies.
Identity and the Currere of Marcrinalitv
The ways in which marginalized groups, individuals,
and ideas come to be marginalized in a given culture,
society, and/or place has much to do with what is
considered to be knowledge and who is considered to
possess it— who is perceived as knower and who is
perceived as known. Clearly, education is deeply
implicated in these processes, and these processes are
themselves deeply implicated in the formation of
identities or subject-positions. This notion of identity-
formation has been systematically neglected in approaches
to multicultural education. As Taubman observes,
Not only have they failed to address how 
identity is formed, what it might mean and how 
it functions, but they have also left unexplored 
the way the approaches themselves consciously or 
unconsciously are used to create identities (In 
Press, p. 3).
I will expand the discussion of Taubman's thesis below as 
it relates in important ways to my own concerns.
Taubman has examined notions of the emergence of 
identity through three registers which, he suggests, are 
most precisely viewed as in dialectical tension with each
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other. In the first register identity emerges as a 
construct of language and, thus, as a kind of fiction 
which alienates one from the complex interplay of 
differences within oneself and between oneself and others. 
It can be viewed from a psychoanalytic perspective, as a 
result of Lacan's "mirror stage" (mentioned in chapter 
one). This fictional register functions through a self- 
essentializing movement in which boundaries between self 
and not-self, margin and center, are rigidly drawn and 
assumed stable. In this register knowledge is discourse.
As such, multicultural education conceptualized from 
within an awareness of this register may be approached by 
examining the way in which discursive practices (including 
those of multicultural education itself) "maintain 
oppression . . . block understanding . . .  or produce 
paranoid knowledge" (p. 8). The danger for a multicultural 
education conceived within an awareness of this register 
only, Taubman observes, is that "it leaves unquestioned 
who or what puts the period at the end of its speech and 
thus reintroduces meaning" (p. 8). That is, it risks 
becoming nihilistic in its potential for endless 
signification and deferral. It is not rooted in action. It 
is "bloodless" (p. 8).
The second register, which Taubman calls the 
"communal as an identity-in-motion," (p. 9) involves group
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membership and all that it implies for identity as it
emerges in the relations among and between individual,
group, and society. The term "identity-in-motion” is
derived from Henry Louis Gates's explanation of the "mask-
in-motion" exemplified by the Yoruba mask which only
produces meaning when worn in front of an audience of
initiates. This meaning-making evokes a sense of interior
cohesion for the group involved in the process of
producing this meaning. Taubman explains,
Within the communal register identity is made 
the ground for action. The identity is not taken 
as a formation of language but as an identity- 
in-motion . . .  In such a world only those who 
are members can explore the meaning of the 
identity (p. 10-11).
The socially marginalized (which I will discuss in more
detail later) stand to benefit from the solidarity
generated by such identity formation. It is through this
register that multicultural education is approached as,
for example, an Afrocentric curriculum. However, this
register risks essentializing identity (also discussed in
more detail later), freezing it into mere group
membership, if its relationship to other registers is
lost.
The third register Taubman describes is the 
autobiographical. Explication of the subtle difference he 
intends between this register and the others requires that 
I quote him at length.
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Within the autobiographical register, unlike the 
fictional register, the narrative which the 
subject constructs does not create the real 
experience of living but rather posits the 
possibility of external validation. One's 
recounted autobiography therefore does not 
create one's experience but captures it. Thus 
autobiography as a means to self-knowledge is 
possible since a dialectic exists between 
narrative and actual experience. This 
autobiography is both the ground for action and 
what is to be transformed (p. 14).
Theoretical debates around the meaning(s) and
definition(s) of autobiography will be raised in my fourth
chapter. Suffice it to say for now that within this
register is a vision for the possibility of
responsibility, action, and agency from the perspective of
transforming and transformative individuals in
relationship to others. Nonetheless, as Taubman warns,
there are many dangers when this register loses sight of
the others. Fixation within this register alone ignores
the extent to which race, class, gender, ethnicity, and
the unconscious do determine identity and knowledge. For
example, a multicultural approach that is frozen in this
register may take the position of a "color blind"
curriculum. But it is also through this register in
interaction and tension with the others that the operation
of those multiple and partial determinisms may be
explored. As Paul Valery reminds us, "There is no theory
that is not a fragment, carefully prepared, of some
autobiography" (cited in Lionnet, 1989, p. 91).
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The three registers of identity formation about which 
Taubman writes resonate with my theoretical conceptions of 
layers of marginality. At this time I will proceed to my 
discussion of marginality during which, as appropriate, I 
will return to Taubman's registers.
The texts I examine in this dissertation confront the 
issue of marginality from different racialized and 
gendered standpoints. I use the term confront to emphasize 
the problematic nature of marginality as it appears in the 
literary works examined in this writing as well as this 
writing itself. In these texts, and as Brazilian educator 
Paulo Freire notes, the marginalized are, in many senses, 
in a position to know more about the culture that keeps 
them far from the center than can members of that culture 
know about the margins (1970). Likewise, marginal aspects 
of even those who are in the center in the broadest sense 
are the aspects of self through which they gain a 
metaperspective or distance from self. This is because the 
margin must "know" the center in order to survive, but the 
reverse is not true to the same extent. Yet neither exists 
as such without the other. Hence there is an infusion of 
each in the other. I refer to this idea as the "currere of 
marginality."
Currere, as William Pinar explains (1975), is the 
Latin root of the word curriculum and its study "involves
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investigation of the nature of the individual experience 
of the public" (p. 400). It is by the experiences and 
ideas through which I am marginalized, or through which I 
choose to dwell in the margins, that I experience the 
public as an individual (not as an indistinct member of a 
group). And it is from that experience that I gain 
multiple perspectives around notions of self, other, 
society as both separate and connected. The term currere 
is apt in the context of this writing in another sense: 
curriculum theory as a field of study is itself 
marginalized in academia generally. And, synchronous with 
Friere's characterization of the oppressed, this 
marginalization is at one and the same time oppressive 
(low funding, negligence, threats of obliteration, etc.) 
and enlightening (there is relative freedom to explore 
multiple perspectives due to a sort of "benign neglect" 
within power structures). As such, curriculum theory is a 
place of encounters between and translations among 
different local knowledges— a process which itself 
constitutes the generation of new knowledges.
The education professorate has historically been at 
the fringes of academia as teacher education has been seen 
as an instrumentally vocational, service-oriented field 
that cannot claim a discipline of its own. It has been a 
field that was seen as derivative of disciplines such as
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philosophy, history, and psychology. The curriculum field 
was "born [in the 1920's] . . .  of administrative 
convenience rather than intellectual necessity" (Giroux, 
Penna, & Pinar, 1981, p. 1). Curriculum, in recent history 
due to economic and demographic trends, has been 
subordinated to educational psychology and administration 
departments to the point that it was declared "moribund" 
in 1970 by Joseph Schwab (Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981, p. 
6). It has since climbed out of that hole a bit but 
largely remains in the same relative position. Part of 
this climb has been a result of its diversification, 
"reconceptualization," and commitment to scholarship more 
resembling that of other disciplines from which it was 
seen as derivative. It is not simply derivative of other 
fields. This idea places curriculum theory, in many 
senses, in a similar situation to cultural studies. We 
either became "artists" and scholars or we died—  
fulfilling "the role of the artist and the role of 
curriculum theorists as seers of the intersections of 
humanity and things condemned by vocation to marginality" 
(C. McCarthy, personal communication, May, 1990).
Marginality both as theoretical and embodied 
existence is a source of big trouble. It "lives" within 
the very language/world that makes it necessary and that 
it must oppose. Paradoxically, it must oppose the notion
of opposition. Frequently marginality is placed in binary 
opposition to centrality or dominance where it is further 
reduced to social categories such as race, class, and 
gender with little or no regard for the intersection of 
these categories with smaller group and individual 
contexts. That is, it is viewed only from Taubman's second 
register— the communal. Social theories and institutions 
as well as philosophical writings based on the logic of 
binary opposition are ill-equipped to deal with the 
nuances of these (non)categories and their implications 
for the production of subjectivity. Literature is often 
the only written source of assistance and encouragement 
for one who wishes to think about these issues in a multi­
dimensional way. Ralph Ellison, in his Shadow and Act, 
echoes these concerns in the context of expressing his 
reasons for writing fiction:
Unfortunately many Negroes have been trying to 
define their own predicament in exclusively 
sociological terms, a situation I consider quite 
short-sighted. Too many of us have accepted a 
statistical interpretation of our lives and thus 
much of that which makes us a source of moral 
strength to America goes unappreciated and 
undefined (1953, p. 16).
Probably no one would deny that literature has value 
far beyond that of pleasure and escape (not that those 
values are not inextricably linked to the others), but in 
many of the social sciences— and even the natural sciences 
(e.g., Michel Serres, 1982b and N. Katherine Hayles,
61
1990)— including my own field of curriculum theory, the 
potential power of literature to inform those fields has 
only recently begun to be articulated.
But marginality, in this writing, is not only about 
the socially marginalized. Marginality can be viewed from 
at least two perspectives or layers: social marginality 
and individual marginality. The socially marginalized 
refers to lives which lie outside the dominant culture 
(the center). While I am aware that race, class, gender 
and other categories are social, historical and cultural 
constructions and not natural ones, at this particular 
historical juncture it seems accurate to refer to the 
margins of larger United States society (the socially 
marginalized) as, in part, non-white or "racialized", 
economically deprived and feminist/"feminine." Still, it 
can be argued that everyone is marginal in at least some 
aspects. The way we attempt to define ourselves has a 
great deal to do with who or what we attempt to define as 
"other" to us. And it is at the frontier between this self 
and this other (these selves and these others) that our 
own individual marginality lies. For example, if I situate 
myself as a white, middle-class woman, then anyone who I 
situate as non-white, non-middle class, and/or male would 
be an other to me. But, I may also exhibit characteristics 
that are traditionally thought of as masculine, I may come
from a working-class background, and my physical 
appearance, manner of speech and behavior may be "racially 
ambiguous." Therein rests part of my marginality in what 
might be called the individual layer. This particular 
example of individual marginality also illustrates, albeit 
simplistically, the interaction between social and 
individual layers in that the individual layer differs 
from the social layer by virtue of ambiguity around 
categories that define the social layer. In other words, 
there exists something beyond these two layers, an 
interactive space where these layers enfold one another, 
which reveals the leakiness of boundaries between 
different forms of marginality and between margin and 
center.
The problem with defining margins and, by default, 
centers as such is that in doing so we are stuck in a 
language of oppositions whereby the only option for change 
is to move from one pole to the other, a complete 
reversal, or to merge the two in dialectical synthesis, 
obliterating differences and flattening out the cultural 
landscape. Either the insidious structure of hierarchy is 
maintained or the integrity of individual difference and 
autonomy is endangered. Perhaps a more desirable state of 
affairs could result from deconstruction of that 
hierarchical system— and I speak here of deconstruction as
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set forth by Derrida. Gayatri Spivak explains this notion
in the context of the feminist concern with the public-
private split (opposition):
The shifting limit that prevents this feminist 
reversal of the public-private hierarchy from 
freezing into a dogma [synthesis] or, indeed, 
from succeeding fully [reversal] is the 
displacement of the opposition itself. . . .
The opposition is thus not merely reversed; it 
is displaced. . . . The peculiarity of 
deconstructive practice must be reiterated here. 
Displacing the opposition that it initially 
apparently guestions, it is always different 
from itself, always defers itself. It is neither 
a constitutive nor, of course, a regulative 
norm. . . . It is in terms of this peculiarity 
of deconstruction then that the displacement of 
male-female, public-private marks a shifting 
limit rather than the desire for a complete 
reversal (1988, p.103).
As such, what I have called the interactive layer of
marginality is not a synthesis of social/individual or
even larger social/ community/individual— it is a
deconstruction of those layers, which undermines claims to
a "positive" stable identity for either self or other,
margin or center.
At this point I should call attention to a difference
between my vision of the interactive layer as a
deconstruction and Taubman's understanding of a
dialectical tension among the three registers of identity
formation. There are, of course, many different accounts
of "dialectics." I am basing my discussion of the
difference between dialectics and deconstruction on a
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particularly lucid account of marxist dialectics by Bertel 
Oilman (1986). In the paragraphs that follow I go into 
perhaps more detail than such an interlude in my arguments 
should warrant. I do this for two reasons: first, the 
differentiation is complex; and second, I have been unable 
to find this explicitly done elsewhere.
A dialectical approach assumes that the processes by 
which events take place are knowable and, somehow, 
sensible. Thus, it must assume a certain transparency of 
language (through to reality). Analysis or investigation 
that proceeds through dialectical thinking is indeed 
complex and dynamic. In that sense it is not mired in 
chains of certainty or pre-determined outcomes. However, 
in a total sense, such analysis can proceed only through a 
kind of faith in the knowable— an epistemological faith. 
Dialectical thinking as it is most often characterized in 
contemporary theory is dependent on a notion of structure 
which presupposes a center of meaning of some sort (even 
those structuralist theories that regard social formations 
as a "decentered" structure) . "This centre governs the 
structure but is itself not subject to structural analysis 
(to find the structure of the centre would be to find 
another centre)" (Selden, 1989, p. 87). A dialectical 
approach depends on conceptualization as direct connection 
to the real— thus giving rise to the possibility for
synthesis or incorporation. It is a movement between 
concepts in search of the knowable. The concepts with 
which it deals are necessarily assumed to be opposites, at 
least in key aspects. This would imply that to some extent 
the concepts (in this case the three registers) can be 
thought outside one another. (Derrida's notion of the 
supplement in deconstructive thinking denies this 
possibility.)
Dialectical thinking is predicated on what Serres 
calls the "ordered structure." In one essay he begins his 
account of this with a quote from La Fontaine's "The Wolf 
and the Lamb" parable: "The reason of the stronger is 
always the best" (1982b, p. 15). The ordered structure, 
like the positioning of the wolf and lamb (and shepherd 
and dog) along the running stream "designates a set of 
elements provided with an ordering relation" (p. 16). This 
can be diagrammed as three points (a, b, and c) on a line 
with a direction (irreversible). Each point is either 
preceded or succeeded, or both, by another point. No point 
can precede or succeed itself, so the relation is 
irreflexive. From this model of the ordered structure one 
can define processes of dominance ("strength"), reason, 
causality, hierarchies in general. "The order of reason is 
only a particular exemplar of order in general. And this 
has immense consequences" (p. 17). The operation of the
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ordered structure proceeds through a series of trials in
which the first task is to establish responsibility. In
order to win in this trial it is necessary to "play the
role of the minorant" (p. 20)— to demonstrate injury or
victimization. The game is a never-ending dialectical
process. "Stable structures and dialectical processes are
inseparable" (p. 21).
Given this characterization of dialectical thinking I
do not dismiss it as an important strategy for approaching
certain types of problems, especially at a theoretically
"local" level. As Guattari explains,
Certainly, in the field of social ecology in 
particular, there will be times of struggle in 
which all men and women feel a need to set 
common objectives and act "like little 
soldiers"— by which I mean good activists (1990, 
p. 7).
However, such a synthesis inevitably gives rise to new 
contradictions, and this is where a deconstructive 
approach to thinking and reading may provide relief. (It 
should be noted, ironically, that setting up this 
comparison as an essential opposition is "antithetical" [a 
term that introduces another ironic turn] to the spirit of 
deconstruction.)
Deconstruction is based in re-readings— the refusal 
of final meaning (or synthesis), even momentarily. It 
proceeds in search of a space between concepts— a marking 
of the unknowable. Realist representation that can emerge
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from dialectical thinking and synthesis is viewed as an 
illusion of presence. Not unlike notions of power for 
Foucault, for deconstruction meaning is not inherently a 
problem until it becomes (viewed as) static, and 
asymmetric in its stasis. As such, a deconstructive 
approach may sometimes be inappropriate to particular 
problems of an immediate, daily or local nature (problems 
that Jacques Daignault refers to as difficulties) because 
of its infinite deferral and lack of closure. That is, to 
think of it as a "method11 which is applied to difficulties 
whereby "solutions" are perpetually deferred can result in 
a nihilism and passivity.
On the other hand, a deconstructive approach to the 
problem of identity in three registers could indeed have 
strategic interventionary value for specific (i.e. local 
and particular) problems in that it allows for a play of 
reversals among those registers, as long as the reversals 
are not made static. Sometimes, even for difficulties, 
solutions need to be temporarily deferred. Deconstruction 
also acknowledges the extent to which Taubman's registers 
cannot even be thought outside or apart from one another, 
at the same time they are not collapsed onto one another. 
For a dialectical approach, a kind of sublation among 
registers is the goal. Such an approach is unable to take 
into account breaks and discontinuities in meaning.
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A deconstructive approach to the three registers 
would seek spaces between, by virtue of these breaks and 
discontinuities in meaning, which defy categorization 
(knowledge), but which nonetheless mark a persistence that 
is unsayable. Its expression in words (or otherwise) is 
not possible by any direct approach. Such expression is 
found in literary works, for example, where direct and 
positive categorization of "messages" or "morals" cannot 
be drawn, but where, perhaps, a sensibility remains— where 
a good reading leaves in its wake the trace of cross- 
cultural experience, a partial translation that is never 
final but always open to re-reading, re-interpretation, 
re-translation. It is not an attempt to subsume through 
synthesis, incorporating differences and discovering 
oneself in every other.
Deconstruction is a conscious acknowledgment of the 
ordered structure and an attempt to subvert it— an attempt 
which is ultimately impossible in any total sense. In 
terms of issues surrounding multiculturalism, racism, 
sexism, the value of deconstruction over dialectics is its 
"self-conscious" recognition of the ordered structure and 
the way in which the structure itself produces, 
necessarily, victims. Possibilities and visions for 
processes/movements capable of minimizing violence and 
victimization seem most likely through this awareness
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which works to keep power and meaning in motion— similar, 
perhaps, in operation to Taubman's "identity-in-motion."
Finally, the idea of identity almost "begs the 
question" of whether or not to approach it dialectically 
or deconstructively as these approaches ultimately signal 
particular orientations toward identity and subjectivity 
in their very constructions. For example, the fictional 
register was conceived by Taubman as being informed, in 
part, by Derridean deconstruction. Another example: both 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas argue "that the subject can 
never grasp its own act of grasping" (Taylor, 1987, p.
204). As such, Merleau-Ponty posited a "dialectic without 
synthesis" to replace the "bad dialectic [which] is that 
which thinks it recomposes being by a thetic thought, by 
an assemblage of statements, by thesis, antithesis, and 
synthesis" (cited in Taylor, p. 79). I will not attempt to 
elaborate on Merleau-Ponty's work in this writing. 
Ultimately, decisions about approaches to problems or 
difficulties with identity formation and multiculturalism 
require a local and situational judgment. Such judgment, I 
insist, requires a competence that is a "literacy of the 
imagination" (Harris, 1989).
Paulo Freire could be said to operate through 
dialectical thinking in his approach to the oppressed (the 
marginalized), and thus to identity. According to Freire,
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the marginalized, or the oppressed, are the only ones who 
can understand the full significance of oppression, hence 
they are the only ones who will have the vision and the 
strength to eliminate it. The greatest obstacle to their 
accomplishing this feat, he says, is that the oppressed 
"are at one and the same time themselves and the oppressor 
whose consciousness they have internalized. The conflict 
lies in the choice between being wholly themselves or 
being divided . . . "  (1970, p.32). This idea is an 
example of what is known in dialectical thinking, as it is 
laid out by Bertel Oilman (1986), as the "interpenetration 
of opposites." However, according to Friere, once this 
process begins there is a danger of complete reversal due, 
in part, to internalization of oppression and the 
consequent identification of oppressors as embodying what 
it means to be human. Another danger comes from attempts 
(by whom is not clear— perhaps, for example, by 
individually marginalized people at the social center?) to 
facilitate the activism of the oppressed through the use 
of "monologues, slogans, and communique's" rather than 
dialogue. This is an "attempt to liberate the oppressed 
with the instruments of domestication" (Freire, 1970, p. 
52) .
While Freire's sense of marginality as expressed here 
most closely corresponds to what I have called social
71
marginality, part of his concern is similar to Spivak's
"deconstructivist" warnings about being subsumed within
the very discourse being opposed. The difference is in
Spivak's insistence that one can never oppose a discourse
from a position entirely outside it. In so doing, Spivak
is able to encompass a broader sense of marginality to
include the interactive layer. That idea is illustrated
(and was alluded to earlier in this writing) by the very
use of the word "oppose" for a "project" that wants to
displace binary oppositions (Spivak, 1988, p. 106, 108,
110). This problem, however, is not a contradiction so
much as it is a paradox. (A paradox, as I use the term
here, is a problem that does not require— indeed can't
have— a solution. It requires deconstructive reading.)
Displacement is not the same as elimination.
Another problem with Friere's position is that in
referring to a choice of becoming "wholly themselves" he
seems to discount the degree to which the oppressed are
within and constitutive of the oppressors, as well as the
degrees to which the oppressed (and the oppressors) differ
from one another. Excavation of these relations provides
the possibility for opening spaces to dialogue and
reinterpretation. As Russell Ferguson explains,
The intent is not to create a new center of 
authority based on a spurious unity of the 
marginalized, but rather to open up spaces for
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new ways of thinking about the dynamics of
cultural power (1990, p. 9).
Indeed, marginality in all its layers is constituted 
by encounters. The social margins result from encounters 
across differences between (in terms of race, class, 
gender, nationality, sexual orientation, etcetera)—  
encounters that often have necessitated one-way 
translation by the marginalized of those who suppress and 
oppress them; that is, "translation with a master" 
(Rajchman, 1991, p. 7). Encounters across differences 
between transform all of those involved in some ways. When 
translation takes place without a master, the 
transformations that take place can set cultural power in 
motion, blurring the boundaries between margin and center.
Individual margins can be thought of as encounters 
across differences within— differences generated by 
socially and culturally produced psyches within 
"singularized" subject-positions. Clearly, these margins 
emerge in the context of the social, but are not, in many 
respects, predictably determined by social structures, in 
part because the social structures are themselves highly 
contradictory. My margins are precisely those areas in 
which I am unpredictable, a surprise. When that 
unpredictability becomes a surprise even to myself then I 
have been set up to learn.
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When those margins are set in the context of their 
interactions with the larger (social) margins, the 
readings required become more complex, richer. I learn 
through good readings of the world (and that includes 
readings of myself), just as good reading is reading that 
is situated to allow for the "surprise of otherness" 
(Johnson, B., 1987, p. 15). Good readings are those that 
operate at some conscious level through all three of 
Taubman's registers.
That is, a reading that sets up the conditions for a 
knowledge-within-difference would proceed through some 
degree of awareness of collective and individual histories 
of the movement and ambivalence of desire, of exploitation 
and privilege, and of the possible relationships among 
these. (Autobiography is one place to explore those 
relationships.) For example, William Pinar's essay 
"Understanding Curriculum as a Racial Text" is both itself 
such a reading at the same time it is a call for and a 
description of the conditions for eliciting such readings 
from teacher educators, teachers, and students. In this 
essay Pinar explains how, psychoanalytically, the 
repression of African-American history, literature, and 
culture can be understood in terms of attempts at American 
identity formation and stabilization. Such an identity can 
only be sustained through a kind of willful ignorance that
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distorts and deforms at the level of the individual and 
the social both European-Americans and African-Americans 
alike. Such a national identity can only be sustained 
through deployment of a "border patrol" between center and 
margin.
Desire operates through this labor (of sustaining 
national identity) from within a history that lives in the 
present, not unlike the lie that is told and goes out of 
control, snowball-like, requiring constant re-creation to 
protect not only the perpetrator, but all who were taken 
in. The desire itself (to perpetrate a lie, for example) 
is what must be explored. What is needed, Pinar suggests, 
is a kind of social psychoanalytic therapy to expose the 
lie and save the subject— to de-center then "re-center" 
the subject on the basis of cross-cultural encounters that 
assist the continuous (re)constitution of it. That subject 
is himself. It is also the rest of us, as citizens of the 
northern United States and of the southern United States 
in particular. Exposure and exploration of the lie and 
what drives it presents a surprise of otherness when I 
discover that as a European-American I am being 
constituted also by that which is African-American, that 
this infusion lives and moves through a collective 
unconscious and memory of which I am part and from which,
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at the same' time, I differ. Now I can read in a new way. 
Ground is provided for a new assemblage.
The Essence of Essentialism 
The problem I refer to— margins and centers, 
frontiers, boundaries, outsides and insides, the places of 
reified (and re-reified) structures— is about the 
necessity for coming to terms with difference and 
otherness. As Mark Taylor reminds us, "The history of 
society and culture is, in large measure, a history of the 
struggle with the endlessly complex problems of difference 
and otherness" (Altaritv. 1987, p. xxi). Learning is about 
difference and perception. And difference that is 
perceptible is necessarily concentrated at the boundaries, 
fluid and dynamic though they be, the borders between 
margin and center. Thus a society that values learning 
also values and loves and listens to its so-called 
margins. Yet too often, to be marginalized is already to 
be situated in a kind of "double bind" with respect to the 
so-called centers of society. That is, the socially 
marginalized are expected to adopt and function within a 
cultural "memory" that is not truly their own at the same 
time they must struggle if they wish to be included in 
that society.
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At the same time that the margins are posed with a 
double bind, their questions and other responses to the 
center take the form of another kind of double bind— a 
kind of chiasmus to the double bind imposed on the margins 
by the center of expectation/exclusion. Margins, being 
both advantageous and dangerous territories, ask us to 
abandon an ostensibly rationalist discourse by posing 
questions and responses to the center in the form of mixed 
messages that say "I am this,” "Don't label me as this".
For example, in challenging the common wisdom about 
race among white people as well as among her peers in the 
literary community Zora Neale Hurston frequently played 
with stereotypes and cliches about race. She does this in 
an essay called "How It Feels to be Colored Me" published 
in World Tomorrow in 1928 (examined by Barbara Johnson in 
1987). Hurston divided the essay into small separate parts 
and responded to the question differently in each part. By 
so doing she, at times, appears to give contradictory 
answers to the question as she reverses and re-reverses 
cliches about race. Her "answer" comes, therefore, from 
the piece as a style. Hurston's reversals play between 
herself as essentially black (different from you, white 
person) and essentially nothing (the same as you, white 
person). Johnson's speculation is:
In the first essay, Hurston describes the jungle
feeling as an art, an ability to feel, not a
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reversion. In the second, the jungle appears as 
a result of "strain." In the first, Hurston can 
proclaim "I am this"; but when the image is 
repeated "you are that," it changes completely.
The content of the image may be the same, but 
its interpersonal use is different. . . The 
difference between difference and sameness can 
barely be said. It is as small and as vast as 
the difference between "like" and "as" (1987, 
pp.177-8).
This call for abandoning a rationalist discourse is 
often heard through literature, poetry, and art— symbolic 
arenas that have historically been more often excused from 
the "responsibility" of rationalism. Through such 
literature, the problematic of an anti-
essentialism/essentialism binary is exposed and, as I see 
it, calls up two notions of essentialism: essentialism as 
it is typically used in a pejorative sense— that is, one 
that absolutely prevents translation (the signifier 
becomes the signified), and another that ambiguously 
simultaneously demands and rejects translation— "translate 
me" or "I am this, understand me" and at the same time "do 
not translate me" or "do not label me as this." 
(Translation will be discussed further below.)
The first sort of essentialism is based on the notion 
that identities of persons and things are stable and 
definable according to transcendental essences and/or 
standards of judgment. The second is a destabilized 
essentialism that is locally and strategically deployed as 
resistance to the first as well as to terrorism generally.
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The difference, as expressed by Diana Fuss, is that the 
first type of essentialism is "inherently reactionary—  
inevitably and inescapably a problem or a mistake" (1989, 
p. 20). The second type when deployed "may have some 
strategic or interventionary value. . . the radicality or 
conservatism of essentialism depends, to a significant 
degree, on who is utilizing it, how it is deployed, and 
where its effects are concentrated" (P.20).
The case of Susie Phipps in Louisiana (in 1982) in 
conjunction with much of civil rights legislation provides 
an example that demonstrates the political problematics 
coming out of the anti-essentialism/essentialism binary 
opposition. Susie Phipps contested her legal definition as 
black which was arrived at by conformation to a Louisiana 
state law (1970) that asserted that anyone who had "1/32 
black blood" was indeed black. This was to be determined 
by genealogical records which, in Phipps case, indicated 
that a great-great-great-great grandmother had been a 
"Negress and a number of other ancestors mulattoes, 
quadroons, and octoroons" (Dominguez, 1986, p. 2).
The trial involved expert testimony from 
anthropologist Munro Edmonson who argued on Phipps behalf 
that by virtue of the way genes are "shuffled" before 
birth it is at least theoretically possible for one to 
inherit all genes from just two grandparents. Furthermore,
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he cited "modern genetic studies [that] show that blacks 
in the US average 25% white genes and that whites average 
5% black genes, and that by these statistics, using the 
1/32 law, the entire native-born population of Louisiana 
would be considered black!" (p. 2). (How these statistics 
were arrived at is another interesting question that I am 
not now prepared to deal with.) Though Susie Phipps lost 
her case, nervous Louisianians overturned that law in 
1983. But the question of legal racial identity remains, 
though now, at least ostensibly, for different purposes. 
With the hard-fought battles over civil rights 
legislation, legal racial distinctions are deemed 
necessary in order to insure equal protection under the 
law, etcetera. The contradiction that arises is one where 
legal distinctions on the basis of race may both limit 
choice at the same time they enhance it in other ways.
This case demonstrates the demand for deconstruction 
of that binary which opposes essentialist definitions of 
race (as in blood, for example) to "anti-essentialist" 
claims of uncertainty, at the same time it points to the 
second form of essentialism/translation, that is, the 
ambiguous and shifting one, as politically strategic for 
the marginalized. Replacing what is dynamic with static 
essences (or, for that matter, static "anti-essences" that 
claim to know the essence of essentialism) is a
characteristic of modern social and economic structures.
It is what Milan Kundera calls "totalitarian kitsch" which 
is, he says, "the absolute denial of shit," the expression 
of a desire to reach "an agreement with being as such" 
(Unbearable Lightness of Being. 1984, pp. 248, 249). It 
"deprives people of memory and thus retools them into a 
nation of children" (The Book of Laughter and Forgetting. 
1981, p. 235). Robert Boyers writes in a letter to 
Kundera, "Collective activity inevitably entails parades, 
slogans, and the belief that one is right. So you suggest. 
To oppose totalitarianism is to ask questions and to 
refuse to become a model of anything, not even of 
dissidence" (1985, p. 231).
But, if democracy is possible it should by its very 
definition resist totalitarian kitsch. It is difference 
that puts the pressure on governments to live up to 
democratic ideals. And kitsch, as conceived by Kundera, is 
the absolute denial of difference. But how does one 
"deconstruct" such a binary when deconstruction itself is 
often touted as a paradigm of anti-essentialism? Herein 
lies another aspect of the double bind presented to us all 
by the margins.
This double bind has been articulated and explored 
extensively by such literary figures as Milan Kundera,
Zora Neale Hurston, Toni Morrison, and Ralph Ellison. They
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all deal either explicitly or implicitly (or both) with 
notions of double binds and the schizophrenic insight that 
they induce. I see an interesting linkage between the 
language and literature of schizophrenia and the 
characterization of the reader of literature in a state of 
engagement with a text. The engaged reader is said to 
experience a dissolution of the reading self— a "moment of 
dispossession of the reading ego: as separation of itself 
from itself" (Ricoeur). Of course, those who are 
"clinically schizophrenic" probably suffer a 
"dispossession of the ego" which goes far beyond the 
momentary.
Gregory Bateson, in his Steps to an Ecology of Mind 
(1972) included an essay "Toward a Theory of 
Schizophrenia" (pp. 201-227) in which he reflects upon his 
work with schizophrenics. He notes that schizophrenics 
spent their childhoods caught in a double-bind sort of 
logic. That is, they received incessant, inescapable, 
contradictory messages with regard to their own behavior 
and feelings from one or more significant family members. 
The "way out" for these people is to develop different 
systems of logic in order to deal with the situation and 
to translate from other systems to their own. Such logic 
is often circular and rich in metaphor. The difference 
between this metaphor use and ordinary metaphor use,
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Bateson suggests, is that schizophrenics use "unlabeled"
metaphors in the form of distorted syllogisms. For
example: "Men die. Grass dies. Men are grass" (p. 205).
In drawing analogies among a debilitating
schizophrenia, the marginalized, and the reader engaged
with a text, by no means do I wish to imply the existence
of a pathology to be exorcised from the latter two. It is
just that it occurs to me that when one is confronted with
a challenge to one's logical system, such as what often
occurs with reading and learning and living in the
margins, one is forced to compensate and does so through a
schizophrenic moment. There is also a decontextualization
about schizophrenia that seems similar to those aspects of
reading in which the reader is submissive to the text.
Again, they are but moments for the reader in which s/he
is confronted with difference, challenged to be creative
of new systems but temporarily relatively unanchored to
history. As Alan Nadel explains, as we read,
we may even rest on one set of connotations, but 
we do so very tentatively, for the pleasurable 
compact of reading is that we are always open to 
moments of acquisition and surrender— in which 
we recover and discard implications brought to 
the surface by the text (1988, pp. 51-2).
For Wilson Harris, the process of writing is also
schizophrenic:
the unity or density of original expression in a 
work of profound imagination, is paradox; it is 
both a cloak for, and a dialogue with, eclipses,
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of live "otherness" that seek to break through 
in a new light and tone expressive of layers of 
reality. Sometimes this combination and 
breakthrough . . .  is schizophrenic (1983, p. 
xvii).
I wonder if it is these rebellions against logic,
this playfulness, the schizophrenia in us all that allows
for the construction of new "schema," configurations,
categories, via something like "unlabeled metaphors." For
Deleuze and Guattari there exist "positive schizophrenic
lines of escape" (1983, p. 363) which I interpret to be
similar to this state of reading/learning/engagement/
dispossession. The problem with the "sick schizo" arises,
they say, when s/he is "effectively neuroticized" (p.
363), paralyzed by the double-bind. Bateson notes that
psychiatric institutions are often themselves productive
of the double-bind (Bateson, 1972, p. 225). Likewise, I
would argue, other institutions and the theories that
produce them can be. I see theory based on the movement of
difference as providing a "line of escape" whereas much
social theory within a privileged rationalist discourse
attempts to enclose us in the double bind by telling us
that our experiences and feelings are insignificant.
Calling once again on Nadel:
the great value of Derrida is that he . . . 
makes a strong argument for the idea that . . . 
were we not constantly readjusting everything we 
know (recognizing difference and deferring 
under-standing)— we could not make sense of 
anything (1988, p. 57)
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Resisting from the margins, we can avoid that trap, and 
often do so through literature, poetry, art, storytelling, 
ritual, popular culture.
Translation and Tradition 
Translation in this writing emerges as a composite 
notion from my readings of the idea through several 
authors. For some of them, translation includes but goes 
beyond the purely linguistic categories set forth by Roman 
Jakobsen. Those are: intralingual translation, or 
paraphrase; interlingual translation, or translation in 
the most common sense; intersemiotic translation, in which 
for example, verbal signs are reencoded in nonverbal sign 
systems. In going beyond, for example, Michel Serres 
writes of translations among the disciplines of 
literature, philosophy, and science which call into 
question the whole notion of separate "disciplines" 
(similar, in this regard to cultural studies). Philosopher 
John Rajchman theorizes a "translation without a master" 
that is a kind of cultural translation (1991). Cultural 
studies scholar David Murray envisions a cultural 
translation as something that is almost always possible, 
but always problematic, undecidable, and dynamic (1991). 
Derrida writes of the problematics of translation as being 
the problematics of the difference between signifier and
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signified— also undecidable. Because this difference is 
impure, he prefers a notion of transformation to 
translation: "a regulated transformation of one language 
by another, of one text by another" (1981, p. 20).
(Indeed, this transformation that takes place is clearly 
embodied in literary works of Afro-Caribbean writers.) 
Henry Louis Gates shares Derrida's notion of translation 
as transformation but "translates" it to accommodate his 
African-American literary theory. He differs from Derrida 
in that, for Gates, the texts in which he is interested 
demand constant re-translation, or at least bitranslation, 
just as the hyphen between African and American suggests a 
doubling (in Fuss, 1989, pp. 82-83). I will begin more 
detailed constructions of these various notions of 
translation with Michel Serres.
For Serres, a major (global) problematic involves 
finding passages between the sciences and the humanities. 
These passages exist, he contends, but they are not as 
simple as they have sometimes been made to be. Knowledge 
from all domains exists only as local pockets or islands 
or spaces. The problem of these spaces has been repressed 
in favor of time which, ordered linearly, can be contained 
in an ordered structure (i.e., globally applied). The 
spaces of knowledge are local, not global, between which 
passages exist— but these passages are not generalizable.
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Spaces are disorderly multiplicities that resist a
totalizing and linear history (1982b, p.xiii).
These passages or translations are found and
demonstrated not through similarities, metaphors, or
analogies but through formal operations of translation
(which may appear to be "unlabeled metaphors") whereby
fundamental structures are found to be "isomorphic"— that
is, Serres explores the identical workings of the "ordered
structure" in different domains. Thus, in Zola's texts for
example, "The narrative does not function like a motor, it
is a motor; thermodynamics is part of its very textuality"
(p. xxxvi). Science, literature, philosophy, and myth of a
period are equivalent cultural formations, according to
Serres. Consequently, models of knowledge can be read to
function in the same way across domains. Still, such
connections are not obvious and require what Serres calls
"rigorously disordered" readings.
This sort of translation can occur across identity
registers, and does so in certain literary works. For
example, as Francoise Lionnet suggests, Zora Neale
Hurston's autobiography Dust Tracks in the Road
amounts to autoethnography, that is, the 
defining of one's subjective ethnicity as 
mediated through language, history, and 
ethnographical analysis; in short, that the book 
amounts to a kind of "figural anthropology" of 
the self (1989, p. 99).
Translation, in Serres's sense of it above, is 
similar to the inter-, or more accurately, anti­
disciplinarian efforts of cultural studies. His method for 
locating isomorphisms between different fields (or spaces 
of knowledge) is at the same time historical, literary, 
and anthropological; his analysis is philosophical and 
social. As the editors of his book of collected essays, 
Hermes. explain:
if the separation of knowledge into regions, 
formations, or disciplines is no longer 
applicable, then knowledge must be reformulated 
on new bases, new practical and theoretical 
operators must be discovered, and new operations 
must be defined. As we have seen, Serres calls 
these operations, interference, translation, 
distribution, and they all converge toward the 
idea of communication (1982b, p. xxxv).
It is his notion of communication (that includes, for
him, translation) that links his specific notion of
translation described above to that of other theorists
here. For Serres, communication is contingent upon
exclusion— not the result or demonstration of a dialectic
movement between opposites. Fluid movement across
boundaries without obliterating boundaries (margins,
differences) is paradoxically hostile to communication and
necessary for it. That is, there must be difference, the
"excluded third man" ("parasite", "noise") in
communication; It is what the communicators
(interlocutors) team up against and try to destroy.
8 8
Communication occurs in the search for sameness but it is 
necessarily a reaction to and against difference. As such, 
communication always risks violence.
Perhaps translation, given that it is always partial, 
can serve as an approach to communication that is not 
based in a desire to eliminate the noise of otherness. The 
notion that translation can take place presupposes some 
common meaning— some "common sense." Rajchman advises, "If 
it is sense that translation preserves, where there is 
translation, there can be no altogether new sense. There 
is always some sense in common" (1991, p. 6). Yet, too 
often the translation that takes place between dominant 
and subordinant groups in institutions called schools is 
such that the "common sense" ("common culture") is 
attributed only to a single dominant cultural identity. 
This is certainly true of any form of "cultural 
deprivation" theory. But it is also, more subtly, true of 
those multicultural models or approaches that fail to 
recognize the complexity of difference and the production 
of subjectivity. "Conversely," Rajchman continues, 
"translation without a master would be the art of breaking 
with those with whom one nevertheless identifies, while 
exposing oneself to the singularities of those one 
nevertheless tries to understand" (p. 7).
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Again, translation without a master is a two (or
multi) way process. As Murray points out with regard to
early encounters between aboriginal Americans and whites
in the United States,
In a situation of dominance, the cultural 
translation is all one-way, and the penalty to 
the subordinant group for not adapting to the 
demands of the dominant group is to cease to 
exist. Knowledge of the processes of this 
translation, though, must be repressed by the 
dominant side, in favour of a reassuring image 
of mutual intelligibility which does not 
register as significant who has had to 
"translate" (1991, p. 6).
This assumption of the transparency of language, this
"unspoken belief in the isomorphic relationship between
language and reality" (Greenblatt, 1976, p. 572), is
precisely the trouble with an ideology of positivism which
has such a firm grip on current theory and practice in the
curriculum field and in education generally. Rajchman
asks,
Can there exist a common sense, a public, or 
public space— a glasnost— which is not 
identified with a single tradition, or with a 
single way of classifying the plurality of 
traditions, but which is so divided up that each 
tradition remains exposed to the singularities 
of the others, and of those yet to come? (1991, 
p. 6).
Such translations within the multicultural curriculum 
need not succumb to the criticisms of those who fear the 
"loss" of Western culture and tradition. Tradition in such 
a new assemblage, contrary to accusations by conservative
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critics of multiculturalism, is not tossed out; it is 
rearticulated, reinterpreted, eventually re­
territorialized (a continuous cycle); it is translated. 
Encounters among positions in the margins and the center 
result in such rearticulations of traditions—  
rearticulations that initially deterritorialize elements 
of the old. Just as the margins are simultaneously 
advantageous and dangerous positions, so is this 
deterritorialization. Deterritorialization, as explained 
by Guattari, is a breaking up into singularities, it is 
ruptures of meaning, and it constitutes existential 
territories that have "always sought refuge in art and 
religion" (1990, p. 6).
Each of the existential territories . . . exists 
. . . as a precarious, finite, finitized entity 
for itself; it is singular and singularized; it 
may bifurcate into stratefied and death-laden 
reiterations; or it may open, as process, into 
praxes that enable it to be rendered 
"inhabitable" by human projects (p. 8).
Such "human projects" become reterritorialized, 
transformed by cross-cultural imagination as, for example, 
in literary allusion— which is "to translate out of time" 
(Nadel, 1988, p. 49). Allusion is a linguistic expression 
of encounters between, for example, in the case of post­
colonial Caribbean nations, the traditions of colonizer 
and colonized, as well as between those traditions and 
"original" expression. The paradox of tradition, Alan
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Nadel indicates, is that "when we deal with the concept of
tradition, we see that only its own manifestation can
alter it" (1988, p. 30). In elaborating on the implication
of allusion (in Ellison's Invisible Man) in "translating
tradition" Nadel argues that the
artist must . . . both invoke and overcome his 
or her historical sense. He or she must know the 
difference between the past and the present so 
well as to be able to afford not to know it. . .
. Tradition, for Eliot, means the manifestation 
of the past in the new (p. 29).
It becomes a "revisionary repetition" (Moreland, 1990, p.
4) .
Nadel's theoretical use of literary allusion as a
kind of revisionary repetition resonates with other
theorists of the margins: Wilson Harris's development of
"cross-cultural imagination," Francoise Lionnet's
appropriation and extension of Edouard Glissant's
"metissage," and Henry Louis Gates's "signifyin'." For
Harris, forgotten pre-Columbian traditions return in his
novels to interact with traditions brought by the Western
colonizer, and the encounter produces a revisionary
moment. Within each of his novels, he writes,
there are different texts playing against each 
other, as much as to say that if you were to 
have a profound, creative democracy, you must 
have various texts playing against each other in 
such a manner that the tradition comes alive so 
marvelously that one begins to break the 
apparition of tyranny, the habit of conquest 
(1989, p. 27).
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Lionnet retains Glissant's notion of metissage in 
French rather than translating it to English (as "half- 
breed" or "mixed-blood" or "creole") as, in French, its 
meaning does not carry the negative connotation of the 
English translations. Metissage involves the braiding of 
"cultural forms through the simultaneous revalorization of 
oral traditions and reevaluation of Western concepts" (p. 
4) for the purpose of recovering unwritten pasts. It 
parallels
the Greek art of metis [which] is an art of 
transformation and transmutation [alchemy], an 
aesthetics of the ruse that allows the weak to 
survive by escaping through duplicitous means 
the very system of power intent on destroying 
them (p. 18).
This evokes notions of the "trickster" and "signifyin'" as 
explained by Henry Louis Gates with reference to African- 
American literary theory, and which can be seen in the 
works of Maya Angelou and Zora Neale Hurston, for example. 
"Signifyin'" involves repetition and reversal of an idea—  
a chiasmus— which is carried out so as to "constitute an 
implicit parody of a subject's own complicity in illusion" 
(Gates, 1987, p. 240).
The concepts developed by Nadel, Harris, Lionnet, and 
Gates will be more fully explored through literary 
readings in the next chapter. (Lionnet also provides 
autobiography theory which is useful to my project in 
chapter four.) I mention them now in the interest of
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elaborating a theory of marginality which is wary of the
dangers of thoughtless essentialisms at the same it
insists on the possibility for dynamic self-creation for
the margins through translation and love.
Implicit in all this is the notion that a truly 
creative alchemical response to crisis and 
conflict and deprivation— a response that 
engages with formidable myth— may well come from 
the other side of a centralised or dominant 
civilisation, from extremities, from apparently 
irrelevant imaginations and resources (Harris,
1983, p. 30).
The case of Susie Phipps illustrates one-way 
translation imposed on the margins from the center 
("centralised or dominant civilisation") "Ironically, the 
1970 Louisiana law was enacted to supersede an old Jim 
Crow statute which relied on the idea of "common report" 
in determining an infant's race" (Omi and Winant, 1986, p. 
162). However, this case represents faulty translation on 
three levels: (a) it represents an attempt to impose a 
language of scientific rationality on situations where 
multi-dimensional aspects of human experience are at play 
and at stake, (b) given that its authors buy into a 
scientific rationalism, they misread or fail to read 
scientific understandings, in this case, about recombinant 
DNA and a social construction is natural scientifically 
defined, (c) they attempt to make the local the global. 
Boundaries between margin and center are rigidly defined 
on the basis of a "purity," and that purity operates in
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only one direction— from center to margin. As such, the 
center is clearly defined as only that which is in no 
amount "other." The margins are left to fend for 
themselves out of a neglect that is sometimes benign, but 
more often not.
To communicate (to know), to translate, is always to 
risk killing, Serres reminds us. Communication/translation 
is always an attempt to eliminate the noise of otherness, 
to exclude, to marginalize, both symbolically and 
literally that which paradoxically forms a necessary 
backdrop for that same communication— that is, something 
against which exists the need to communicate. But maybe 
that violence can be best resisted if communicating 
discourses (essentialisms) are localized journeys 
traversed in love (listening). The margins, like the 
creoles of Louisiana, are local phenomena. The 
particular historical relations of diverse cultural groups 
in a particular locale carry immense import for the 
processes of translation which continue to shape 
subjectivities for a region. It is in this sense that the 
multicultural curriculum need attend to the notion of 
place. For translation to be a truly two-way process, 
local historical circumstances (relations among cultural 
groups of a place) have to be excavated and acknowledged. 
For even those who are relatively new to a region are
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affected by the region's history as well as by the 
specific histories they bring with them. Indeed, this 
movement constitutes new encounters which continue to 
shape the character of local and national cultures. These 
encounters cannot be explored outside a deep listening 
among and between marginalized and dominant groups. Such 
listening is, inherently, a part of translation that is a 
two (or more) way process.
The pedagogy that I seek attends to the identity 
politics of individual student experience of literature 
and life without collapsing under such politics to new 
"atheoretical" essentialisms. The deconstruction and 
translation that must take place in the classroom is 
situation specific and, as such, must fall back on 
questions of judgment. Judgment not based in love can only 
give rise to terrorism.
Love in the Margins
I begin this section with two quotes that represent a 
spectrum of love inclusive of mind and body, eros and 
agape', and something else beyond those dualisms. Perhaps 
that space beyond that Michel Serres and Zora Neale 
Hurston differentially explore in these quotes could be 
referred to as "eco-erosic" love.
Love has just been defined as an intermediary.
It is neither a god nor a mortal, neither rich
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nor poor; it occupies the middle spot between 
knowledge and ignorance. Love can be thought of 
as being among the fuzzy subsets. He is the 
included third. He is between. (Serres, 1982a, 
p. 246).
And,
She was stretched on her back beneath the pear 
tree soaking in the alto chant of the visiting 
bees, the gold of the sun and the panting breath 
of the breeze when the inaudible voice of it all 
came to her. She saw a dust-bearing bee sink 
into the sanctum of a bloom; the thousand 
sister-calyxes arch to meet the love embrace and 
the ecstatic shiver of the tree from root to 
tiniest branch creaming in every blossom and 
frothing with delight. So this was a marriage!
She had been summoned to behold a revelation.
Then Janie felt a pain remorseless sweet that 
left her limp and languid. . . .
Oh to be a pear tree— any tree in bloom!
(Hurston, 1978, pp. 24-5).
I write about a problem that has no solution other 
than love— and that is no solution because it resists the 
framework that anything called a "solution" requires. Not 
being "rational," love is well suited for dealing with the 
call to abandon the privileging of certain rationalist 
discourses. This love that I speak of is also listening—  
listening on many perceptual levels. Listening, as a part 
of language, is itself marginalized by so much 
philosophical writing that privileges the saying aspects 
of language (Fiumara, 1990). Zora Neale Hurston loves us 
with her novel Their Eves Were Watching God at the same
time she makes demands on our rationalist conditioning
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(with regard to double-binds, for example). She teaches us 
to listen. Michel Serres does the same.
With regard to my earlier positioning of feminist/ 
"feminine" in the margins of larger society and my 
emphasis on love as integral to the workings of all the 
other oppositions operating within this text, I would like 
to preface my discussion of love with some notes about the 
connection between love as agape'/eros and notions of 
masculine/feminine. Again, stressing my intent to avoid 
successful reversals (new essentialisms) I should perhaps 
clarify my use of the term "feminine" and thus also 
"masculine." I believe that probably every man and every 
woman possess characteristics from both of the cultural 
categories feminine and masculine so that what are 
considered feminine and masculine are not necessarily 
coexistent with female and male respectively. Yet 
"feminine" perspectives toward love are mostly 
marginalized in the philosophical literature, particularly 
in Western philosophy and theology. It is the "feminine" 
conception(s) of love, therefore, on which I wish to 
focus.
In my search for meaning in the idea of love I have 
examined some of the historical discussions stemming from 
my own "Western Judeo-Christian" cultural heritage, a 
heritage in part "inherited" by African-American people in
the United States (Plato, the Disciple Paul, St.
Augustine, and finally Freud were read via Donnelly, 
French, Kristeva, 0'Donovan, Soble). As several of the 
sources I consulted point out, such discussions are rich 
with possibilities, but they are largely lacking with 
regard to female/feminine (as well as black racial) 
perspectives. For female/feminine perspectives I have 
turned to a contemporary feminist theological 
interpretation of the Christian concepts of agape' and 
eros (Donnelly, 1984). My thesis (and Donnelly's as I read 
her) is that a "feminine" conception of love is one that 
does not hierarchicalize (and thus artificially split) 
agape' and eros— a hierarchy which necessitates dualistic 
thinking with regard to mind and body, spirituality and 
sexuality. Donnelley and others call it "radical love" (p. 
30-34).
Agape' refers, historically, to selfless love—  
especially the sort of love that is said to exist between 
God and human beings, but also within some forms of human 
friendship. It is considered to be the highest form of 
love in much of Christian (male) theological literature. 
Eros involves, but is not limited to, sensual, sexual 
and/or romantic love between human beings. Both terms 
have, however, been variously interpreted over time. True 
to Derrida's insistence on the indeterminacy of origins,
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contradictory readings of early usages of these terms 
abound. The opposition deconstructs itself when looked at 
historically.
Both eros and agape' were concepts developed by men. 
Plato spoke of eros, the disciple Paul spoke of agape7. 
Erosic love for Plato was desire— to love was to seek and 
to love what is lacking. Still, Plato separated mind and 
body within eros by differentiating between a raving or 
vulgar eros (body) and a sublime eros (mind). Thus, for 
the philosopher, love involved lacking and seeking beauty, 
truth, the good. Freud's notion of the libido (which, is 
only male) is Plato's eros (Kristeva, 1987, pp. 59-82).
St. Paul first announced agape' as a sort of three-tiered 
plan for moving the concept of love away from eros and 
desire and passively under the thumb of the Father/God who 
bestows it. He emphasizes first, God's disinterested love 
for man, second, His sacrifice of the Son to prove it, and 
third, the importance of loving one's fellow man, 
including (especially) enemies and sinners as proof of 
allegiance to the Father (pp. 139-150).
Alan Soble interprets erosic love as being "property- 
based and reason-dependent," one in which we appraise the 
worth of the "object" to be loved, and agapic love as love 
which bestows value on the loved one regardless of prior 
properties (1990, p. 12). According to Soble, Eric Fromm
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sees mother love as agapic (unconditional) and father love 
as erosic, whereas Irving Singer considers all parental 
love erosic (p. 13)• Soble's definitions point to male 
imagery for eros and female for agape if one takes 
"property-based" and "reason-dependent" to be 
characteristics of modern patriarchy, and nurturing to be 
a "feminized" concept.
St. Augustine, like Plato, divides love on the basis 
of mind (spirit) and body while introducing the notions of 
sin and shame (O'Donovan, 1980, p. 10). In the scheme of 
St. Augustine women had little to say or offer as they 
were viewed as virtually all body with no mind or 
spirituality and limited souls (French, 1984, p. 107).
With woman as body and man as mind the (one-way) 
translation in Christian thought to woman's love as erosic 
(erotic) and man's love as agapic was easy. Both Plato and 
St. Augustine saw mind and body as separate and 
hierarchicalized— a dualism that has since proven vicious, 
but which is still very much in place in what has been 
called "Western rationalist masculine discourse."
Is another hierarchy emerging with these notions of 
feminine and masculine? Only in a limited sense, I think, 
because as stated before I do not believe these categories 
are natural, let alone restricted to associations of 
feminine to female and masculine to male. The limited
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sense of hierarchy I present here is an example of
strategic use of fluid essentialisms. It is an inherently
unstable one in that concepts/categories of
feminine/masculine are historically and culturally defined
moment to moment, and as such are synchronically,
diachronically, and linguistically unstable. With this and
my female status in mind it should come as no surprise if
my arguments and discussion favor a feminist standpoint. I
do not claim innocence, but neither do I apologize. Spivak
speaks of this issue as follows:
By pointing attention to a feminist marginality,
I have been attempting, not to win the center 
for ourselves, but to point at the 
irreducibility of the margin in all 
explanations. That would not merely reverse but 
displace the distinction between margin and 
center. But in effect such pure innocence 
(pushing all guilt to the margins) is not 
possible, and, paradoxically, would put the very 
law of displacement and the irreducibility of 
the margin into question (1988, p. 107) .
Soble argues a case through a logic of binary
oppositions (although he neither explicitly formulates it
on the basis of hierarchy nor on prior marginalization)
for complete reversal of the agape'/eros hierarchy and the
non-necessity, then, of agape', forgetting that the terms
of language derive meaning from difference (if not
differance) and the only difference at work in his system
is that of opposition. Thus he obliterates all meaning in
his "structure of love" by attempting to discredit and
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eliminate the term to which eros is opposed (and thereby 
derives its meaning).
A "feminine" complete reversal of the agape'/eros 
hierarchy is a fallacy no less than the "masculine" 
version. The problem for everyone is the same insofar as 
an incomplete reversal or displacement is the goal. The 
ways to approach that problem are different— different 
broadly for masculine and feminine standpoints and 
different particularly for each individual. Still, I would 
argue for the existence of a certain advantage for the 
feminine standpoint through what I have called a currere 
of marginality. The feminine standpoint in which eros (or 
feeling) is often allowed to supersede agape'
(rationality) is a marginalized standpoint in Western 
market society. (Although true agape' is marginalized as 
well . . .  a kind of pseudo-agape' prevails— what 
Donnelley calls "sloppy agape'" [1984, p. 20]) As 
expressed earlier, those coming from marginalized 
standpoints are typically more driven to deal with other 
more dominant standpoints and thus reach broader 
understandings encompassing multiple possibilities. This 
is why I feel some comfort in referring to the non- 
hierarchicalized yet non-contradictory conception of eros- 
agape' as feminine.
It is through the multiplicitous experience of an 
entity, idea, or concept— both in mind and body— that we 
come to know it non-violently. "True love" for anyone or 
anything comes from both mind and body, selflessness, and 
a kind of selfishness. I conceive of this selfishness as 
one where the lover attempts to soak up as much experience 
of the other, the loved, into the self as possible, though 
not in an intrusive (violent) sense, and not in a self- 
obliterating sense. It differs from pure agape'
(altruistic, selfless love) in that it involves more of an 
emotional investment and risk of rejection. But in order 
to truly be established such that it can grow and evolve 
it cannot be rejected— it must be reciprocal, the lover 
must receive a "return" on that emotional investment. 
Otherwise it never goes beyond agape', which by my 
interpretation of agape', need only be a one-way affair 
(as in "love your enemies"). This is not to say that 
agape' is an inferior form of love— just that agape' is 
neither superior, isolable, nor is it all there is. I am 
also suggesting that displacement of these hierarchies is 
more easily associated with the feminine at this 
particular cultural moment, since such a standpoint could 
be conceived of as displacement of at least three 
oppositions: masculine/feminine, agape'/eros, 
margin/center. The displacement or deconstruction of
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hierarchicalized love, I believe, is found in the idea of 
transference love— transference that is peculiar to the 
pedagogical situation. An explanation of this follows.
Love as multi-layered engagement with life is a 
prerequisite for translation, and translation is essential 
to the multicultural curriculum. The implications that 
psychoanalysis holds for pedagogy are manifested by the 
significance of love to both. Henceforth in this writing 
love functions as an analogy for teaching/learning at the 
same time it is often, as in psychoanalysis, more than an 
analogy; it is a very real and necessary condition for the 
pedagogical situation. Returning to the initial quote in 
this section by Serres, this (transference) love "occupies 
the middle spot between knowledge and ignorance." These 
assertions are detailed in the immediately following 
paragraphs.
Love (in the sense of "in love") effects a stifling 
of imagination (as in "love is blind") at the same time it 
totally disrupts. It is a dangerous moment at the same 
time it renews (like the margins). "One speaks [of it (one 
learns; imagination returns)] only after the fact" 
(Kristeva, 1987, p. 3). It subverts and problematizes 
language providing an opening for translation. "I" becomes 
an "other." It makes one unique and special (particular) 
at the same time it blurs boundaries between self and
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other. Fear shares its symptoms. Indeed, it is "fear of
crossing and desire to cross the boundaries [margins] of
the self" (p. 6). And, like learning, it is schizophrenic.
The experience (love) ties a knot with strands made
of the symbolic, the imaginary, the real.
Strangled within this tight knot, reality 
vanishes: I do not take it into account, and I 
refer it, if I think of it, to one of the three 
other realms. That means in love I never cease 
to be mistaken as to reality (Kristeva, p. 7).
Like learning/teaching, these are dangerous territories,
disruptive, unsettling, risking blowing apart all that is
official or certain. Love and learning are marginal
passages. Love (learning) calls into question the very
notion of identity.
Indeed, in the rapture of love, the limits of 
one's own identity vanish. . . . Do we speak of 
the same thing? And of which thing? The ordeal 
of love puts the univocity of language and its 
referential and communicative power to the test 
(p. 2).
What do we mean by love? Searching the question reveals a 
"linguistic profundity"— love as "solitary because 
incommunicable" is nonetheless translatable. Versions of 
love (languages of love) "commune [only] through a third 
party: ideal, god, hallowed group" (p. 3) (sometimes,the 
communal register).
Can a classroom be one such place (Serres's "included 
third"; "between"), political problematics and all?
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Love probably always includes a love for power. 
Transference love is for that very reason the 
royal road to the state of love; no matter what 
it is, love brushes us up against sovereignty 
(p. 9).
Transference takes place through a granting of authority
by the analysand (student? teacher?). We ask our students
to "suspend disbelief" in our competence. We ask them to
grant us authority.
But it is they who are to listen as we tell our
stories. Here lies the "swerve" in this analogy. The
swerve is the surplus, the place of nonsense, the
uncultivated (Serres, 1989). It is a margin (a "margin of
mystery" [p. 8]). The swerve gives us time, "breathing
space" (p. ll). There is still something left to do; to
fill. This particular swerve means sovereignty is not
complete. If it is they, our students, who listen, are
they not the analysts and we the analysands in this
analogy? Yet, it is we, the teachers, who are "presumed to
know." And "as soon as there is somewhere a subject
presumed to know, there is transference" (Lacan, cited in
Felman, 1987, p. 35).
Psychoanalysis proceeds, as does teaching, through a
kind of "mutual apprenticeship" (p. 33). The analyst
"attempts to learn from the students his own knowledge"
(p. 33). Love, then, is two-way. Lacan insists:
I deemed it necessary to support the idea of 
transference, as indistinguishable from love,
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with the formula of the subject presumed to know 
(cited in Felman, p. 35).
and
The question of love is thus linked to the 
question of knowledge (cited in Felman, p. 35).
and
Transference is love . . .  I insist: it is love 
directed toward, addressed to, knowledge (cited 
in Felman, p. 35).
Listening is a love; love pays attention to
listening. It occurs in an open system. Kristeva writes,
"As implied in modern logical and biological theories
dealing with so-called 'open systems,' transference is the
Freudian self-organization" (p. 14). With this, as Felman
reminds us,
the position of the teacher is itself the 
position of the one who learns, of the one who 
teaches nothing other than the way he learns.
The subject of teaching is interminably— a 
student; the subject of teaching is 
interminably— a learning (p. 37).
It (learning/love) is also indefinitely deferred.
A coincidence between findings of psychoanalysis and
modern physics (Heisenberg's uncertainty principle) led
Lacan to the following pedagogical principle:
Until further notice, we can say that the 
elements do not answer in the place where they 
are interrogated. Or more exactly, as soon as 
they are interrogated somewhere, it is 
impossible to grasp them in their totality 
(cited in Felman, p. 29).
As most dramatically evidenced by those students who
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return later to marvel at what they learned in a class and 
how little they realized it at the time, it is always 
after the fact— always deferred.
"Hate is the integral of all contraries," says Serres 
(1982b, p. 25). Is the "center" also the integral of all
contraries? If so, love can not be the opposite of hate,
nor can the margins be the opposite of the center as both 
would then themselves be contraries. There is no 
"solution". The best we can do is attempt to read well, to 
listen, to set ourselves up for the "surprise of 
otherness" (Johnson, B., 1987, p. 15). As such, the 
"integral of all contraries" is a poor reader. It reads 
itself into all texts, denying, repressing, and
suppressing difference. Denying learning, growth,
experience— yet requiring all of those for its very 
existence and continued dominance. Thus it cannot remain 
dominant for all situations, for all events, for all time. 
It moves about and around the margins where it recuperates 
by appropriation, by gaining just enough insight to fling 
itself back to the center to rest and re-atrophy— to re- 
reify.
Love— transference love (?)— will resurface in this 
dissertation. It provides the texture of novels read in 
chapter three. It appears in the autobiographical writings
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of some of my students in chapter four. And it is the 
subjective state within which I have written.
Conclusion
I have argued that a "racialized" standpoint is a 
marginalized one in addition to a feminine/feminist 
standpoint, and that a feminine/feminist standpoint is 
more capable of displacing at least three hierarchicalized 
oppositions (center/margin, mind/body, agape'/eros) than 
is a standpoint at the center. In light of the novels 
examined in this dissertation, an obvious next question is 
how capable of displacement is a racialized standpoint 
relative to the feminist one? I have no intention of 
attempting to quantify such a comparison in any way. My 
intent is only to entertain the notion that arguments 
similar (not identical) to those for a feminist standpoint 
could be effectively employed for a racialized standpoint.
Expressions of and beliefs about love, indeed, 
emotion in general, are culturally specific (for example, 
see Catherine Lutz's Unnatural Emotions. 1988). As such, 
when I call upon Western Christian concepts as well as 
Western psychoanalytic concepts of love, limitations must 
be acknowledged. African-American and African-Caribbean 
people have, however (as mentioned before), "inherited" 
much that has been called "Western." Still, one of the
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more emphatic points of my writing here is to call 
attention to, and to explore the ways in which, encounters 
between cultures are what constitutes the very notion of 
culture, and results of these encounters are manifested in 
regionally particularistic forms. To the extent that this 
is so, then, it seems reasonable to look at notions of 
love through "Western" lenses as long as the lenses are 
acknowledged and their limitations brought to the surface. 
It is through readings of literary works that I hope to 
encounter some of the translations and transformations of 
these Western notions.
In comparing novels by authors of different racial 
and gendered positions, a point of interest will be to 
what extent does the "non-synchronous" nature of these 
subjectivities affect their approaches to love and 
marginality. By non-synchrony I am referring to a concept 
of dynamic and contradictory relations of race, class, and 
gender as theorized by Cameron McCarthy (1988a) whereby, 
for instance, one's racial interests will under some 
circumstances come into direct conflict with one's 
gendered interests. Non-synchrony refers to complex 
dealings with differences between. Differences within 
require an appeal to feminist psychoanalytic, 
poststructural, and "schizoanalytic" theories. It should 
be noted that explorations, of "difference within" are
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often relegated to the status of luxury when held next to 
the necessity of dealing with difference between created 
by historically specific exclusions and oppressions. 
However, I argue that readings of differences within and 
their interactions with differences between are crucial to 
development of multicultural theories that do not 
disarticulate radical minority and feminist concerns.
Difference is approached in different ways for 
different historical periods. For the characters of 
Morrison's Beloved, for example, the difference between is 
the difference that most occupies the energies— the 
difference between being social categories of difference 
that determine historical exclusion and oppression of 
marginal groups. Still, for these characters to have lives 
that include love, pleasure, etc. other levels/layers of 
difference had to come into play. Barbara Johnson's 
"difference within" is useful but limited for 
understanding the particular issues at play here.
According to this theory differences between are often 
illusions created by repression and projection of 
differences within. Both difference between and difference 
within connote a negativity to differences in the context 
of my usage of it for the immediately preceding writing—  
that is, either I have an identity foisted upon me from 
without and I am excluded or I am repressing parts of
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myself and thus excluding some ones or some things from my 
consideration. These connotations belie the positive 
potential of difference and of marginality. Already I have 
mentioned the currere of marginality which begins to 
reveal causes for celebration in difference (without 
ignoring historically oppressive consequences).
I would like to offer the suggestion that there is 
another way of thinking about difference that is neither 
purely within nor between and is not based on repression 
or exclusion in any life-denying senses of those terms, 
and that is conducive to action in the ethico-aesthetic 
realms. Invisible Man's invisibility-becoming glimpses at 
this, I think. The dual or perhaps paradoxical sense of 
marginality whereby it serves as both a force that 
excludes and includes— excludes one from power and yet 
includes one by promoting forms of knowledge that can be 
translated into forms of power— seems to parallel 
Ellison's usages of "leaping outside history." Leaping out 
in search of a kind of psychic relief from the pressures 
of invisibility and marginality can be viewed as an act of 
hopelessness, of abandoning social and political action 
and retreating into self— an ultimately conservative move 
much like those of the hysteric and the sorceress as 
described by Catherine Clement and Helene Cixous (1988).
On the other hand it can be viewed as leaping outside
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recorded or official history and self-consciously into the 
more compelling, unwritten history. In this sense it might 
be thought of as taking "the ultimate" political action of 
rejecting systems that forbid joy; a way of converting the 
hysterical laughter into the "god-laugh," ("the god-laugh 
always seems frivolous" (Robbins, 1987, p. 232]), and 
searching out and acting out the marginality within.
It seems to me that Ellison is attempting to find a 
way of taking this leap outside history while continuing 
to maintain a level of "realism" in which social/political 
action is more outwardly and materially manifested. That 
sense of difference, I think, can be theorized through 
love and learning and through notions such as Taubman's 
three registers of identity formation where individuals 
are viewed as connected, not harnessed. That sense of 
difference and identity through cross-cultural imagination 
and translations of tradition are explored through 
readings of (and translations across) literary works by 
Ralph Ellison, Toni Morrison, William Faulkner, Zora Neale 
Hurston, Mark Twain, and Jamaica Kincaid in chapter three.
CHAPTER THREE
Literature, Cultural Studies and the Multicultural
Curriculum
The pages of this chapter are devoted to exploring 
the ways in which the novels' margins are situated— in 
relation to social centers, individual centers and centers 
of the novels themselves— and ways in which they translate 
between and among one another and/or between and among 
tradition(s) (e.g., canonical works). A central question 
in these endeavors is: How are margins and centers 
represented? In exploring the margins (and centers), 
essentializing movements and gestures are uncovered as 
well as the ways in which these movements and gestures 
negotiate with registers of identity formation.
Love and learning— the pedagogical imperative within 
each novel— are also organizing themes for my approach to 
reading. Indeed, as I have implied before, reading is not 
possible outside these themes. Where appropriate, the 
pedagogical relations between the texts are also 
highlighted. The search for voice (key to the search for 
identity) impels much of the "literature of the margins" 
to proceed through a pedagogical imperative. In Twain and 
Faulkner, for example, voice is not found for key 
characters to the same extent that it is in the novels by 
Hurston, Morrison, Ellison and Kincaid. The journey for
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Huck and Jim is one of love and learning (learning to 
love), but Huck's search for voice is repeatedly 
frustrated, and Jim's is practically unpursued or 
unexamined. The same frustration is found in Absalom. 
Absalom! Major characters remain obsessed up to their 
deaths. In both novels the limits of voice seem somewhat 
pre-figured.
Learning to "read the world" is inseparable from 
learning to read one's "self." Richard Wright defines 
literacy as "at best, no more than vicarious cultural 
transfusions" (cited in Cooke, 1984, p. 83). Michael Cooke 
adds, "a voice means, in addition, independent strength 
and form and clarity" (p. 83). A combination of these two 
ideas might produce an equation to Wilson Harris's 
"literacy of the imagination" (also known as "cross- 
cultural imagination") (1989). Such a literacy insists on 
a cautionary note with regard to Cooke's use of the term 
independent. Perhaps Althusser's notion of relative 
autonomy translates well to this purpose. Althusser is 
referring to a model of social formation whereby the level 
of ideology is relatively autonomous from social 
structures in constructing the individual subject (Hall, 
Hobson, Lowe and Willis, 1980, p. 184). Guattari uses the 
term "relatively mutually autonomous" to refer to "vectors 
of subjectification" (1990, p. l). "Inferiority would
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appear as a quality produced at the meeting-point of 
multiple components which are relatively mutually 
autonomous— in certain cases, openly discordant" (p. 1).
In other words, certain of these "vectors of 
subjectification" pass through a "terminal" (the position 
of the individual) whereby they are taken up, or not, to 
produce interiority at a particular time. If voice is the 
articulation of the individual subject, then it seems that 
relative autonomy substitutes well for Cooke's 
independent. Voice issues forth from particular subjects 
not as independent expression, but as, at least in part, 
particular translations of traditions that are 
encountered.
In this same spirit it should be noted that many of 
the readings covered in this chapter are borrowed from 
other literary critics/theorists. My primary purpose in 
this chapter, as stated earlier, is to demonstrate the 
theoretical problematics laid out in chapter two. I found 
that done, on occasion, in certain others' readings of the 
novels selected. Some of the readings, of course, are "my 
own," or at least less derivative ones. Still other 
readings are more explicitly a braiding (a metissage) of 
my own ideas with ideas of other readers.
Morrison's and Ellison's novels are dealt with at 
greatest length as they are the two novels out of those
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selected in which I was able to discover the most 
intertextuality or encounters with other texts and 
traditions. Readings of the other texts spin off of these 
two centrifugally, but without "letting go." I write of my 
readings within the tradition of literary criticism that 
assumes of its readers a certain familiarity with the 
texts under consideration.
Intertextual Literary Readings
Love as an explicit thought comes late in Ralph
Ellison's Invisible Man though its expression is implicit
throughout. It seems that invisible man approaches and
touches the power of his own displaced (interactive)
marginality repeatedly but he always heads back for his
(non-displaced) center. While at first read the
"feminine"/feminist standpoint seems notably absent from
the text, closer readings reveal female characters as more
significant and mutually marginalized players. They seem
to lead him into consciousness of his marginalization and
victimization (invisibility). They are, according to
Claudia Tate,
like the underground station masters of the 
American slave era [assisting him] along his 
course to freedom. . . . They embody the 
knowledge he needs to state his escape (Tate,
1987, p. 164-5).
In Tate's essay "Notes on the Invisible Women in
Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man." she theorizes that the
women in this novel are crucial to each major turning
point in invisible man's growing self and social
awareness. The nude "magnificent blonde" at the battle
royal "provides . . . his first lesson in invisibility"
(p. 167) as he recognizes their mutual objectification/
exploitation and her "Kewpie Doll mask" response to it (p.
167). The second major breakthrough occurs, according to
Tate, after Mary Rambo emotionally and physically nurtures
him back to a state of greater self esteem such that he
can "depart from the world of 'Keep This Nigger-Boy
Running'" at least for a while (p. 168). His third and
fourth lessons come from the women of the Brotherhood. He
is able to overcome the anxiety of confronting the taboo
around sexual encounters between black men and white women
with Emma and the anonymous rich white woman as well as to
identify somewhat with their common exploitation. Finally,
with Sybil he comes not only to recognize invisibility but
also to appreciate the potential power in it.
But before he can clearly' see his relationship
with the magnificent blonde, Emma, and the 
anonymous seductress and acknowledge their 
respective marginality, alienation, and 
ultimately their respective invisibility, he 
must dance his third and final dance, in which 
his partner is Sybil. . . . Sybil, like Mary, is 
another surrogate mother who comes to deliver 
the young protagonist from the deception of his 
false identity with the Brotherhood. She is also
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another symbolic blonde, who ushers him to the 
threshold of the final battle royal. In 
addition, she is his last teacher, who propels 
him along the course to freedom by making him 
aware that invisibility is not necessarily a 
liability but possibly a valuable asset (pp.
169-70).
And it is this recognition of mutual marginalization that
finally brings invisible man to an appreciation for the
necessity of love to life and to action— love, but not to
the exclusion of justifiable and motivating anger; love,
but not self-obliterating or self-submerging love.
So why do I write, torturing myself to put it 
down? Because in spite of myself I've learned 
some things. Without the possibility of action, 
all knowledge comes to one labeled "file and 
forget," and I can neither file nor forget. Nor 
will certain ideas forget me; they keep filing 
away at my lethargy, my complacency. . . .  I 
denounce because though implicated and partially 
responsible, I have been hurt to the point of 
abysmal pain, hurt to the point of invisibility.
And I defend because in spite of all I find that 
I love. In order to get some of it down I have 
to love (Ellison, 1952, pp. 566-7).
When Ellison writes of love at this time I do not
feel that he means it in terms only of agape' or
"brotherly love." Indeed, it was his encounter with Sybil
which was simultaneously sexually, emotionally and
intellectually moving for him that seemed to trigger
thoughts of love and the connections between love and
social action. Further, he displaces the "masculine"
hierarchy of thinking/feeling in the following passage:
There is, by the way, an area in which a man's 
feelings are more rational than his mind, and it
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is precisely in that area that his will is 
pulled in several directions at the same time 
(p. 560).
Listening is love. Or at least that might be what 
Kristeva is saying when she calls transference love 
"optimum"— optimum because it "avoids the chaotic 
hyperconnectedness of fusion love as well as the death- 
dealing stabilization of love's absence" (1987, p. 15). 
Sybil listened. It was an agapic listening without 
judgement, an erosic listening with her body, and there 
was exchange of those between them. Invisible man seemed 
to be shocked into awareness that this mass of human 
beings outside consisted of individuals who love and 
listen and are loved and listened to.
Listening, like engagement with a text, effects a 
dissolution of the boundaries of self, as does love. 
Simultaneously frightening and exhilarating it allows the 
"outside" "inside", opening up channels of possibility, 
sharing languages, inspiring action. Love conceived in 
this way could become part of what Guattari calls a 
"mental ecology"— i.e. one that can "face up to the logic 
of the ambivalence of desire [eros?], . . . re-evaluate 
the ultimate goal of work and human activities in terms of 
criteria other than those of profit and productivity 
[relationality], acknowledge the need to mobilize 
individuals and social segments in ways that are always
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diverse and different [difference]" (1990, p. 9). It is
schizophrenic— "his will is pulled in several directions
at the same time" (Ellison, 1952, p.560)— leaping into
difference and otherness. But this schizophrenia can
become a "positive schizophrenic line of escape" (Deleuze
and Guattari, 1983, p. 363), or it can become
"neuroticized" (p. 363) as narcissistic "fusion love"
(pure eros) and from other manifestations of codes
relinquished to institutions (Kristeva, 1987). I should
add that in Kristeva's terms, as for Lacan, narcissism is
not used pejoratively, but as an inescapable condition of
human love and life.
What stands between the subject and his desire 
for death is narcissism. The relationship 
between narcissism and aggressiveness makes for 
the fact that narcissism, the ecstatic 
affirmation of one's being alive, is always 
enacted at someone's expense. The affirmation of 
one's life entails the exploitation of someone 
else's life (Schneiderman, 1980, p. 6).
Just as for Serres, where the risk in communication or
pursuit of knowledge is the risk of violence, the pursuit
of love, teaching, the work that strives to eliminate
violence, is interminable, impossible, and essential.
"Fusion love" is excessive in its narcissism— "its
Highness the Ego projects and glorifies itself, or else
shatters into pieces and is engulfed" (Schneiderman, 1980,
p. 6). This is eros, untempered by agape'. Fusion is what,
in Toni Morrison's Beloved, Sethe's love for Beloved (the
122
ghost) became for a time (more on this later) , but I do 
not believe it started that way with Beloved (the child) . 
Love can be murderous as a result of fusion, but love—  
especially perhaps mother-love— complicated by the ravages 
of the almost total social marginalization of slavery can 
be cataclysmic. Killing the child to save her (and the 
others) from slavery might have been, as Morrison said, 
"the right thing to do [but] she had no right to do it" 
(Otten, 1989, p. 83).
Paul D is suspicious and frightened of loving too 
big or too much. Sethe's love seems often all-consuming 
and without boundaries. Paul D first becomes aware of and 
is alarmed by Sethe's seemingly boundless mother-love when 
she attempts to apologize for Denver's (Sethe's daughter 
named after the poor white girl, Amy Denver, who helped 
Sethe) rudeness to Paul D, and then to disallow him to 
confront Denver directly about it. He feels that it is 
"very risky. For a used-to-be-slave woman to love anything 
that much" given the fate of so many relationships under 
slavery. One must "love . . . everything, just a little 
bit [so that] maybe you'd have a little love left over for 
the next one" (Morrison, 1987, p. 45). Later, upon 
discovering that Sethe had murdered her baby girl, Paul D 
is horrified and uncomprehending of the source, meaning, 
and implications of such love.
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This here Sethe talked about love like any other 
woman, . . . but what she meant could cleave 
the bone. This here Sethe talked about safety 
with a handsaw. This here new Sethe didn't know 
where the world stopped and she began. . . .
More important than what Sethe had done was what 
she claimed. It scared him.
••Your love is too thick". . . "You got two 
feet, Sethe, not four," he said, and right then 
a forest sprang up between them; trackless and 
quiet (pp. 164-5).
The murderous spectacle put on for the white 
inquisitors (the masters from whom Sethe ran away) was 
indeed sufficient to save herself and other children from 
returning to slavery. (Spectacular expressions such as the 
woman who responded to her first bidder at the slave 
auction by chopping off her own hand with a hatchet were 
not so uncommon to slave women (Fox-Genovese, 1988, p. 
329).) Finally, she is heard. But the incident was 
permanently inscribed in the memory of herself, her sons 
and the community as a horrifying reminder of the 
tenuousness of their integrity as a community, as loving 
individuals, as families. She buried the memory with the 
child, purchasing a headstone with yet another indignity—  
selling her body to another white exploiter.
With the unexpected arrival of Paul D the task for 
Sethe and he and Denver becomes that of dealing somehow 
with this repressed past that interferes with their 
abilities to feel for themselves and one another. Paul D 
had always "dealt" with his own past by moving around,
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effectively denying it. But now he wanted to stop and 
settle with the person who had known him longer than 
anyone else.
The ghost (proper) of Beloved, who had earlier been 
maintaining Sethe and Denver without serious challenges, 
had now been run off by Paul D. Sethe, Denver, or both had 
to bring her back in a form that could not be denied by 
Paul D. Beloved's (re)appearance at a crucial point in the 
development of the (love) relationship between Sethe and 
Paul D has the effect of stopping the painful process of 
love/analysis (pedagogy). Paul D and Sethe had been 
serving as one another's "analysts" teachers, but a new 
analyst had to enter the picture for the cure to be 
effected.
The analysis proceeds pathologically. Paul D 
participates in exhuming this past by impregnating the 
ghost, the analyst, Sethe's past. This act of his could be 
seen as a response to fear of love— fear, indeed, of the 
object of Sethe's love, knowing what her love can lead to. 
On the other hand he provided her past, her ghost with 
possibilities (pregnant with possibilities), but in doing 
so it almost consumed Sethe. With Beloved as analyst, 
Sethe's transference love quickly escalates out of 
control. As the boundaries between Sethe and the one she 
loves obsessively (Beloved) are further diminished by this
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love of hers, her "self" declines mentally and physically 
to a dangerously marginal place. Boundaries dissolve to 
the point that Sethe's love must be a kind of self- 
love/self-hate, excessively narcissistic.
But what is Denver's stake in all this? She is 
fascinated with the ghost (Sethe made?). Why? Sethe, the 
one Denver loves, is afraid of her own love, 
understandably, and that fear/love takes the form of the 
ghost. Denver is fascinated with the "abject"— the object 
of her mother's fear and love. Kristeva writes that the 
abject is at the margins of life/death, "the edge of non­
existence," and is signified by waste, corpses (ghosts?) 
(Kristeva, 1982, pp. 1-11).
Meanwhile Paul D is plowing through an emotional 
crisis of his own. It is when their respective crises of 
love reach a climax (the analysis is complete when the 
pregnancy "ends") that both Paul D and Sethe together find 
a place for love that could be characterized as 
displacement of the agape'/eros or of the (self- 
obliterating love)/(fear and distance) hierarchy. Much of 
this work is done via Stamp Paid and Denver through the 
legacy of love left behind by Baby Suggs who had arrived 
upon a "deconstruction" of those dualisms long ago. Suggs 
preached love of body, love of self and, in the "same 
breath," Christian love (Morrison, 1987, pp. 88-9).
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While in Beloved's conclusion the possibility for 
love not based on opposition seems imminent, the fate of 
invisible man is less clear. He has become aware of his 
invisibility/marginality and what that can do for him. But 
his notion of love is still quite vague and undeveloped 
and he has yet to sustain an intimate relationship in the 
context of this new self awareness.
Recognition of marginality and allusions to its 
paradoxical nature and its "usefulness" are sprinkled 
throughout the experience of invisible man as represented 
by Ellison. Invisibility can be used synonymously with 
marginality at the social level in the sense that it means 
invisible to "others." At the individual level 
invisibility is synonymous with marginality in the sense 
of its being self awareness that is most difficult to come 
by— it is hidden from the self. Invisible man begins his 
journey blind to his own invisibility but by the end of 
this text he insists that he is "invisible, not blind" 
(Ellison, 1952, p. 563).
In the beginning he is unable to draw on the power 
that his marginality can provide. He is baffled and 
plagued by his Grandfather's dying words about what it 
means to "yes them to death," and he participates in his 
own exploitation and display in order to attend a school 
where he is "named . . . and set running with one and the
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same stroke of the pen" (p. 555). This pattern continues
far beyond the point at which he has caught the first
glimpses of his invisibility on into his work for the
Brotherhood where he thought he could lead an
"historically meaningful life." It seems significant that
the most explicit and clearly articulated verbal lessons
he was given about invisibility were from a "fat man"
(also black) who was committed to an insane asylum and was
formerly a physician— one who seems to embody "order out
of chaos" (or vice-versa). Speaking of invisible man:
Already he's learned to repress not only his 
emotions but his humanity. He's invisible, a 
walking personification of the Negative, the 
most perfect achievement of your dreams sir! The 
mechanical man! (p. 92).
And then later, on the train to New York:
You're hidden right out in the open— that is, 
you would be if you only realized it. They 
wouldn't see you because they don't expect you 
to know anything, since they believe they've 
taken care of that . . . (p. 152).
To merely hear it verbalized was not enough because 
it did not yet name his experience sufficiently. Invisible 
man had to experience more. If naming experience is the 
first step to forming a sense of autonomy, as Paulo Freire 
claims, then "claiming ownership of that freed self" 
(Morrison, 1987, p. 95) is one step beyond that. Upon 
finally realizing the true agenda of the Brotherhood, 
invisible man is flooded with the realizations that,
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They had set themselves up to describe the 
world. . . .  It was as though I'd learned 
suddenly to look around corners; images of past 
humiliations flickered through my head and I saw 
that they were more than separate experiences.
They were me; they defined me. I was my 
experiences and my experiences were me, and no 
blind men, no matter how powerful they became, .
. . could take that. . . . Here I had thought 
they accepted me because they felt that color 
made no difference, when in reality it made no 
difference because they didn't see either color 
or men . . .  I now recognized my invisibility 
(Ellison, 1952, pp. 496-7).
This is the point at which Sybil becomes instrumental
in invisible man's "loss of illusions." Allusions
throughout the book to loss of eyes, a glass eye,
blindness, and castration begin to coalesce into a network
of symbolism. Houston Baker claims that black male
sexuality is a key theme of the novel and that it is
rarely dealt with by literary critics (p. 329). Trueblood
as object of fascination for whites, merges with Norton's
phrase "casting out the offending eye," the imagery of
blindness and illusion, the threat of castration at the
factory hospital, and finally invisible man's dream of
having been castrated by Jack— his testicles at times
described more like eyes. Confronting the repression of
black male sexuality with regard to white women becomes a
crucial interconnected symbolic expression of freedom,
marginality, and love. White woman represents,
the means by which black people in general were 
penalized for exercising the freedom of choice, 
in that the penalty was traslated into the
129
accusation of rape and the sentence was death.
The symbolic linkage between the white woman and 
freedom, therefore, finds its origin in hundreds 
of years of southern race relations (Tate, 1987, 
p. 166).
Returning to his grandfather's dying advice,
invisible man asks the question again, what did he mean by
saying "yes"? As he explores the possibilities, more
capable of imagination now, he stumbles upon an "currere
of marginality":
Was it that we of all, we, most of all, had to 
affirm the principle [upon which the country was 
built], the plan in whose name we had been 
brutalized and sacrificed— not because we would 
always be weak nor because we were afraid or
opportunistic, but because we were older than
they, in the sense of what it took to live in
the world with others and because they had 
exhausted in us, some— not much, but some— of 
the human greed and smallness, yes, and the fear 
and superstition that had kept them running.
(Oh, yes, they're running too, running all over 
themselves.) (Ellison, 1952, p. 561)
And he further captures the notion of the paradox of
marginality both in a Freirian sense and in the more
subtle sense of Spivak's deconstructivist thought:
Weren't we part of them as well as apart from 
them and subject to die when they died? . . .
It's "winner take nothing" that is the great 
truth of our country or of any country. Life is 
to be lived, not controlled; and humanity is won 
by continuing to play in face of certain defeat.
Our fate is to become one, and yet many— This is 
not prophecy, but description (1988, pp. 562,
564) .
Like Ellison, Morrison uncovers a paradoxical currere 
of marginality in Beloved. The carnival, which allowed for
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a "Colored Thursday," was a chance unbeknownst to the
white carnival-folk for black people to "see the spectacle
of whitefolks making a spectacle of themselves" (1987, p.
48). Another example of black "Signifyin(g)" on whites is
Paul D's "chain-gang":
With a sledge hammer in his hands and Hi Man's 
lead, the men got through. They sang it out and 
beat it up, garbling the words so they could not 
be understood; tricking the words so their 
syllables yielded up other meanings. . . . They 
killed a boss so often and so completely they 
had to bring him back to life to pulp him one 
more time (pp. 108,109).
The power of marginality in the external world is dampened
in Beloved compared to Invisible Man. due to the
difference in the larger social situation of the time
settings. Nor is it a given— it is problematic and
paradoxical. The "meanness" of the black community toward
Sethe resonates with invisible man's recognition that only
"some— not much, but some— of the human greed and
smallness, . . . and the fear and superstition" had been
exhausted in blacks relative to whites (Ellison, 1952,
p.561).
Boundaries between social categories that are 
represented as natural ones are exposed as fraudulent in 
Beloved as they are in Invisible Man ("a part as well as 
apart"). This displacement also arises in the blurring of 
self/other for black/white, but Morrison approaches it 
from a different perspective than that of Ellison— namely,
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she sees black in white whereas Ellison sees white in 
black.
Whitepeople believed that whatever the manners, 
under every dark skin was a jungle. Swift 
unnavigable waters, swinging screaming baboons, 
sleeping snakes, red gums ready for their sweet 
white blood. In a way, he thought, they were 
right. The more coloredpeople spent their 
strength trying to convince them how gentle they 
were, how clever and loving, how human, the more 
they used themselves up to persuade whites of 
something Negroes believed could not be 
questioned, the deeper and more tangled the 
jungle grew inside. But it wasn't the jungle 
blacks brought with them to this place from the 
other (livable) place. It was the jungle 
whitefolks planted in them. . . .  It spread. . .
. it spread, until it invaded the whites who had 
made it. . . . The screaming baboon lived under 
their own white skin; the red gums were their 
own (Morrison, 1987, pp. 198-9).
Ultimately, for Sethe it is the love she negotiates 
with Paul D that allows her the awareness that she is 
indeed her own "best thing." Like invisible man this 
negotiated, "deconstructed" love provides the turning- 
around place for a more autonomous, yet connected, life. 
The difference between the two novels with regard to love 
that is most pronounced is the different directions from 
which the deconstruction was approached. For Morrison, 
Sethe had come from an almost complete reversal of the 
agape'/eros hierarchy in her mother-love for first Denver, 
then Beloved (as ghost). For Ellison, invisible man seemed 
to begin with very little self definition for the concept 
of love. But in those situations, dominant oppositions
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tend to win by default. These different starting places 
affected approaches to other oppositions as well. Blurred 
boundaries in Beloved became more distinct, clear 
distinctions became more fluid in Invisible Man— more 
fluid in spite of his wary tendency to keep things 
divided.
Love and the pedagogical imperative that lives in 
these novels are not bounded by the confines of 
expressions among characters only within their respective 
texts. That is, Sethe "speaks" beyond the pages of Beloved 
and invisible man beyond the pages of Invisible Man. For 
example, both have been read as, in part, re-readings and 
re-writings of Mark Twain's Adventures of Huckleberry Finn 
(Moreland, 1991, & Nadel, 1988). In Beloved. Sethe, a 
pregnant woman who had just suffered a severe beating by 
her master, runs away from slavery by crossing the Ohio 
River from Kentucky into Ohio. But before she makes it 
across, exhausted, hungry and about to deliver, she 
collapses where she might have died had not a young poor 
white runaway girl, Amy Denver, happened upon her, taken 
care of her and helped to deliver the child. As Richard 
Moreland notes, there are parallels with the relationship 
between Sethe and Amy and the one between Huck and Jim, a 
difference being it is Sethe's journey (Jim's 
counterpart), not Amy's (Huck's counterpart), that is of
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primary concern in Morrison's story. Furthermore, Sethe 
and others, find a voice in Morrison's story. Neither Huck 
nor Jim are ever able to fully articulate their positions 
in Twain's story.
Ellison's Invisible Man. on the other hand, 
represents an effort to continue the search for a voice 
not only for Jim, who might seem the logical counterpart 
to invisible man as both are black, but also for Huck.
Alan Nadel sees invisible man as vascillating between Jim 
and Huck.
The point is that at various stages throughout 
the book, the invisible man plays Huck and at 
others Jim, as often subconsciously as 
consciously.
The problem for Ellison at the time he was 
writing Invisible Man was that we didn't have a 
literature which permitted those roles for 
blacks (1988, p. 143).
"For Ellison," according to Nadel, "Twain was the last 
great American author to see the full implications of the 
connection between the black and the fundamentals of 
democracy" (p. 127). In this spirit, in 1947 Ellison re­
reads and re-writes Twain's story of Huck and Jim amidst a 
sea of unfavorable criticism for Twain's book, 
particularly its last section.
This sort of retelling can be thought of as an 
example of what Henry Louis Gates calls "Signifyin'"— a 
tradition in Black English vernacular. Zora Neale Hurston 
was possibly the first to theorize about black
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"Signifying" through her studies as an anthropologist on 
African-American and African-Caribbean culture, 
particularly through folk story-telling. It is a major 
tropological strategy employed in her novel Their Eves 
Were Watching God. Henry Louis Gates has made this trope a 
focus of much of his recent work. He calls it the trope of 
the "Signifyin(g) Monkey." The "g" in Signifyin(g) is a 
"Signifyin(g) upon" Derrida's "mispelling" of the French 
difference to differance, which Gates does, as does 
Derrida, in order to retain an instability for meaning of 
the term. Signifyin(g) is a repetition and a reversal 
(chiasmus) of a sentence, phrase, or idea, and has been a 
part of African-American vernacular tradition since 
antebellum America— even referred to in common 
conversation as "signifyin upon" (1987).
In order to more clearly explicate this concept I'll 
pull out some examples provided by Gates. Jazz music often 
proceeds through "signifying riffs." For example, when 
John Coltrane performs My Favorite Things he is 
Signifyin(g) upon Julie Andrews "vapid original." It is 
"repetition of a form and inversion of the same . . . 
Resemblance . . . evoked cleverly by dissemblance" (1987, 
p.243). And as an example in language Gates provides the 
following anecdote in ah endnote from Figures In Black;
While writing this essay, I asked a colleague,
Dwight Andrews, if he had heard of the
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Signifying Monkey as a child. "Why, no" he 
replied intently. "I never heard of the 
Signifying Monkey until I came to Yale and read 
about him in a book." I had been signified upon.
If I had responded to Andrews, "I know what you 
mean; your Mama read to me from that same book 
the last time I was in Detroit," I would have 
signified upon him in return (1987, p. 293) .
Signifyin(g) "constitutes an implicit parody of a
subject's own complicity in illusion" (p. 240). It has no
equal in "standard English" usage. It is at a level of
sophistication in common usage unique, in north America
and the Caribbean, to "Black English." A key aspect of
Signifyin(g) is its "indirect intent":
The apparent significance of the message differs 
from its real significance. The apparent meaning 
of the sentence signifies its actual meaning 
(Mitchell-Kernan, 1973, p.325).
Signifyin(g) can take the form of irony, parody, or 
pastiche, and thus as a language form is not the exclusive 
province of black people; but black people named the term, 
invented the unique rituals associated with it, and self­
consciously use both the strategy and the term itself in 
everyday conversation (Gates, 1988, p. 90). Parody is the 
form taken by what Gates calls "motivated Signifyin(g)" 
and involves negative critique or polemic. Pastiche 
corresponds to "unmotivated Signifyin(g)" which is not to 
imply a lack of intention but more a lack of negative 
critique. As examples of each Gates calls upon Ishmael 
Reed's Mumbo Jumbo for "motivated Signifyin(g)" on Richard
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Wright's Native Son and Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man. and
Alice Walker's The Color Purple as "unmotivated
Signifyin(g)" on Zora Neale Hurston's Their Eves Were
Watching God. Gates explains the difference as follows:
Whereas Reed seems to be about the clearing of a 
space of narration, Walker seems to be intent on 
underscoring the relation of her text to 
Hurston's, in a joyous proclamation of 
antecedent and descendant texts. . . . This form 
of the double-voiced implies unity and 
resemblance rather than critique and difference 
(1988, p. xxvii).
In Invisible Man Ellison not only re-tells Twain's 
story, he also, according to Alan Nadel, alludes to 
literary criticism of Adventures of Huckleberry Finn that 
was written by Leslie Fiedler (Nadel, 1988) where he 
signifies on Fiedler in the sense parody— albeit a loving 
parody. Briefly, what Fiedler had suggested was that the 
relationship between Huck and Jim was a homoerotic one 
which, according to Fiedler is the only possible response 
to feelings of love between black and white men in 
America.
So buried at a level of acceptance which does 
not touch reason, so desperately repressed from 
overt recognition, so contrary to what is 
usually thought of as our ultimate level of 
taboo— the sense of that love can survive only 
in the obliquity of a symbol, persistent, 
obsessive, in short, an archetype (Fiedler,
1977, p. 416).
In Invisible Man young Emerson (another allusion) is
the homosexual son of a man to whom invisible man was sent
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to find a job. Invisible man enters this place of business 
with an unopened letter of "recommendation" in hand that 
turns out to be a slanderous letter of non-recommendation. 
Finally, it is young Emerson who reveals to invisible man 
what has happened. But he does so under the condition that 
invisible man not tell Emerson's father what he has done, 
leaving invisible man helpless to defend himself. In 
telling invisible man his own story, Emerson refers to 
himself as "Huckleberry" and invites him to a gay black 
and white nightclub.
The purpose behind Ellison's subtext response to 
Fiedler in Invisible Man. Nadel suggests, is to 
demonstrate the consequences of Fiedler's reading of Twain 
and implicitly of American society. If Fiedler is correct, 
then "Huckish" attempts to help black people out of 
untenable situations that result from racism are 
meaningless— only Huck's guilty conscience is real, and 
his act of freeing Jim amounts to nothing. As Nadel 
explains,
Huck does not feel guilt about Jim's enslavement 
nearly so much as he does about his desire to 
end that enslavement, and Huck's act of personal 
responsibility is defined by what he does in 
spite of his guilt, not because of it. . .
Fiedler, on the other hand, does not see in 
Huck's story that his action defies his guilt so 
much as that his guilt substitutes for action 
(1988, p. 129).
138
I have called Ellison's parody loving though
"motivated" because it retains a sense of the plausibility
of Fiedler's conclusions for particular people, places and
times. In fact, Ellison wrote directly to Fiedler's
criticism ten years later in which he explains how Twain's
depiction of Jim understandably produces misreadings by
black critics.
Twain fitted Jim into the outlines of the 
minstrel tradition, and it is from behind this 
stereotype mask that we see Jim's dignity and 
human capacity— and Twain's complexity— emerge 
(cited in Nadel, 1988, p. 130).
And by depicting Huck "with his street-sparrow
sophistication," (cited in Nadel, p. 130) Ellison adds,
Huck seems more adult than Jim. Because of this affront,
it is understandable that a black reader would be upset.
Of Fiedler's reading Ellison says,
I believe him so profoundly disturbed by the 
manner in which the deep dichotomies symbolized 
by blackness and whiteness are resolved that, 
forgetting to look at the specific form of the 
novel, he leaped squarely into the middle of 
that tangle of symbolism which he is dedicated 
to unsnarling, and yelled out his most 
terrifying name for chaos (cited in Nadel, p.
131).
Through much of the text of Invisible Man Twain's 
text is commented upon directly in what more closely 
resembles "unmotivated Signifyin(g)". Nadel refers to this 
re-reading and re-writing as allusion and "translating 
tradition" rather than "Signifyin(g)", but I want to
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insist on the similarity between the two. Just as with 
parody and pastiche, allusion is not the sole province of 
black literary practice. However, the idea of Signifyin' 
which goes by that name is explicitly named and practiced 
within African-American vernacular tradition, whereas 
parody, pastiche, irony and allusion are literary modes or 
tropes common to perhaps all literary traditions. Allusion 
as Nadel discusses it in his theoretical text is not 
directed only at a black literary tradition but is 
intended for more general application.
Signifyin' has been useful for thinking about black 
literary theory in that it can signal very specific modes 
of parody or pastiche such as those that focus on black 
vernacular language usage and Black English usage in 
particular. Such culturally specific theoretical 
categories are important to reveal and to apply to 
culturally specific literature such as African, African- 
American, or African-Caribbean, Gates and others insist 
and I agree, in order to avoid what Anthony Appiah calls 
"the Naipaul fallacy" (cited in Gates, 1986, p. 405). This 
fallacy refers to attempts to establish the worthiness of, 
say, African literature by holding it up to European 
literature in order to show that they are the same. It can 
likewise involve attempts to "understand Africa by 
embedding it in European culture," for example (p. 405).
Nadel traces the Signifyin(g) or alluding parallels 
between Ellison's and Twain's texts intricately. A 
detailed reproduction of his reading does not serve my 
purposes at this point. Following, however, are highlights 
of his reading: Nadel compares the paint factory incident 
where invisible man is tricked into having a serious 
accident (at the factory where young Emerson sent him to 
work) with the destruction of the raft in Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn by the riverboat; members of the 
Brotherhood are referred to by Nadel as "latter-day Tom 
Sawyers" in their betrayals of invisible man; invisible 
man is, at times, compared to Jim as being one who is also 
invisible, and at times, to Huck in his journeying to find 
a place where he wouldn't have to be ashamed.
The last third of Twain's book has been the most 
controversial. It has been variously regarded as bad 
writing, a mistake, or misplaced. Ernest Hemingway wrote, 
"If you read it you must stop where the Nigger Jim is 
stolen from the boys. That is the real end. The rest is 
just cheating" (cited in Nadel, 1988, p. 22). Contrary to 
this opinion Ellison writes, "Huck Finn's acceptance of 
the evil implicit in his 'emancipation' of Jim represents 
Twain's acceptance of his personal responsibility in the 
condition of society. This was the tragic face behind his 
comic mask" (Ellison, 1953, p. 50).
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Ellison re-writes this part of Twain's text through
invisible man's encounters with the Brotherhood, a group
of mostly male, mostly white orthodox Marxist activists.
Invisible man was selected by the Brotherhood to be their
"mouthpiece" for the people of Harlem. However, when
invisible man delivers a particularly moving speech that
speaks to the hearts of Harlem residents the Brotherhood
becomes upset. They now insist on training invisible man
in the correct "scientific" way to work for them— to give
speeches. This as opposed to his
appeal to the heart, the emotions of his 
audience . . . This reversal and subsequent 
effects of his training on his humanity create a 
discomfort similar to the one created when Tom 
decides to show Huck the "proper" way to free 
Jim (Nadel, 1988, p. 137).
This alludes to Tom Sawyer's rules for his and Huck's
plan of escape for Jim. Rather than simply releasing Jim
from the prison-hut where he is chained in the easiest,
quickest most obvious manner, Tom insists,
It don't make no difference how foolish it is, 
it's the right way— and it's the regular way.
And there ain't no other way, that ever I heard 
of; and I've read all the books that gives any 
information about these things (Twain, 1985, p.
304).
The Brotherhood represents those (literary) theorists 
who "define history and exclude from it those who don't 
confirm their theories" (Nadel, 1988, p. 137). Jim's 
treatment at the hands of Tom parallels the Brotherhood's
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treatment of invisible man in many ways. Tom/the 
Brotherhood sabotage Jim/invisible man in their quests for 
freedom/black empowerment. A reversal in this repetition 
is that invisible man is Huck as much as he is Jim. It is 
Huck who is being manipulated by Tom as well as Jim.
Huck's complicity in his own manipulation also resembles 
that of invisible man's involvement with the Brotherhood. 
In doing this Ellison directs us toward the last part of 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn— the part that is Twain's 
"way of showing the seriousness of Huck's and Jim's 
dilemma, the full implications of recognizing Jim's 
humanity" (p. 138).
Ellison reveals the frustration of hopes for freedom 
and democracy in this part of Twain's novel through his 
allusions to it and Signifyin(g) upon it in Invisible Man. 
Richard Moreland suggests, "it is this frustration that I 
think Morrison brilliantly addresses in Beloved" (1991, p. 
2). As such, insofar as Morrison's text is Signifyin(g) 
upon Twain's, it too seems to fit more closely Gates 
notion of an "unmotivated Signifyin(g)".
Moreland reads Morrison's "put[ting] his [Twain's] 
story next to hers" (p. 2), in part, through the ecosophy 
of Felix Guattari, whose notions of deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization I have related to my use of 
translation earlier (in chapter two) (1990). For Guattari
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the beginning of this process is marked by "a-signifying 
ruptures" which Moreland sees as represented by the 
frustration repeatedly provoked in generations of 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn readers— frustrations born 
of the persistent resistance of his novel to providing 
satisfactory resolutions. Language and style that were 
needed to express such resolutions were not available to 
Twain until Morrison's text entered it. Moreland cites 
Guattari,
At the heart of all ecological praxes is an a- 
signifying rupture in a context in which the 
catalysts of existential change are present, but 
lack expressive support from the enunciative 
assemblage which frames them (p. 8).
And further,
In the absence of ecological praxis, those 
catalysts remain inactive and tend towards 
inconsistency; they produce anxiety, guilt, 
other forms of psychopathological repetition (p.
8).
Moreland adds, "by putting Twain's novel next to
Morrison's, anticipating Morrison's" (p. 8) one finds an
example of Guattari's hope:
But when expressive rupture takes place, 
repetition becomes a process of creative 
assemblage, forging new incorporeal objects, new 
"abstract machines" (cited in Moreland, p. 8).
Such a new assemblage means, in this context, the
extension of Twain's "realist" approach to include
"incorporeal objects" in the form of "real" ghosts, such
as the ghost of Beloved, which energizes a new pedagogical
144
situation— "a new condition of knowledge" (Felman, 1987,
p. 31). For example, Huck's elaborate lies with which he
hopes to protect Jim can now be read as "creative
assemblages" in the context of Morrison's re-reading.
"Lies" that Huck tells are in the service of a larger
social truth, the discovery of which can now be seen as a
"work in progress" (Moreland, 1991, p. 12) that requires
"new codes of love" (Kristeva cited in Moreland, p. 12).
The elaboration of both negative and positive 
freedoms in a discourse of love is a "work in 
progress" more easily traced in Twain's novel 
thanks to the similarly new and particular codes 
of love elaborated still farther and more 
explicitly in Morrison's novel between another 
runaway slave in Sethe and another young poor- 
white runaway who helps her in Amy Denver (p.
12).
Moreland reads Twain through Morrison and Morrison
through Twain demonstrating his thesis at some length— an
exercise that, once again, I need not repeat. Instead, I
will offer my own reading of a conversation among Twain,
Morrison and Ellison following this "summarizing" passage
from Moreland:
This work in progress, drawing out the 
frustrated duet in Huck's (and the canon's?) 
monologue, involves not only exploring more of 
the runaway slave's own parallel, separate 
consciousness . . . but also tracing Denver's 
task for herself and her communicating her 
mother's story for herself and her community 
(and for us?) in a different form with 
different, more bearable, more liveable 
consequences (1991, p. 25) .
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It has been said of the American South that we are
obsessed with the past, but that it is a romanticized
mythical past that we remember and as such is ahistorical.
Still our history presents itself in daily life in hidden
ways. It surfaces in the form of violence and guilt that
some theorists say is peculiar to the South. We seem torn
between what W.J. Cash called a "frontier" mentality of
radical individualism and what are sometimes suffocating
community ties (1969). If this is so, and we suffer from a
repression of collective memory as a society, perhaps the
South needs a kind of social psychoanalysis, as William
Pinar has suggested (in press), and perhaps novelists, as
I have taken some effort so far to suggest, are capable of
being an important part of that analysis.
Twain seems to be addressing the well-worn conflict
between radical individualism and community responsibility
that takes a particular form in the South. He does this,
according to Richard Gray, by "dissecting the Southern
myths and exposing their faults and weaknesses" (1986, p.
115). However, Jim's story is not told and, at the end of
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. Gray suggests that Twain
seems even to give up on his hero. As Gray states,
Huck is pushed to one side of the action, Tom 
Sawyer is permitted to play his familiar games, 
and the issue of Jim's slavery is reduced to the 
level of farce. For all Huck's occasional 
protests at Tom's behaviour, or his famous final
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cry of defiance, the comedy loses its edge, the
moral problems are minimised (p.115).
As discussed above, Ellison disagrees with this reading. 
Here is where, perhaps, Morrison picks up the story one 
hundred years after Twain, and fifty years after Ellison.
Just as Sethe, Paul D., and Denver begin to trust in 
the possibility of a new life together, the past comes 
back to haunt them in such a way that they cannot dismiss 
it. Similarly, an "innocent" reading of Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn and perhaps other Southern literature 
might lull us into complacency before fully confronting 
our repressed past. Morrison teaches us (as, Ellison 
points out, Twain alluded to but was unable to teach us 
directly) that past suffering is most scarring only so 
long as it is repressed. Confronted, that repressed past 
becomes a source of wisdom— wisdom that may otherwise be 
unattainable. (A "line of flight" from structures that 
oppress is hollow without a preliminary and ongoing inner 
search.)
Huck's painful childhood experiences take him on a 
line of flight of often solitary excitement and adventure. 
But, one might ask, where is Jim's "line of flight"? Huck 
is able to do this because he has discovered his 
"invisibility" in a social and historical moment when a 
young white boy on a raft is not particularly noticeable. 
This assurance of a kind of invisibility affords him a
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freedom of movement not available to a black runaway 
slave. Ellison is able to discover the benefits of such 
invisibility only because his character lives in mid­
twentieth century inner city New York. But, as Nadel 
explains, "Ellison's imagery highlights the dilemma of 
which both he and Twain were well aware— that there was no 
place for Jim to go" (1988, p. 132). As Morrison's story 
reveals, the most marginalized are able to attain a "line 
of flight" of sorts only through an internal search 
coupled with the assistance and cooperation of a 
community. Invisibility of the sort that Huck (and later, 
invisible man) is able to utilize is unavailable to Jim or 
Sethe or Paul D. On the other hand, Huck seems less able 
to look inward than are, ultimately, Morrison's 
characters.
Still, this inner search in which a repressed past is 
exhumed is not without danger. The past can take over the 
present as it did for a time in Beloved when Denver had to 
shift her protective efforts from Beloved to Sethe (as did 
the rest of the community). Southern ahistorical obsession 
with the past must be confronted with history in order to 
overcome obsessiveness. That history lives in the present, 
in part, through that obsessiveness. But when love (such 
as Sethe's love for Beloved) and historical consciousness 
become overwhelmed by guilt, growth is no longer possible.
148
In order to be a mobilizing force the past must be 
exorcised from dwelling under the skin, so to speak, but 
not from conscious memory. The ambiguously positive ending 
for Beloved seems to hold the possibility of that promise 
both for the novel's characters as well as the reader.
Examples of pasts that dwell under the skin are 
manifested by irony, cynicism and guilt and can be found 
scattered throughout Faulkner's Absalom. Absalom! This 
manner of approach to history points to particular 
approaches to theory as well. Returning to the visual 
metaphors in Ellison one can detect a (I want to say 
focus, but that is yet another visual metaphor) gathering, 
a cacaphony, attention directed, around the notion of the 
gaze that intends to control by way of surveillance— a 
gaze that does not really "see" anyone, but least of all 
itself. "Outside the Brotherhood we were outside history; 
but inside of it they didn't see us" (Ellison, 1952, p. 
488). Attention is directed, via Ellison's brightly lit 
and illegally electrified city basement filled with jazz 
and blues sounds, toward the ways in which "official" 
written history (including literary theories) means to 
control as well as toward that which it cannot control—  
the criminal, the schizophrenic, the marginal, the noisy, 
the invisible, the perverse, the phantasm. Ellison's 
writing highlights the possibilities for a different
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approach to social, historical, and literary theories— a 
point made by Eamon Halpin in his essay "The Ocular and 
the Otic: Theoretical Paradigms in Faulkner and Ellison" 
(1990). The generation of alternative theoretical 
possibilities is yet one more way in which literature 
translates tradition. In this case the translation is 
noted by Halpin to occur between Ellison and Faulkner.
A "social theory" which "sees" itself (that is, is 
aware of its own complicity in the knowledge it produces) 
is very different from theory that underpins the 
Brotherhood or theory that emerges, as Halpin notes, from 
a particular reading of Faulkner's Absalom. Absalom! 
Literary (and other) theories which are "visual"— that is, 
they represent an all seeing eye/"I"— are compared to 
literary theory embodied in Ellison's writing. The sense 
in which Ellison's writing exhibits a different— in some 
senses opposite— literary theoretical paradigm from that 
displayed in Absalom. Absalom!. is another way in which 
his novel "converses" with Faulkner, (now) a traditional 
canonical author.
Faulkner's Rosa Coldfield is obsessed. She wants to 
know— wants to control— the way the story of Sutpen's 
Hundred and of Thomas Sutpen himself gets told and is 
received. Rosa repeats, to a reluctant young local man, 
Quentin Compson, her story of the past in the small
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Mississippi town where she lives and where, years earlier,
a stranger who moved there disrupted her life. Rosa is not
the only one who is repeating the story, but it is her
version which dominates the novel in its excessively
personal, hyperbolic and paranoid tone. For Halpin, the
only outsider who hears and repeats the story, Shreve (a
Canadian college student who is Quentin's friend),
in his imagined detachment from the events which 
both he and Quentin attempt to understand, . . . 
exemplifies the literary critic's tendency 
towards irony and readerly autonomy (1990, p.
5) .
Further,
in Shreve the crisis in criticism is effaced or 
at least only dimly represented. In the figure 
of Rosa Coldfield, by contrast, Faulkner 
provides us with a fuller understanding of the 
psychology of the literary critic. Whereas 
Shreve embodies the critic's representation of 
himself to himself, Rosa allows us to see the 
conditions out of which such a representation 
arises (p. 5).
She resembles the literary critic in the sense that her
living of her story, "her condition is one of belatedness"
(p. 6). Her "methodology is a hermeneutics of suspicion .
. . For Rosa meaning is always concealed, lurking in
secrecy and guilt beneath an illusory surface" (p. 7).
"Her role in the novel's events is one of surveillance"
(p. 8). Like Ellison's Brotherhood, Rosa believes herself
able to see things in others that others can not see for
themselves.
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Her penetrating vision allows her, or at least 
seems to allow her, to occupy a position of 
greater power than either Ellen [Rosa's sister 
who married Sutpen] or her children, whom she 
tends to see as hapless victims. Their 
visibility is the opposite of Rosa's own 
condition, which is a kind of invisibility. Rosa 
sees but for the most part cannot be seen 
herself (p. 8).
In her monumental efforts to know, she exemplifies
Lyotard's description of the "opposition between
scientific and narrative knowledge" (Halpin, 1990, p. 10):
The scientist questions the validity of 
narrative statements and concludes that they are 
never subject to argumentation or proof. He 
classifies them as belonging to a different 
mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped, 
backward, alienated, composed of opinions, 
customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance, 
ideology. Narratives are fables, myths, legends, 
fit only for women and children (italics added)
(cited in Halpin, p. 10).
As such, Rosa's approach to interpretation operates within
a complicated opposition of "scientific objectivity"/
superstition or narrative knowledge. She— "almost despite
herself— provides us with an insight into the profoundly
interested nature of interpretive and critical discourse.
In her the scientific observer is exposed as a kind of
paranoid voyeur or spy" (Halpin, 1990, p. 10). For Halpin,
Rosa represents the paradigm of modernist literary
criticism.
Ellison's invisible man, on the other hand, in 
feeling victimized by this paradigm of interpretive 
strategy, begins to look for alternatives— alternative
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subjectivities. While at times he responds to his
victimization in kind, that is, by using his own
invisibility as a means of "power or control over those
who can be seen" (p. 16), at other moments his
invisibility seems creative of a movement away from
static, assymetric and violent power relations. Here,
invisibility seems to offer him a path to a 
different kind of subjectivity, a subjectivity 
which is not linked to the omniscient eye, but 
to the unpredictable and unbounded 
reverberation, to echoes and acoustics, to sound 
and music (p. 16).
This "music of invisibility" signals an alternative 
"experimental subjectivity" in which the subject is able 
to move into or out of "at any point" (p. 17). "The 
subject is never quite in time, never part of a regular 
and predictable beat within which it could feel in full 
control of itself and its destiny" (p. 17). Such an 
experimental subjectivity is inherently aware of its own 
complicity in positioning by virtue of the fact that it is 
"experimental." It is "invisible,not blind" (Ellison,
1952, p. 563). Invisible man seems to find considerable 
power at last through his awareness of his invisibility—  
invisibility which he says is not the same thing as 
blindness such as Jack's (of the Brotherhood). This 
awareness is brought into "sharp focus" when invisible man 
is forced to leap outside history in a very literal sense 
as he burns the papers signifying his own history in
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search of light and escape from a manhole. This idea is 
extended in the epilogue when he says, "so after years of 
trying to adopt the opinions of others I finally rebelled. 
I am an invisible man" (p. 560).
Still, to fall (or jump) into a hole never to emerge 
is to respond to blindness with blindness— merely a 
response in kind. "The politics of infinitely advancing 
while looking over the shoulder is a very dangerous 
exercise. You tend to fall into a hole" (Stuart Hall,
1987, p. 45).
Fit Only for Women and Children
While Rosa's narrative strategy may indeed offer 
insight into the paranoia of much modernist criticism, her 
own story comes through in another manner— a manner that 
points to the significance of absences, in terms of race 
and gender, in this novel. For me the most intriguing 
absences are the voices of Judith (Rosa's niece, Sutpen's 
daughter) and Clytie (Sutpen's mulatto daughter and 
slave), while the most intriguing presence is the voice of 
Rosa. They are powerful characters who are crucial to the 
novel. Rosa has the only female voice, and that voice is 
represented as near hysteria. The relationship between 
Rosa and Clytie strikes me as the most complex and perhaps 
the most suggestive.
It seems to me that the complexities, ambiguities, 
and psychology of racism, Southern racism in particular, 
are most significantly explored through these female 
characters. And through exploration of racism, the perhaps 
more universal themes of love, hate, and sexuality are 
confronted in their particularistic, Southern regional 
forms. Rosa is clearly obsessed with the Sutpen family in 
general, Sutpen in particular, and appears to live 
vicariously through them even after their deaths. This 
apparent preoccupation with Thomas Sutpen gets projected 
onto Clytie after the death of Charles Bon (Judith's 
mulatto half-brother, unbeknownst to her, and her lover)—  
a death of one who represents for Rosa her own potential 
for love and passion as expressed through her "summer of 
wistaria" at age fourteen. (Rosa's erotic fantasizing in 
her "summer of wistaria" is reminiscent of Hurston's Janie 
and her "pear tree in bloom.") Indeed it is Clytie's 
physical touch, "touch of flesh with flesh which 
abrogates, cuts sharp and straight across the devious 
intricate channels of decorous ordering, which enemies as 
well as lovers know because it makes them both" (Faulkner, 
1936, p. 139), that shocks Rosa into an awareness of the 
problematics of race, sex, love, and hate. Awareness, 
however, does not constitute understanding. Minrose Gwin 
in her book Black and White Women of the Old South
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expresses Rosa's awareness-without-understanding as 
follows:
Rosa's driving need is not so much to discover 
the nature of the "something. . . living hidden 
in that house," but to know herself— to 
understand why her life has turned out as it 
has. She finds in Clytie an objective 
correlative for the intense ambivalence, the 
love and the hate, she feels for herself as 
white southern woman trapped by gender, history, 
culture, and her own racism. Rosa may intuit 
Clytie as a female shadow-self, the product of 
pure sexual passion which young Rosa envisions, 
but never experiences (1985, p. 117).
According to Catherine Clement (in her reading of
Freud), a collective repressed past survives in the
hysterical woman more than in anyone else (1988, pp. 3-
39). Rosa's hysteria certainly seems to bear that out in
this novel where it takes the form of a paranoia that is
exemplary of the entire South in many ways. In paranoia,
according to Paul Smith, "the 'subject' thus endows the
external world with what it takes to be its own worst
tendencies and qualities. . . [Projection] is undertaken
in order to maintain the fiction, exactly, of a wholeness
and wholesomeness in the subjects' internal economy"
(1988, pp. 95-96). "Rosa reflects the darkness of the
white self which rejects human connection with the black
Other" (Gwin, 1985, p. 111). As one defines oneself, in
part, by who one defines as other this division and
destruction of the racial other is division and
destruction of the self. It is a self divided against
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itself. Indeed, it is the relationship between Clytie and 
Rosa which finally destroys them both. Rosa's noted 
tendency toward an interpretation through the gaze, or a 
hermeneutics of suspicion could be thought of as a kind of 
hysterical male identification. How else could Faulkner 
write her except as "male"?
These "silences" are indeed noisy. Faulkner's seeming 
neglect or exclusion of certain stories and voices are 
telling. They do not necessarily reflect an unconscious 
exclusion on Faulkner's part, or a malevolent exclusion.
He leads us to speculate on a vast and complex interiority 
to women and black people, even though such is not 
provided overtly in the narrative. It seems possible that 
his narrative strategy reflects a kind of representational 
honesty on his part— a reluctance to speak for women and 
black people in the same ways he speaks for white males.
In Zora Neale Hurston's novel Their Eves Were Watching 
God, published just one year after Absalom. Absalom1. we 
see a "corrective" to missing black speech, black female 
speech in particular.
The historical moment among the black literatti in 
which Hurston wrote Their Eves Were Watching God was one 
of contestation over what constitutes an appropriate tone 
in black writing. Hurston was in the clear minority as one 
who wrote in "dialect" and as one whose work was not
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preoccupied by black struggles with racism. One of her 
most vociferous critics was Richard Wright who felt her 
lack of bitterness toward whites and the "minstrel image" 
her work perpetuated were counter-revolutionary (Hemenway, 
1977, p. 241).
Hurston wanted her work to be far-removed from what 
she called "the sobbing school of Negrohood," (p. 220) and 
claimed that such writing was even a distortion: "We talk 
about the race problem a great deal, but go on living and 
laughing and striving like everybody else" (p. 221) . 
Hemenway expands on this thought in his biography of 
Hurston.
By leaving out "the problem," by emphasizing the 
art in the folkloric phenomenon, Hurston 
implicitly told whites: Contrary to your 
arrogant assumptions, you have not really 
affected us that much; we continue to practice 
our own culture, which as a matter of fact is 
more alive, more esthetically pleasing than your 
own; and it is not solely a product of defensive 
reactions to your actions. She felt that black 
culture manifested an independent esthetic 
system that could be discussed without constant 
reference to white oppression. The price for 
this philosophy was an appearance of political 
naivete' and the absence of an immediate 
historical presence (p. 221).
Still, as Michael Cooke points out, there is a potential
regressiveness to particular forms and/or timing for
Signifyin(g), a major trope for Their Eves Were Watching
God. (I will return to this later as I introduce Jamaica
Kincaid's writing.)
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Hurston's novel begins with "definitions" of men's 
desire (which, according to Gates [1988], is a revision, 
or Signifyin(g), of Frederick Douglas's 1845 text) and 
women's desire opposed to one another, and which Hurston 
reverses later within the text. She characterizes men as 
"watchers" of distant ships, and women as "dreamers" 
creating their own "truth" (lives), and then reverses this 
as the protagonist's (Janie's) grandmother (Nanny) talks 
about the distant ship carrying her dreams, whereas Tea 
Cake (Janie's third husband) sees the distant ship, and 
all else that has to do with his fate, as under his 
control. This reversal is ever-reversing throughout the 
text— those "definitions" never stable.
Broadly speaking, the text is the story of a black 
woman in search of self-awareness, which is "thematize[d] 
through an opposition between the inside and the outside 
of things" (Gates, 1988, p.184)— or, a kind of divided 
self. The advantages to keeping things (self) divided, as 
referred to by Ellison's invisible man, are strikingly 
demonstrated in Their Eves Were Watching God and 
brilliantly interpreted by Barbara Johnson (1987).
Johnson recalls Jakobson's discovery of patterns of 
aphasia (speech dysfunction) as falling into two main 
categories: similarity disorders and contiguity disorders. 
With such disorders the ability to follow one topic from
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another on the basis of its similarity or contiguity is
restricted or totally blocked. Personality, cultural
style, and verbal style in "normal" (that is, non-aphasic)
verbal behavior— behavior where both processes are
continually operative— will exhibit preference for one
process over the other, but some facility with both is
necessary. One with a similarity disorder is unable to
follow one topic from another metaphorically; with a
contiguity disorder, one is unable to follow one topic
with another metonymically.
Johnson points out, as has Paul de Man, that metaphor
is the privileged trope of the two in Western culture, and
together metaphor and metonymy constitute an
interdependent opposition. Metaphor as a kind of analogy
presents a necessity— an inference of identity and
totality. Metonymy, because it has to do with contiguity,
is perceived as coming about through chance— it is purely
relational. One problem with this— a problem that is
highlighted by Hurston's use of these tropes— is that it
is often difficult to tell the two tropes apart, for
example, as in "birds of a feather flock together." This
proverb sums up
the tendency of contiguity to become overlaid by 
similarity, and vice versa.. . . One has only to 
think of the applicability of this proverb to 
the composition of neighborhoods in America to 
realize that the question of the separability of
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similarity from contiguity may have considerable 
political implications (Johnson, B., 1987, p.
157) .
Johnson demonstrates how Hurston is "acutely 
conscious of, and superbly skilled in, the seductiveness 
and complexity of metaphor as privileged trope and trope 
of privilege" (p. 159) through her analysis of the 
following passage from Their Eves Were Watching God that I 
will reproduce in part after setting the context. The 
passage follows an argument between Janie and her second 
husband, Joe Starks, over her handling of a business 
matter in their store. Joe has told Janie that "Somebody 
got to think for women and chillun and chickens and cows" 
(cited in Johnson, p. 159) as they cannot think for 
themselves.
Times and scenes like that put Janie to thinking 
about the inside state of her marriage. Time 
came when she fought back with her tongue as 
best she could, but it didn't do her any good.
It just made Joe do more. He wanted her 
submission and he'd keep on fighting until he 
felt he had it.
So gradually, she pressed her teeth 
together and learned how to hush. The spirit of 
the marriage left the bedroom and took to living 
in the parlor. It was there to shake hands 
whenever company came to visit, but it never 
went back inside the bedroom again (Hurston,
1978, p. 55).
Janie's thoughts at this time take her back to an incident 
which revealed to her that "She wasn't petal-open anymore 
with him" (p. 56). Joe had slapped and berated her after 
she had ruined a meal.
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Janie stood where he left her for unmeasured 
time and thought. She stood there until 
something fell off the shelf inside her. Then 
she went inside there to see what it was. It was 
her image of Jody tumbled down and shattered.
But looking at it she saw that it never was the 
flesh and blood figure of her dreams. Just 
something she had grabbed up to drape her dreams 
over. In a way she turned her back upon the
image where it lay and looked further. She had
no more blossomy openings dusting pollen over 
her man, neither any glistening young fruit 
where the petals used to be. . . . She had an 
inside and an outside now and suddenly she knew
how not to mix them (cited in Johnson, B., 1987,
pp 161-2) .
Janie's self-division into her inside/outside
opposition is expressed through her use and reversals of
the metaphor/metonymy opposition. Her marriage situation
is related to metaphorically, analogically, as the house
and the store. Her marriage space is related to
metonymically, "a movement through a series of contiguous
rooms" (p. 163). In the first paragraph of the passage
where "the spirit of the marriage left the bedroom, [there
is an] externalization of the inner, metaphorically
grounded in metonymy" (p. 163). "Something fell off the
shelf inside her" (p. 163) in the second paragraph reveals
an "internalization of the outer, metonymically grounded
metaphor" (p. 163).
The reversals operated by the chiasmus [above] 
map out a reversal of the power relations 
between Janie and Joe. Henceforth, Janie will 
grow in power and resistance, while Joe 
deteriorates both in his body and in his public 
image (p. 163).
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At the point Janie realizes "how not to mix them" is
the point at which she acquires the power of voice. This
power "grows not out of her identity but out of her
division into inside and outside" (p. 163). The ability to
articulate, to have "the power of voice" requires this
divsion in figurative language— the simultaneous presence
of distinct poles, inside and outside, similarity and
contiguity, metaphor and metonymy, and "not their collapse
into oneness" (p. 163). But distinct does not mean that
they can be spoken outside one another. It should be
reiterated that a peculiar characteristic of hierarchical
oppositions is their interdependence upon one another.
This division, therefore, requires deconstruction for its
"resolution," not dialectical synthesis.
It must be remembered that what is at stake in 
the maintenance of both sides [as divided]—  
metaphor and metonymy, inside and outside— is 
the very possibility of speaking at all. The 
reduction of a discourse to oneness, identity—  
in Janie's case, the reduction of woman to 
mayor's wife— has as its necessary consequence 
aphasia, silence, the loss of ability to speak:
"She pressed her teeth together and learned to 
hush" (p. 164).
There is a difference, then, between self-division 
that is divided against the self— a "difference within" 
that creates frustration, hatred, xenophobia, "sick" 
schizophrenia, neurosis, division that is a sort of 
surgical cutting off between self and other as in Lacan's 
mirror stage— and self-division that is for the "self"—
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division that enables voice, prevents (critical) aphasia, 
avoids essentialistc collapsing of differences. The 
differences at stake here point to a dynamism among the 
three registers of identity formation as mentioned 
earlier.
It is only through a faith in and seeking of love
that Janie is moved to action, to speech, moved to learn.
And it is finally through the realization of the love she
sought (with her third husband, Tea Cake) that Janie gains
the self-knowledge required to understand a history that
lives in the present.
Dis is uh love game. Ah done lived Grandma's 
way, now Ah means tuh live mine. . . She was 
borned in slavery time when folks, dat is black 
folks, didn't sit down anytime dey felt lak it.
So sittin' on porches lak de white madam looked 
lak uh mighty fine thing tuh her. Dat's whut she 
wanted for me— don't keer whut it cost. Git up 
on uh high chair and sit there. She didn't have 
time tuh think whut tuh do after you got up on 
de stool uh do nothin'. De object wuz tuh git 
dere. So Ah got up on de high stool lak she told 
me, but Pheoby, Ah done nearly languished tuh 
death up dere. Ah felt like de world wuz cryin' 
extry and Ah ain't read de common news yet 
(Hurston, 1978, pp. 171-2).
The story ends with her in relative solitude (what 
Michael Cooke calls "accomplished solitude" [1984, p.
84])— reflective of the way Hurston's own life-story 
ended. But it is a different solitude than that of 
invisible man who has yet to sustain an intimate 
relationship with anyone. Still, Janie's intimacy has been
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limited, for the most part, to one other. Her friendship 
with Pheoby signals hope for her connection to the 
community— a connection that she desired earlier but that 
was largely stifled by Joe Starks. Tea Cake stifled this 
connection in his own way as well. It was he who convinced 
Janie he could be trusted to return from long absences 
from her, yet it was also he who could not stand, 
eventually, to allow her out of his sight.
This love for her reached its pinnacle with his 
madness. Bitten by a rabid dog, he was "mad with love," 
jealous to the point of murder at which time Janie shot 
him in self defense. Once again Janie took control of her 
life by refusing to be canceled— this time by what may 
have been becoming fusion love, although that possibility 
is steeped in a rich ambiguity. The drama of this final 
scene is descriptive of the risk of love, ambivalence of 
desire, the potential violence though necessity of 
knowledge, of the pedagogical relationship. She chooses to 
sustain the love she's known with Tea Cake through place 
and memory.
So Ah'm back home agin and Ah'm satisfied tuh be 
heah. Ah done been tuh do horizon and back and 
now Ah kin set heah in mah haouse and live by 
comparisons. Dis house ain't so absent of things 
lak it used tuh be befo' Tea Cake come along.
It's full uh thoughts, 'specially dat bedroom 
(Hurston, 1978, p. 284).
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Of Janie's ending in "accomplished solitude," her 
rejection of the social sphere, Cooke writes, "Her home is 
a symbol of her condition, free and proud and yet 
radically unshared" (1984, p. 84). Her solution is to 
deny, to some extent, the significance of the communal 
register.
She pulled in her horizon like a great fish-net. 
Pulled it from around the waist of the world and 
draped it over her shoulder. So much of life in 
its meshes! She called in her soul to come and 
see (Hurston, 1978, p. 286).
This rejection of the communal in favor of the 
individual is, as a personal solution, perhaps ironic for 
an author whose life-work was to preserve the community of 
African-American folk culture. Rather than view it, as 
Cooke does, as a rejection of all but solitude, a 
rejection of intimacy— an ironic and thus cynical turn—  
her refusal to sever herself from her past and the 
pedagogical situation she sets up between herself and 
Pheoby ("'Lawd!' Pheoby breathed out heavily, 'Ah done 
growed ten feet higher from jus' listenin' tuh you, Janie. 
Ah ain't satisfied wid mahself no mo'" [p. 284]) could be 
thought to signal a beginning in her conclusion. The 
celebratory note with which Hurston ends the novel (Janie 
embraces all of the life within the mesh that is her 
horizon) is not a note of disconnection or isolation. It 
differs radically from Ellison's ending with invisible man
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still in the hole— albeit contemplating leaving that hole 
for love and social action. She did, after all, return to 
her community. It is hard to imagine that she came back 
there only to isolate herself from the others. The 
power of the fictional register (of language) is 
recognized by her earlier in the novel as she "kills" Joe 
Starks with her words— an act of "motivated Signifyin(g)"- 
- thereby avoiding her own cancelation and, further, 
creating her "self." Yet the strength of her words 
depended on the public, communal witnessing (and 
understanding) of their utterance. Her act of telling the 
tale, to herself, to Pheoby, signifies her recognition of 
the autobiographical register in forming identity.
Like Hurston, and in another sense, Faulkner, Jamaica 
Kincaid's project consists of an exploration of self 
through discovering history that lives in the present.
Much of the writing in her latest two texts proceeds 
through a discourse of anger. But to read her only as this 
is to miss the greater significance in her stories. One 
literary mode of expression for Kincaid, particularly in 
Lucy, is a metissage— "initiating a genuine dialogue with 
the dominant discourses they hope to transform, thus 
ultimately favoring exchange rather than provoking 
conflict" (Lionnet, 1989, p. 3). This mode of writing 
inherently presents a challenge to essentializing
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tendencies in the written history of Western (or any 
dominant) culture. As such, as a literary mode and 
theoretical category, it holds some cultural specificity 
similar to the ways in which "Signifyin(g)" does. Its 
specificity, however, is not derivative of any one 
particular culture so much as it belongs to a notion of 
"post-colonial culture."
The difference between this mode of writing and that 
of Signifyin' is in its directness. Both constitute a kind 
of translation and, in the case of "unmotivated 
Signifyin(g)" at least, a kind of dialogue. However, 
metissage conceived of as a "cultural braiding" does not 
necessarily proceed through chiasmus— repetition and 
reversal. It is this very indirectness in Signifyin(g) 
that sometimes renders it regressive rather than 
subversive or socially active and creative. As Cooke 
observes,
Signifying always involves questions of power on 
two levels, the social and the mental, and the 
signifier is the one who as best he can makes up 
for a lack of social power with an exercise of 
intellectual or critical power (1984, p. 26).
This strategy amounts to little or, at worst, it can
backfire when one is
busy signifying, but no one [can] tell.
Signifying and wishful thinking tend to coincide 
here. Signifying becomes an idle secret and, as 
Gates has justly remarked, dangerously close to 
tomming (p. 29).
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When, for example, a black artist "signifies on" white 
racial stereotype in certain ways and at certain times, 
"both black and white come out the worse" (p. 29), the 
white for maintaining ignorant beliefs, "the black for 
playing not so much on as down to that belief" (p. 29). 
Kincaid entertains no such play.
Jamaica Kincaid warns of the dangers of reading like 
a tourist— of pre(sub)suming a particular text, of mis­
translating, of failing to remember one's own deep un­
knowing of the "known," the "native" in the text. We begin 
with her book A Small Place (1988) as a tourist (or would- 
be tourist) of Antigua who Kincaid hopes to teach. Later, 
in her book Lucv (1990), she comes to the United States as 
an au pair and finds us still mis-translating (even 
ourselves), or else not bothering to translate at all, 
placing the entire burden on the immigrant, choosing 
ignorance.
A Small Place is not called a novel. It is an essay 
about life among tourists, natives and neo-colonizers in 
"post-colonial" Antigua. However, I am struck by its 
similarities to her autobiographical fiction, Lucv. Both 
are angry works. Kincaid, in an interview with Donna 
Perry, says she is through being "charming"— "when people 
say you're charming you are in deep trouble" (cited in 
Perry, 1990, p. 498).
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Kincaid plays with a kind of complete reversal of the 
colonizer/colonized or tourist/native hierarchies through 
her words of utter disdain for white tourists from England 
and North America. Tourists become for her the embodiment 
of all that is ugly, dirty, stupid and, in some senses, 
evil— characteristics colonizers typically ascribe to 
colonized.
And you look at . . . the way they [Antiguans] 
squat down over a hole they have made in the 
ground, the hole itself is something to marvel 
at, and since you are being an ugly person this 
ugly but joyful thought will swell inside you: 
their ancestors were not clever in the way yours 
were and not ruthless in the way yours were, for 
then would it not be you who would be in harmony 
with nature and backwards in that charming way?
An ugly thing, that is what you are when you 
become a tourist, an ugly, empty thing, a stupid 
thing, a piece of rubbish pausing here and there 
to gaze at this and taste that, and it will 
never occur to you that the people who inhabit 
the place in which you have just paused cannot 
stand you (Kincaid, 1988, pp. 16-17).
This reversal is sustained almost throughout the
entire text but with interludes for describing and
explaining Antiguan internalization of oppressor modus
operandi and values in post-colonial Antigua. Then, the
last two sentences:
Of course, the whole thing is, once you cease to 
be a master, once you throw off your master's 
yoke, you are no longer human rubbish, you are 
just a human being, and all the things that adds 
up to. So, too, with the slaves. Once they are 
no longer slaves, once they are free, they are 
no longer noble and exhalted; they are just 
human beings (p. 81).
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Kincaid's rage is most likely shocking to her
(intended) readers (intended for the New Yorker magazine
initially, but the first time any of her writing was ever
rejected by them [Perry, 1990, p. 497]). But the colonial
history of Antigua lives in the present— undeniably for
those subject to its excess. Antiguans, long since
"emancipated," are still servants to foreigners and
Antiguans corrupted by foreigners. Where else, Kincaid
asks, could we have learned about capital, Gross National
Product, and so on?
I realized in writing that book that the first 
step to claiming yourself is anger. You get mad.
And you can't do anything before you get angry.
And I recommend getting very angry to everyone, 
anyone (p. 498).
For the sake of her arguments, she deploys 
essentialisms of both tourist and native; British, North 
American and Antiguan. In her last two novels (the ones 
examined here) she exhibits, at times, a bitterness toward 
all of the above that is quite different from novelistic 
approaches of African-Caribbean Wilson Harris. His novels, 
for example, could be said to be themselves a view or 
views to the transformations he imagines rather than 
didactics for the way to get there or admonitions against 
obstacles to getting there. Some of Kincaid's earlier 
works fAt the Bottom of the River [1978] and Annie John 
[1983]) could be said to more closely resemble what has
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been called Harris's "postmodern" or "poststructural"
style (Covi, 1990, pp. 345-354). I have chosen, however,
to deal only with the two most recent texts as Kincaid
claims to have abandoned her older style for good, and as
these two texts are such clear demonstrations of the ways
repressed histories live— particularly through language:
For isn't it odd that the only language I have 
in which to speak of this crime is the language 
of the criminal who committed the crime? And 
what can that really mean? For the language of 
the criminal can contain only the goodness of 
the criminal's deed. The language of the 
criminal can explain and express the deed only 
from the criminal's point of view. It cannot 
contain the horror of the deed, the injustice of 
the deed, the agony, the humiliation inflicted 
on me (Kincaid, 1988, pp. 31-2).
In this way her writing is a clear example of cross-
cultural encounter as it reveals the operation of
translation with a master.
The bitterness and anger remain in Lucv. However, she
finds as invisible man discovered, "too much of your life
will be lost, its meaning lost, unless you approach it as
much through love as through hate" (Ellison, 1952, p.
580). Lucy indeed loves Mariah, wife and mother in her au
pair family, at the same time she is an astute observer of
her foibles and contradictions and the connections of
these to larger American society— to patriarchy, to
commodification, to alienation and angst. It is toward
these connections that Mariah seems oblivious except from
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a very limited "liberal feminist" and "liberal
environmentalist" perspective.
Mariah says, "I have Indian blood in me," and 
underneath everything I could swear she says it 
as if she were announcing her possession of a 
trophy. How do you get to be the sort of victor 
who can claim to be the vanquished also?
I now heard Mariah say, "Well," and she let 
out a long breath, full of sadness, resignation, 
even dread. I looked at her; her face was 
miserable, tormented, ill-looking. She looked at 
me in a pleading way, as if asking for relief, 
and I looked back, my face and my eyes hard; no 
matter what, I would not give it. . . .
I said, "How do you get to be that way?"
The anguish on her face almost broke my heart, 
but I would not bend. It was hollow, my triumph,
I could feel that, but I held on to it just the 
same (Kincaid, 1990, pp. 40-1).
Mariah is unaware of the psychosocial and political 
dynamics of otherness. Yet Lucy loves Mariah's warmth and 
innocence at the same time she resents her seemingly 
willful ignorance. Lucy sees her own mother in Mariah— her 
mother being the major reason she left Antigua. Seeing her 
mother in Mariah seemed to help Lucy to deal with her own 
contradictory feelings toward her. Through this love Lucy 
and Mariah enter a pedagogical relationship in which both 
teach and learn.
The pedagogical imperative with which we are faced in 
Kincaid's work is that of cross-cultural imagination—  
literacy of the imagination— which includes a re-reading 
of our own place in colonial history. It is not read as 
history per se, but more as history that lives in the
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present— much like Pinar's characterization of the 
repressed but living racial history (in press). One 
illustrative episode in Lucy is when Mariah took Lucy to a 
favorite clearing in the woods in order to surprise Lucy 
with the extravagant beauty of an entire field of blooming 
daffodils:
"Mariah, do you realize that at ten years of age 
I had to learn by heart a long poem about some 
flowers I would not see in real life until I was 
nineteen?" . . . This woman who hardly knew me 
loved me, and she wanted me to love this thing—  
a grove brimming over with daffodils in bloom—  
that she loved also. Her eyes sank back in her 
head as if they were protecting themselves, as 
if they were taking a rest after some unexpected 
hard work. It wasn't her fault. It wasn't my 
fault. . . The same thing could cause us to shed 
tears, but those tears would not taste the same 
(Kincaid, 1990, p. 30).
Both Kincaid and Wilson Harris write of West Indian
children having to memorize Wordsworth's "I Wandered
Lonely as a Cloud" (the daffodil poem). Both express a
kind of ambivalence to the educational practice that is
characteristic of Harris's notion of cross-cultural
imagination— an ambivalence that is "unsettlement." As
Harris explains:
That unsettlement is rooted in paradox and in 
auction block histories, it is rooted in 
centuries of the conquest of species in nature, 
it is rooted in the conversion of 
conquistadorial biases into the humour of finity 
and infinity. Schoolchildren in the West Indies 
used to write quite naturally and innocently, it 
seemed, of English snow and Wordsworthian 
daffodils that they had never seen, rather than 
palm-groves or cane-fields or rainforests. The
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absurdity has often (and rightly so) been quoted 
as a caveat of blindness inculcated by colonial 
institutions stereotyped and bound within other 
cultural landscapes (1983, p. 134).
What Harris calls the "unconscious infinity of humour" (p.
134) results in West Indian writing that grew out of such
schooling in which, for example in a poem called Snows by
Martiniquan poet, St.-John Perse, "'strange alliances . .
. white nuptials of noctuids, white festivals of mayflies'
may come into attunement, on cross-cultural loom," (p.
134) with poets and poems* of other cultural and natural
landscapes.*
Kincaid's ambivalence about learning the Wordsworth
poem, and other items from the British canon, is expressed
in her interview with Donna Perry:
Every colonial child has to do that. It's a two- 
edged thing because I wouldn't have known how to 
write and how to think if I hadn't read those 
things. I wouldn't have known my idea of justice 
if I hadn't read Paradise Lost, if I hadn't been 
given parts of Paradise Lost to memorize. It was 
given to me because I was supposed to be Satan.
The last chapter of the book I have written has 
a lot of things about that. The book is called 
Lucv. short for Lucifer (Perry, 1990, p. 507).
Kincaid reads history from a multi-faceted
perspective. Columbus's "discovery" of Antigua in 1493
fascinates her (she intends to read his personal journals)
and she sees it from the perspective of the poetics of
exploration as well as the way that this "great curiosity
in every human being [is] . . . bound up in this horrible
thing that happened (slavery— the domination)" (cited in 
Perry, p. 501). Indeed, her approach to studying history 
generally is through studies of domination. While angry at 
the abominations, Kincaid sees no simple "solutions": "If 
you remove the apparatus for the game [of domination as a 
game of musical chairs] to go on, then permanently sitting 
down is its own prison" (cited in Perry, p. 501). "There's 
no such thing as a fresh start" (cited in Perry, p. 502).
Kincaid writes autobiographical fiction. As will be 
shown in the next chapter some theorists would claim all 
autobiography is fiction and/or all fiction is a kind of 
autobiography. I go to that chapter now to explore my own 
and some of my students' connections to those (uneasy) 
relations— relations displayed and disturbed by 
theoretical and literary readings that have gone before.
CHAPTER FOUR 
Autobiography: Fact, Fiction, Truth and Lies
In Plato's writings, dialogue gave way to the 
literary pseudodialogue. But by the Hellenistic 
age, writing prevailed, and real dialectic 
passed to correspondence. Taking care of oneself 
became linked to constant writing activity. The 
self is something to write about, a theme or 
object (subject) of writing activity. That is 
not a modern trait born of the Reformation or of 
romanticism; it is one of the most ancient 
Western traditions. It was well established and 
deeply rooted when Augustine started his 
Confessions (Michel Foucault, 1988, p. 27).
Autobiographical writing, writing and theorizing
about autobiography in education, and other, related
notions such as "teacher lore" (Schubert, 1991), "voices
of teachers" (Aoki, 1990), "narrative dialogue" (Witherell
& Noddings, 1991), "reflective practice" (Schon, 1983,
1991), and "teacher stories" (Pagano, 1990, 1991) have
been increasingly appearing in curriculum discourses over
the last several years (for example, in addition to the
above mentioned, Abbs, 1974; Ayers, 1989; Grumet, 1980,
1988a, 1988b; Miller, 1990; Pagano, 1991; Pinar, 1980,
1981, 1988, in press; Pinar & Grumet, 1976; Taubman, in
press). Many of these projects have been explorations into
the uses of autobiography for teacher education and their
implications for curriculum praxis. Some have been for the
purpose of self-exploration for curriculum theorists and
teacher educators. Some also investigate and generate
176
theorizing about autobiography itself. It is this latter 
mode of inquiry that I wish to address and participate in 
initially in this chapter.
My intent is to survey some prominent theories in 
autobiography that have emerged outside the curriculum 
field, more often from literary and philosophical 
disciplines, as well as some of the theorizing that I have 
encountered among curriculum theorists. Autobiography as 
approached in this study is embedded within a cultural 
studies orientation in that it is viewed as operating 
across identity registers to include political critique—  
critique at and about the borders between traditional 
academic disciplines, and critique of social hierarchies 
that forbid or limit participation of particular voices in 
the creation of legitimated knowledge. Autobiography in 
conversation with literary works is a notion that also 
draws explicitly from cultural studies approaches given 
that cultural studies as a "field" of inquiry originated 
in the literary disciplines and remains significantly 
there at present. After a theoretical exploration into 
autobiography I will provide demonstrations and discussion 
of autobiographical writing by myself and some of my 
students for the purpose of illustration. These specific 
examples represent a part of my study that is yet
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"embryonic" and, as such, not to be interpreted as "data" 
in support of a particular method.
Theory and Autobiography
Autobiography as a "genre" has been a theoretical 
problem for literary critics from the first appearances of 
critical literature about autobiography, and contemporary 
theory is no exception (although the way the problem is 
framed is often very different now) (Olney, 1980, pp. 3- 
27). It has been argued that, (a) all autobiography is 
fiction because even the "self" is a fiction (Sprinker, 
1980), (b) autobiography provides "truths" that nothing 
else does (Olney, 1980, p. 13), (c) all historical and 
autobiographical writing contains elements of fiction and 
elements of fact or at least "truth" (Kerby, 1988), (d) 
autobiography, or the writing/written self, is represented 
metaphorically by style (Starobinski, 1980/1976), (e) 
autobiography exists only as "the late product of a 
specific civilization" (Gusdorf, 1980, p. 29). One which 
holds "conscious awareness of the singularity of each 
individual life" (p. 29). as opposed to those 
societies/cultures that exist as interdependent 
communities.
For curriculum theorists Jacques Daignault and 
Clermont Gauthier (1981) the search for identity— which is
what autobiography may be thought to be— is a search for a 
moving target. As such, the search reveals a "paradox of 
sense" (p. 180) which is within the "paradigm of infinite 
regression" (p. 180). "For example, in order to define a 
phenomenon we use words but these words also need to be 
defined and the words used in these definitions need to be 
defined too and this infinitely" (p. 180). The search is a 
game that never ends. Writing an "autobiography" would 
seem to be a way of saying "Here I am; the search is over" 
if autobiography is concieved as discovery of the self, or 
even, in some senses, as creation of the self— for 
example, in the sense that creation is believed to be 
complete or finished. It is these conceptions of 
autobiography that Daignault's and Gauthier's paradoxical 
identity challenge.
Michael Sprinker, in his essay "Fictions of the Self: 
The End of Autobiography" (1980), echoes the above ideas 
about identity, making his case for the implications of 
this for autobiography through selected writings and 
discussions of Vico, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Freud. He 
recounts stories from Kierkegaard's texts Repetition and 
Fear and Trembling, both written under pseudonyms, to 
assert their resemblance to Kierkegaard's own life, one 
told "through a re-creation of Abraham's sacrifice of 
Isaac" (Fear and Trembling) , and the other "through the
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fictional narrative of the relations between Constantius
and the nameless young lover" (p. 330). Some time later,
Kierkegaard admitted to assuming the pseudonyms but denied
having uttered any of the words written under them. In
this way Kierkegaard
refuses to assume the traditional responsibility 
of an author for his text, and in so doing he 
undermines the conventional notions of author 
and text, self and discourse (p. 332).
Sprinker follows this example of Kierkegaard's
condition of writing as an intertextual "multiplicity of
subjects" (p. 332) with a reminder of Nietzsche's
"obliterat[ion °f] the authority of the subject by
exposing it as a deception" (p. 334)— a deception designed
to cover over the only "real" authority: the will to
power. The will to power, Nietzsche warns, is precisely
what may drive one, in the name of autobiography, to find
it "useful and important for one's activity to interpret
oneself falsely" (cited in Sprinker, p. 334).
Freud took this admonition seriously in writing
psychoanalysis, but Freud also serves, for Sprinker, as
another personal example of one whose life demonstrates
the ways in which "the life and the thought are, in fact
produced in the writing" (p. 337).
To turn Freud back upon himself [as did Lacan] 
is to discover a discourse trapped in its own 
discursiveness, or to put it another way, it is
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to discover in Freud a neurotic impulse to 
uncover the secrets and mechanisms of neurosis 
(p. 336).
And through an extended reading of Freud's Interpretation
of Dreams. Sprinker draws an analogy from dream (text)
interpretation and autobiography whereby both
interpretation and "inquiry of the self into its own
origin and history" always "return to confirm" themselves
(p. 342) . That is, autobiography
is always circumscribed by the limiting 
conditions of writing, of the production of a 
text. Vico, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche all 
contend that the self is constituted by a 
discourse that it never completely masters (p.
342).
This last line is reminiscent of Felman's reading of 
Lacan's reading of Freud where she finds the pedagogical 
imperative implicit in their work to be for a knowledge 
that is not in mastery of itself (Felman, 1982). Like any 
other knowledge, self-knowledge is only that which has 
discovered "that this master text, the unconscious, is 
perpetually changing" (Sprinker, 1980, p. 342)—  
Daignault's and Gauthier's paradoxical "search for 
identity" (1981), truly an "identity-in-motion" (Taubman, 
in press). The necessary intertextuality implied by 
Sprinker's "multiplicity of [writing] subjects" (1980, p. 
332) is also vaguely reminiscent of Francois Lionnet's 
metissage which is "all . . .  a reading practice that
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allows me to bring out the interreferential nature of a
particular set of texts" (1989, p. 8).
Sprinker was criticized by James Olney for his
"Fictions of the Self" in the volume of collected essays
in which Sprinker's essay appears (a collection edited by
Olney). In response to poststructuralists in general,
Sprinker in particular, Olney admonishes:
what they are still troubling about is the self 
and consciousness or knowledge of it, even 
though in a kind of bravura way some of them may 
be denying rather than affirming its reality or 
its possibility. And this is the crux of the 
matter, the heart of the explanation for the 
special appeal of autobiography to students of 
literature in recent times: it is a fascination 
with the self and its profound, its endless 
mysteries and, accompanying that fascination, an 
anxiety about the self, an anxiety about the 
dimness and vulnerability of that entity that no 
one has ever seen or touched or tasted (1980, p.
23).
Janet Varner Gunn in her book Autobiography: Toward a
Poetics of Experience, also criticizes Sprinker's essay:
Michael Sprinker goes one step further in the 
last essay of the volume [Olney's book]. Drawing 
on the work of Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, 
and Jacques Derrida, his essay joins 
autobiography to the ranks of livres sans 
auteurs. The struggle against writing's law of 
gravity is finally in vain, since "no 
autobiography can take place except within the 
boundaries of a writing where concepts of 
subject, self, and author collapse into the act 
of producing a text" [p.342, Sprinker]. . . .
For Sprinker, the "self-written" cannot exist 
outside of [the text] (Gunn, 1982, pp.5-6).
Gunn, I believe, misinterprets Sprinker as she does
Derrida's statement "there is nothing outside the text"
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(1976). The text to which she seems to refer is the 
particular autobiographical text. Perhaps a better 
translation of that statement is Jo Anne Pagano's "there 
is nothing that is not a text" (1991, p. 202). Apparently, 
Gunn, and perhaps Olney, reads a pessimism into the idea 
that what one writes about oneself is not reducible to 
that self or vice versa.
There is another critique to be directed toward 
Sprinker's essay, however. While he writes of a 
"multiplicity of subjects" and intertextuality, he implies 
through his particular choice of examples and discussions 
around them that this multiplicity is somehow still 
"centered," in a sense, within individual human beings. 
That is, there is no sense of the cultural communal in his 
characterization of identity, writing and autobiography. 
Autobiographies of the socially marginalized emphasize 
(typically) a multiplicity that is also a plurality, a 
collectivity of subjects and a collective subjectivity. It 
is this sort of intertextuality, interreferentiality, 
inter-subjectivity— a full and complex metissage— that is 
central to this study that Sprinker ignores, resists, or 
represses.
The above discussion is evocative of Olney's 
recognition, in this same collection, of some of the 
particular, popular uses of autobiography.
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Autobiography has become the focalizing 
literature for various "studies" that otherwise 
have little by way of a defining, organizing 
center to them. I have in mind such "studies" as 
American Studies, Black Studies, Women's 
Studies, and African Studies. According to the 
argument of these critics (who are becoming more 
numerous every day), autobiography— the story of 
a distinctive culture written in individual 
characters and from within— offers a privileged 
access to an experience . . . that no other 
variety of writing can offer (1980, p. 13).
Georges Gusdorf, however, sees autobiography as a
fiercely individual act— a perspective that necessarily
denies even the possibility of autobiography for such
(marginalized) groups except insofar as they mirror the
dominant Western ideology of radical individualism.
The author of an autobiography gives himself the 
job of narrating his own history; what he sets 
out to do is to reassemble the scattered 
elements of his individual life and to regroup 
them in a comprehensive sketch. . . .
Autobiography . . . requires a man to take a 
distance with regard to himself in order to 
reconstitute himself in the focus of his special 
unity and identity across time (1980, p.35)
Shari Benstock points to the ways in which such
a definition of the autobiographical act [as 
Gusdorf's] . . . strikingly recapitulates the 
effects of Lacan's mirror stage . . .  a 
recognition of the alienating force within the 
specular (the "regard") that leads to the 
desperate shoring-up of the reflected image 
against disintegration and division (1988, pp.
14-15).
Traditionalists, like Gusdorf who reject the spirit 
of collectivity in the autobiographical act, are searching
185
for that which is a kind of "final authority," at least
implicitly. As Pagano insists, such a search
betrays a hunger for something outside, 
something beyond judgment according to which we 
might be absolutely certain— according to which 
any one of us might be the one presumed to know.
This is, of course, the logic of domination 
(1991, p. 201).
This self-authorized authoritative version of the subject, 
the self, is autobiography in which "the Subject is made 
an Object of investigation. . . . This view of the life 
history, is grounded in authority" (Benstock, 1988, p.
19).
But just as with the conservative versus liberal or 
radical debates around Afrocentrism, the humanities, and 
"political correctness" discussed in chapter one, these 
issues and problems cannot be simply divided into 
polarized camps. This complexity is well illustrated in 
African-American autobiography, for example. African- 
American autobiography (which includes slave narratives), 
in addition to questions around identity and subjectivity, 
also has to be thought through in the context of who its 
expected audience is and has historically been (typically 
privileged, dominant, those who read and have access to 
books) as well as its pedagogical imperative for that 
audience and that author. Of course, any autobiography 
must be thought through contextually in this manner, but I 
point to African-American autobiography in particular in
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order to highlight the very specific and often overlooked 
historical context of African-American writing. Often, in 
"writing the self into existence" such authors are also 
actively engaged in writing an entire people along with 
them. This alters the context for theorizing about 
autobiography from the apparent context for much written 
autobiographical theory. This context, with its larger 
pedagogical and emancipatory project, can render arguments 
about "fictions of the self" pedantic, but, at the same 
time it renders the isolated, unified, "self-identical" 
self obsolete— a distortion. Somehow, the notion of the 
"fictional register" must be drawn into conversation with 
the communal, as Taubman has suggested. An 
autobiographical register which, through such 
conversation, deconstructs these identity "constructs" 
holds such a possibility.
The problem of the divided self that emerged through 
readings in chapter three resurfaces here. The self 
divided against itself is the self of the mirror stage— a 
stage which signals a search for unity that "derives from 
an experience of self as fragmented, partial, segmented, 
and different" (Benstock, 1988, p. 12). It is a division 
between self and other which is experienced as absolute. 
And the self-division that is for the self is that which 
works through difference, thereby enabling voice,
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preventing a sort of critical aphasia, learned illiteracy. 
Need is for the re-cognition of both divisions— re­
cognition that is available only as the autobiographical 
register operates consciously within the context of the 
others. The deconstruction that takes place through this 
operation is eloquently described by Benstock:
If the autobiographical moment prepares for a 
meeting of "writing" and "selfhood," a coming 
together of method and subject matter, this 
destiny— like the retrospective glance that 
presumably initiates autobiography— is always 
deferred. Autobiography reveals gaps, and not 
only gaps in time and space or between the 
individual and the social, but also a widening 
divergence between the manner and matter of its 
discourse. That is, autobiography reveals the 
impossibility of its own dream: What begins on 
the presumption of self-knowledge ends in the 
creation of a fiction that covers over the 
premises of its construction (p. 11).
"Marginal" autobiography is in a unique position to
come to this re-cognition. The fragmented, "postmodern
self" that is so widely hailed as a (the?) "sign" of the
times, seems, in some senses, ludicrous to those whose
communal histories have long known fragmentation,
displacement, and dispossession in the most material
senses as well as symbolic ones. W.E.B. DuBois's
recognition brought to print of the "double consciousness"
necessary for African-American individuals' survival is a
very well-known example (1969). As Stuart Hall explains,
Identity is formed at the unstable point where 
the "unspeakable" stories of subjectivity meet 
the narratives of history, of a culture. And
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since he/she is positioned in relation to 
cultured narratives which have been profoundly 
expropriated the colonized subject is always 
"somewhere else": doubly marginalized, displaced 
always other than where he or she is, or is able 
to speak from (1987, p. 44).
Our relations to such autobiographies (literatures), 
whether we are members of socially marginalized 
(colonized) groups or not, are extra-ordinarily 
significant to any notion of identity— both national and 
individual. Indeed our identities can only be thought 
through difference. It is only in our relations to others 
that identity, and thus autobiography, has meaning at all. 
Such a "relational theory" of autobiography guides ray own 
"autobiographical" reading/writing of a novel (below) read 
by me as an adolescent, and re-read for this writing.
As Pinar implies, our autobiographical writing 
depends on our particular relations to marginality (In 
press, p. 395). Those of us who are indeed newly 
"victimized" as "fractured identities" within a particular 
(negative) facet of the "postmodern age," Christopher 
Lasch's "minimal self" (1984), need to attend to that 
self-division in our autobiographical constructions. Such 
a construction is what Pinar calls an "architecture"— a 
construction that takes seriously the boundaries one has 
erected as well as dissolved (in press). One who has not 
experienced what Hall calls "centering of marginality" 
(Hall, 1987, p. 44), on the other hand, may benefit from
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abandoning "the image of an architecture of self" (Pinar,
p. 395), for a deconstructed self. Hall's sentiments seem
similar as he writes,
I believe it is an immensely important gain when 
one recognizes that all identity is constructed 
across difference and begins to live with the 
politics of difference. But doesn't the 
acceptance of the fictional or narrative status 
of identity in relation to the world also 
require as a necessity, its opposite— the moment 
of arbitrary closure? Is it possible for there 
to be action or identity in the world without 
arbitrary closure— what one might call the 
necessity to meaning of the end of the sentence? 
(1987, p. 45)
In another theoretical twist of the autobiographical 
matrix, rather than focusing on the fictional status of 
identity, theory also points toward the autobiographical, 
or "truthful," status of fiction. Kerby, believes that 
history and autobiography ("self-narration") are 
necessarily narrative, and that this narrative does not 
exclude the "fictional." He expresses this notion as 
follows:
Narrative truth may not do for an historical or 
biographical study that aims at "objectivity" 
(supposing this goal were even possible!), but 
it is, nevertheless, a curious fact of human 
reality that, to quote Ricoeur, "It makes little 
difference whether [the stories we tell] are 
true or false, fiction as well as verifiable 
history provides us with an identity." A 
"truthful" or "authentic" story of the human 
subject need not be one that achieves or even 
aims at objective historical verisimilitude 
(1988, p. 238).
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This position is not incompatible with Jean
Starobinski's in the view that "truth" can be read from a
text in ways unrelated to factual accuracy— for example,
through "style" and through what is selected for
narration. Starobinski seems to feel that since style is
what distinguishes one author from another (one individual
from another) that style is therefore the "essence" of
autobiography and thus we can not talk about the style of
an autobiography or limit theory about it to genre.
The conditions of autobiography furnish only a 
large framework within which a great variety of 
particular styles may occur. So it is essential 
to avoid speaking of an autobiographical "style" 
or even an autobiographical "form," because 
there is no such generic style or form. Here, 
even more than elsewhere, style is the act of an 
individual (1980, p. 73).
In a similar sense, philosopher of curriculum Jo Anne 
Pagano makes pedagogical use of the self-narration that 
emerges from fictional writing of her students. They are, 
she suggests, much better able to expose their "desire for 
ignorance" (1991, p. 201) and thereby encounter the 
"surprise of otherness" through fictionalizing their 
journalizing of student teaching. In doing this "we go 
beyond ourselves" (p. 202). Pagano expresses concern that 
in ("non-fictional") autobiographical writing, even that 
which is not to be graded, students may cover over their 
own "resistance to knowledge" or "desire to ignore" (p.
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201). In fictionalizing those accounts we are more 
inclined
to probe our ignorances and to create new 
conditions for knowledge. . . . The advantage of 
fiction writing over autobiography is that the 
writer can claim a greater distance, and, 
consequently, the desire for ignorance is more 
readily exposed (p. 201).
Fictions allow one to write the ambiguity that is 
"identity"— "I am this, but not now; I was this, but not 
really." Jamaica Kincaid demonstrates this possibility, I 
think, in writing her novels as self-conscious 
autobiographies and her autobiography as fiction. Stories 
over the same chronological time sequences differ as she 
differs (and defers) from herself. Perspectives toward 
autobiography as self-authorized authoritative stories 
about ourselves that discover and unify the self remove us 
from relationality, politics, ultimately from meaning. 
These perspectives deny the active role of ignorance, the 
will to ignore. As Pagano suggests, fictional writing is 
one way to counter this.
The major issues in these arguments seem to 
revolve around subjectivity (What/where is it? If we do 
not know, can we even discuss autobiography?), the social 
and individual usefulness of autobiography, and the 
literary limits and functions of autobiography. If 
autobiography is fiction does this mean that a project 
such as the one I suggest here is impossible and thus
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useless? That one cannot know more about the "self" in 
this way because one cannot write the "truth"? Or even, 
one cannot know more about the self because there is no 
unified "self" to know; the entity we call our "self" is 
so constantly in a state of flux that it makes no sense to 
attempt autobiography at all? Or that what we write exists 
only as a particular text and is not in the least 
representative of the "real" person who wrote it, or of 
anyone or anything at all aside from that particular text 
(it is a "thing-in-itself")?
It seems to me that there is a kind of truth to an 
affirmative answer to these questions, but that to leave 
it at that and dismiss autobiography misses the greater 
significance revealed in theoretical debates about 
identity and pedagogy. More to the point perhaps are the 
questions: Does it matter if this is "fact" or "fiction?" 
If it is all fiction, is there a "truth" in it? What is to 
be gained by doing this? Part of the "truth," I believe, 
lies in a negative answer to those earlier questions, and 
that is the part I am concerned with now. As Pinar 
understands, "we aim, in autobiography, at truthfulness, 
not truth, at expanding and complicating the lived space 
in which we dwell, through which we experience the world—  
as that space expands, so does the world to which we have 
access" (W. Pinar, personal communication, July, 1991).
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Like most of the theorists mentioned above, I feel that 
much "truthfulness" lies completely outside the realm of 
the "factual." I also would argue that "truth" is 
contextually bound such that if I ask the question, "Is 
the self a fiction?" for one purpose, the answer might be 
the opposite of the reply to that same question when asked 
for a different purpose.
The particular "method" I am interested in for my own 
autobiographical writing in this chapter involves the 
interreferential reading of literature (autobiography, 
fiction, historical fiction) set in or near my own home or 
region, accompanied by reflective writing as a means of 
gaining insights into "self" and "other," how I construct 
who the "other" is, how I am constructed as the "other," 
and how a "sense of place" is itself built on notions of 
the "other." Certain literary works can serve as highly 
accessible resources (as compared to so much of social 
theoretical literature) for reaching deeper understandings 
about the nuances of "difference" and "identity." With 
such understandings, the possibilities for what could be 
called life-affirming and intelligent interpersonal 
relationships among teachers and students and their lives 
outside institutions are enhanced. Put another way, 
"repressed people tend to be stupid, and when smart, 
calculating only. Meditative, not just calculative,
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thought is an index of intelligence" (W. Pinar, personal 
communication, July, 1991).
The concept of the "other" is a crucial one for 
understanding the construction of "a sense of place." 
Creation of a notion of what constitutes "them and us," 
the meaning derived from "difference," of who, therefore, 
is "other" and the subsequent exclusion of the "other" 
(even within one's self) are often critical elements to 
the "sense of place." (For example, think about the 
presumed mindset of one who is called "provincial," "local 
yokel," etc.) A challenge to teachers, curriculum 
designers/theorists, and other interested people is to 
discover ways of invoking the power of place, retaining 
the "treasures" (Kincheloe, 1991, pp. 145-151), while 
bringing about respect for and celebration of difference. 
Respecting difference, but not in a "liberal/pluralist" 
sense where difference is respected only to the extent 
that one is to acknowledge it, tolerate it and "work" with 
it in order to provide "equal opportunity" for everyone to 
be more alike— that is to have, say, "white middle-class 
values." In contrast to a tolerance defined in this way, 
true respect tolerates the sustained existence of 
difference, and indeed recognizes difference not as an 
indicator of pathology, but as a healthy and even 
inevitable condition for living.
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Uncovering place in this way involves the process 
known to anthropologists as "making the familiar strange." 
This means, in the present context, rendering the 
strangeness of the "other," which has been problematically 
made "familiar" through stereotyping and/or otherwise 
erasing, strange again though in a new sense of that term- 
-a sense that does not assume strangeness to be inherently 
frightening and hostile. The "other" is made strange in 
that the comforting familiarity of stereotyping is 
abandoned and replaced with the disturbing exhilaration 
that comes from exposing "dangerous remembrances" about 
past experiences that are contrary to "official" thought 
as it is so often written/spoken in conventional 
discourses— experiences which contribute to the present 
drama, often in unexpected ways.
Making the familiar strange also means, in this 
context, critically examining the cliches one has learned 
to live by— cliches which are not only expressed through 
language but also through routines, habits, ways of 
seeing. Where did they come from? What purposes have they 
served and do they serve? What happens when they are not 
taken for granted? Are my cliches the same order of 
reasoning as my stereotyping?
I see this approach as being useful for teacher 
education as, I believe, it is extremely important for
teachers to be we11-acquainted and comfortable with 
difference, including difference within themselves. This 
is important in that learning necessarily involves self- 
awareness which necessarily involves difference-awareness. 
How can teachers facilitate students' self discoveries and 
creations if teachers are unable to facilitate their own? 
Additionally, teachers and their clients (students, 
parents, public) stand to benefit immensely if teachers 
are equipped to examine their own desires— desires to 
teach, desires for students, desires for themselves. This 
acquaintance and comfort arises only after the "statues" 
(Hurston, 1984, p. 25) that we have built of ourselves, 
those aspects of self trapped in, say, Lacan's Imaginary 
order, have been disturbed and re-articulated. Such a 
disturbance is made possible through, in part, 
intertextual readings of literary works and social and 
philosophical theory. In what may seem a paradoxical 
suggestion, the production of such readings are capable of 
disrupting the statue, yet such readings are only possible 
once disruption has begun. This is where autobiography, as 
an integral part of that intertextual adventure, becomes 
crucial. Through re-readings, re-writings and re-visions, 
the situation (of reading and writing) moves, such that 
what at first appears as paradox is revealed to be closer 
to a hermeneutical process. Clearly, adaptations of this
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may be useful for teachers in a variety of classroom 
settings, but with the understanding that certain dangers 
inhere. Autobiography conceived narrowly, for example as 
only direct narrative confession, can be impositional 
and/or shattering for some students. This is why it is 
even more important to emphasize the notion, as 
Starobinski, Pagano, and as Kerby do, that autobiography 
can be conceived of as encompassing an almost endless 
variety of styles and approaches. One does not have to 
narrate some sort of "life story" in order to 
express/create/learn about ourselves honestly in writing.
In my classes, while I have not specifically asked 
for fictionalized autobiographies, students have been 
alerted to that possibility. Some have written poetry in 
response. One wrote a kind of poem that looped and circled 
around the pages, thereby expressing herself not only 
through word-signs but also spatially, in a kind of 
"topography." The primary place of fiction in my classroom 
has been, however, in the position of parallel readings—  
readings for students to respond to in their own 
autobiographical accounts. This has not always been done 
directly. Yet I have strongly sensed that those who read 
the literary readings (Maya Angelou's I Know Whv the Caged 
Bird Sinas [1969], and Annie Dillard's An American
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Childhood [1987]), were responding to them in their own 
writings, however indirectly.
My own writing which follows immediately, is 
autobiographical in an oblique way which, given the 
notions of subjectivity and identity that dominate this 
work, is for me, one preferred approach to autobiography. 
Student work that I include here is not so oblique. While 
students were made aware of multiple possibilities for 
approaching the task, there was little time (one half of a 
semester) for them to experiment and develop a comfort 
with unfamiliar approaches. As such I must re-emphasize 
the fact that inclusion of their work is not viewed by me 
to be anything like a thorough investigation of a "method" 
for actual classroom situations. As stated at the outset, 
my investigation in this study is primarily theoretical, 
and my inclusion of some examples gathered so far from 
classroom practices is meant only to demonstrate a 
beginning for a future work.
Autobiographical Samples 
Mv Selection of a Text
Gwin Bristow's "Plantation Trilogy", including her 
books Deep Summer (1937), The Handsome Road (1938), and 
This Side of Glorv (1940), were popular books among my 
female peers of early adolescence. The books had been
reprinted in paperback in the late 1960's-early 1970's. I 
absorbed them each in one to three sittings, often staying 
up with flashlight under the covers past two in the 
morning. In looking at them now (particularly The Handsome 
Road) I am intrigued by what about them so captured me at 
that age— a child not especially drawn to the study of 
history in school, reading historical fiction into the 
early mornings. I know there was a sense within me of 
something magical, hidden, contradictory about the state 
of Louisiana where I had grown up, though more 
particularly about southern Louisiana (where I had not 
grown up), and that this sense was, in part, provided me 
by these books.
The Handsome Road tells a story of Civil War 
Louisiana mostly from the perspective of a young white 
woman who was "poor white trash," but also, at times, from 
the perspective of a wealthy white plantation-owning 
woman. The genre appears to be similar to the romanticized 
historical fiction of Gone With the Wind (1936). My 
questions as I initially approached the re-reading of this 
text were around the ways race, class, and gender were 
constructed. Why would this text be most appealing (at 
least in the late 1960's-early 1970's) to young, most 
likely white, female readers, and to me in particular?
What historical sense of place did it achieve for me? How
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did I situate myself within it ideologically? How did it 
support and/or shape my conceptions of race, class, and 
gender formation and difference at the time?
There are some other questions of interest to me 
about this book, which I cannot answer at this time, but 
which I raise for rhetorical purposes. Why was the book 
popular enough to go into fourteen printings up through 
1973, yet never critically reviewed again after the first 
few years of publication? The first paperback came out in 
1949. By 1969 it was only in its fifth printing. But by 
1973 it was in its fourteenth printing. The cover art and 
blurbs on the 1969-73 paperbacks are clearly aimed at a 
romance-reading audience. But the book reviews in the late 
thirties from reputable sources are favorable and treat 
the book as serious adult reading.
The Handsome Road; Romance and "Class Consciousness”
The book opens with a verse entitled "Plantation Song," 
"Nigger pick de cotton, nigger tote de load,
Nigger build de levee foh de ribber to smash, 
Nigger nebber walk up de handsome road,
But I radder be a nigger dan po' white trash!" 
which the poor white protagonist, Corrie May, later 
overhears the slaves singing at a plantation where she has 
gotten temporary work. This along with numerous other
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references to slave class condescension toward poor whites 
sets the tone for the antagonistic way racial difference, 
from the perspective of the poor white protagonist, is 
represented through most of the text. At the same time, 
this situation inspires a kind of "class-consciousness" in 
Corrie May that enables her to resist fulfilling some of 
the expectations for a young person of her gender and 
social class. But, aside from what Corrie May regards as 
condescending, African-Americans in this novel display 
little agency, and they receive little sympathy.
Bristow maintains a tension in the character of 
Corrie May between acceptance of the "status quo" for 
gender and class relations and angry rejection of both 
throughout most of the book. Challenges to interpersonal 
race relations occur only briefly when Corrie May is under 
the care of an African-American family in their home as 
she gives birth to an "illegitimate" son. Significantly, 
she names her son after the father of this family.
Bristow, perhaps, condemns slavery in the overt sense, but
covertly romanticizes it— leaving out any graphic 
depictions of abuses at the hands of whites, in fact 
portraying slave lives as mostly pleasant, but doing that 
from a distance with no reference to an interior life. On 
the other hand, graphic depictions of life for poor whites
are plentiful. She also frequently romanticizes
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traditional gender roles and the lives of the "elite" 
through her uses of language at the same time she seems to 
want to expose the social construction of such "common 
wisdom."
It is a contradictory book in much the same manner, 
perhaps, as particular modern romances are contradictory 
in their simultaneous challenges to and affirmations of 
traditional femininity (Radway, 1983). As will be 
demonstrated in what follows, Corrie May steps outside the 
bounds of traditional femininity and of social class 
divisions on occasions, at the same time those traditions 
are left substantially unchallenged. Such contradictions 
explain to me part of my attraction to it. Growing up in a 
small north Louisiana town with parents who were liberal 
democrats and non-Christian, I felt myself to be 
politically and emotionally in a highly contradictory 
place (in many senses of the term "place") as a female 
adolescent. As I re-read the book (after nearly 20 years)
I found myself engrossed in it all over again— like a 
fourteen-year-old— at the same time I clearly recognized 
the style of the writing to be largely predictable and 
cliched, much like a romance novel.
Now as I re-read an essay by Cora Kaplan, "The Thorn 
Birds: Fiction, Fantasy, Femininity" from her book Sea 
Changes: Culture and Feminism. I am struck by the
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similarity of her adolescent experience in reading Gone
With the Wind to my own experience with Bristow's books.
Like many readers of this early blockbuster 
romance I read it in one bout, too engaged with 
the story to eat or to sleep. I was a fast 
reader, but it must have taken me two days; no 
skipping here for the romance takes up most of 
the text. My compulsion was observed for the 
book itself was not approved of; pro-Southern 
and unashamedly racist, as well as without 
literary merit in my parents' eyes, it brought 
together a reactionary political narrative with 
a reactionary emotional one. I finished the book 
late in the night and the ending left me in 
despair and near hysteria (Kaplan, 1987, pp.
117-8).
While Bristow's book was, perhaps, not as politically 
reactionary as Gone With the Wind in the sense that it 
went farther in challenging the plantation system of the 
Old South, and my parents did not disapprove my reading 
it, I did "inhale" the book, and I did react emotionally 
to it at age fourteen, crying at times for both Corrie May 
and the wealthy plantation belle, Ann Sheramy.
A mystique around the old plantation homes themselves 
was also evoked for me (by then I had visited some of 
them). These homes embodied the polar opposites of good 
and evil for me— good in that they were, I thought, 
romantic and beautiful; evil in that I knew, but probably 
repressed the knowledge, that people had been held there 
as slaves and very possibly were tortured. I must confess 
an awe that I still feel, but an awe felt through the 
undeniable awareness of what those places symbolize.
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Recently, I had occasion to experience and explore these 
feelings in the very concrete situation of "house-sitting" 
one of these homes, Como Plantation, that sits next to the 
Mississippi River, isolated by four miles of dirt road 
that dead-ends at the house. Some nights were terrifying. 
Morrison, in Beloved, describes well what I believe I felt 
there:
I was talking about time. It's so hard for me to 
believe in it. Some things go. Pass on. Some 
things just stay. I used to think it was my 
rememory. You know. Some things you forget.
Other things you never do. But it's not. Places, 
places are still there. If a house burns down, 
it's gone, but the place— the picture of it—  
stays, and not just in my rememory, but out 
there, in the world. . . . Where I was before I 
came here, that place is real. It's never going 
away. Even if the whole farm . . . dies. The 
picture is still there and what's more, if you 
go there— you who never was there— if you go 
there and stand in the place where it was, it 
will happen again; it will be there for you, 
waiting for you (1987, pp. 35-6).
Indeed, the "big house" at Como Plantation was a turn-of-
the-century structure built then because the original
house had burned to the ground. Nevertheless, it was all
there— out there. As I re-read Bristow today, I cannot do
other than read her through Morrison, and, of course,
through my older self as well as my reconstructed
adolescent self.
For Kaplan, rather than an attraction to Southern
place born from personal experience, the strength of her
attraction to Gone With the Wind (henceforth, GWTW) lay in
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its romance and nostalgic embrace of "traditional 
femininity [which] could be lived in an unashamed way." It 
was a reaction, in part, to fifties female adolescence 
and, in part, a form of resistance in a household where 
the trappings of fifties femininity were disapproved but 
so was censorship. The way, in Kaplan's estimation, that 
book spoke to her as well as to women in general is worth 
repeating in full here because I believe her 
interpretation is relevant for The Handsome Road and for 
me as well.
For me personally it was a resonant and painful 
text, for I was engaged in a long and bitter 
struggle with my father in these years, for my 
autonomy, for his love and approval. But it 
spoke I think to a much wider audience of 
American women readers for whom the pre-Civil 
War South did serve as a sort of pre-capitalist 
site of family romance, a mythical moment of 
settled traditional social relations that the 
Civil War destroyed forever. . . .  As a parable 
of Southern history and as a romantic narrative 
with incestuous overtones it is history and 
fantasy spoken from the position of the women.
It remains so today (1987, p. 119).
Re-reading The Handsome Road as an adult has, I
believe, evoked from me what Toni Morrison calls rememory-
-a sense of having been struck by a glimmering of
recollection, of something that has happened but has been
long lost to consciousness. Rememory that occurs through
my reading Bristow now calls up questions for me, about me
and my relations to others, after fourteen years of age—
questions that have, however, in some way sprung from my
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vision now of that fourteen-year-old and what happened, 
what was felt, in her life between then and now. In the 
context of my current literary and theoretical readings, 
no doubt Bristow's book has come to mean more and to mean 
other than it did. Likewise, Kaplan writes of a kind of 
revisionary repetition of her experience of GWTW twenty- 
five years later with the novel and the television mini­
series The Thorn Birds. (I, too, watched the entire mini­
series on television. I did not know any men who did.) It 
was through her adult reading of another romance that 
Kaplan was able to re-read her younger self reading GWTW. 
She writes,
Like Gone With the Wind, but with significant 
differences, The Thorn Birds pursues an 
interesting occasionally radical interrogation 
of sexual difference inside a reactionary set of 
myths about history (1987, p. 134).
Like romance novels more generally, as mentioned
earlier, each of these texts invite the woman reader to
explore limited reversals of traditional femininity and
masculinity, all the while, ultimately at least,
attempting to bring her back into the fold of traditional
female roles. The heroine may resist fulfilling
traditional role expectations only to be "conquered" as
"Mr. Right" finally arrives (and then, perhaps, dies!).
Here is a sample from The Handsome Road:
Denis came down the hall. He looked tall and 
splendid, and Ann called herself a fool to
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hesitate before the chance of the most enviable 
marriage on the river. As he met her at the foot 
of the staircase he impulsively swept her into 
his arms. After a moment Ann drew back a little.
She looked up at him, feeling a sensation of 
pleasure at the nearness of his physical beauty.
Denis did not say anything. He stood with one 
hand on her shoulder and his other arm around 
her waist, smiling down at her so urgently that 
Ann felt herself yielding as though his ardor 
were a command she had no power to disobey, and 
as Denis drew her to him again she put her own 
arms around him and pressed his lips down to 
hers (1938, p. 53).
And I loved it. Why?! Such analysis almost frightens me.
As Barbara Johnson wrote: "Literature is not only a
thwarted investigator but also an incorrigible perpetrator
of the problem of sexuality" (1980, p. 23) . Similarly (and
to repeat), for Kaplan (who is not Southern), "the deep
South and its fake aristocracy, imitation feudalism (which
Mitchell both deplores and celebrates) was an imaginary
historic site where traditional femininity could be lived
in an unashamed way" (1987, p. 118).
Jessica Benjamin's psychoanalytic theorizing in her
book The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis. Feminism, and the
Problem of Domination (1988) is, in my case, illuminating.
According to Benjamin, for girls (as for boys) "the father
becomes the image of liberation from maternal power . . .
the one who recognizes and embodies desire" (p. 100). He
is the first "ideal love" in households where certain
traditional gender roles are maintained, that is, where
the mother's agency is devalued in comparison to the
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father's. He "seemingly embodies the agency and desire one
lacks in oneself" (p. 100). He is "the way into the world"
(p. 103). In such families, the dual desire of the child
for separation and identification results in a split
whereby the child "assign[s] the contradictory strivings
to different parents" (p. 104). This then can result in
the devaluation of the mother and the idealization of the
father which, for girls, who must necessarily identify
with their mothers, presents a particularly difficult
dilemma in their struggles for independence. The
attraction for women to romance novels is explained by
Benjamin as follows:
In the most common fantasy of ideal love, the 
one so frequently found in mass-market romances, 
a woman can only unleash her desire in the hands 
of a man whom she imagines to be more powerful, 
who does not depend upon her for his strength.
Such a man, who desires but does not need her, 
satisfies the element missing from both mother 
and father, the ability to survive attack and 
still be there. In this sense the ideal lover 
actually provides a dual solution, containment 
and excitement, the holding environment and the 
road to freedom— the joint features of both the 
ideal mother and father (p. 120).
As I mentioned previously, re-reading Bristow induces 
for me "rememory" (that sudden and startling but vague 
remembrance of forgotten events or thoughts) and, in the 
context of what Benjamin writes, that rememory takes me to 
early relationships to my father and to boys. While a full 
reconstruction of my earlier reading self through
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Bristow's book is necessarily lacking, the re-reading of 
such a previously read novel provokes memories of long- 
forgotten events, perhaps even remembering myself 
remembering, much like the smell of my grandmother's house 
does. I do remember feeling driven to please my father, to 
value school as he did, to be a "good girl."
Second grade: I was a new student in Cypress Springs 
Elementary School. The boy who was class clown did not 
care that other boys were terrified of and eschewed girls- 
-he "loved" them. I was new, so I was his next target. He 
sent a note during class to me, surreptitiously, a love 
letter. I remember thrill and mortification. He was 
outrageous freedom for me. He said anything at all to the 
teacher, and still, usually, charmed her. I, on the other 
hand, was outrageously confined (shy, tentative) by 
"goodness." I would not acknowledge him. I corrected his 
spelling and sent the note back. I was my father's 
daughter.
Rememory: Good girl gone bad. My older sister sneaked 
out of the house one night to meet her boyfriend. Her 
empty room was discovered, I was awakened and questioned, 
pleaded with never to do the same, to which I responded,
"I would never do that." The very next night: (romance and 
pain) sneaking out at night together (my sister and I) we 
were betrayed by the dog who led our father to the place
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of our liaison with our boyfriends. (God damn this small 
town!) Pounding on the door he yelled, "Give me what's 
mine!" (My father's daughter.) I remember laughing through 
fear. A year or so after this event my older sister would 
follow this guy to Mississippi only to return home after a 
few weeks with a bruised face. My boyfriend broke my heart 
by sleeping with other girls and with emotional distance.
I broke up exclaiming, "I never, ever want to see you 
again!" (Twenty years later we are still friends.) Coming 
to understand this ownership idea has been difficult for 
me almost to the present. (Do I belong to my father? Do I
belong to my partners? Do my partners belong to me? What
about friends? Students? What is owed and what is due?)
Like GWTW. The Handsome Road ends with the heroine 
(Corrie May) and the other primary female character (Ann) 
"tragically" without husbands or lovers. But unlike 
Scarlet in GWTW. this is not a punishment for "bad 
behavior"— at least not as explicitly. Still, both women 
do end up in the presumably much needed care of men— their 
sons.
Legends and place.
Rich descriptions of the natural beauty of south 
Louisiana in terms of foliage, sunsets, water, smells
(which, even in 1938 let alone 1859-65, must have been
phenomenal compared to Louisiana today) are sprinkled 
throughout the book. Any mention of the sensuality of 
natural place— especially, for some reason, in terms of 
smell— has always captivated my imagination.
Interestingly, these descriptions are primarily found in 
conjunction with scenes of the plantation "big house." For 
example, Bristow writes of gardenias in the breeze and 
vetivert sachet's for Ann's clothes— two of my favorite 
scents to this day. It could be argued that this is a 
strategy for impressing upon the reader the starkness and 
injustice of the black and poor white situation by way of 
pointing out the discrepancies between the two physical 
environments. As I recall, for me at fourteen, such a 
strategy only served to romanticize the plantation homes 
to the extent that I found myself hoping they and their 
inhabitants could go on forever unscathed. I even imagined 
myself eventually owning one of those homes and becoming a 
writer— probably of romantic historical fiction. In what 
follows, I read the text as I see it now.
At the heart of The Handsome Road lies Corrie May's 
determination to both survive and to get beyond living for 
the mere survival that marks her social class in this poor 
white antebellum community just north of New Orleans. 
Outside town, along the river road, is the stark contrast 
of the wealthy plantation homes— homes that house
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"Southern Gentlemen" who were raised to exploit land and
people— especially black people, poor people and women—
and to do so with the utmost "courtesy" and "reserve."
"You'll read the Latin poets, especially 
Catullus," [the young 'gentleman's' cynical 
aunt] went on, "and you'll be fond of Byron, and 
you'll treat every lady as if she were in danger 
of breaking in two, and say the Army of North 
Virginia was the greatest bunch of fighting men 
God Almighty ever let get together on this 
earth." "I never saw it," said Denis [Ann's 
son]; rather wistfully."My dear child, do you 
think that matters? That's the ultimate test of 
your type Denis— living by legends you don't 
know anything about" (1938, p.262).
Living by legends. Legends of the "Southern Lady," the 
plantation myths, of bitterness and blame for southern 
defeat (those "damned Yankee Carpetbaggers") survived for 
me in forms that I could neither recognize nor face at 
fourteen, but which leapt from the pages for me as I re­
read and remembered reading. Yet, given the incongruence 
of my parents' and my own political views with the local 
and southern majority, I surely considered myself immune, 
rational, compassionate. I marvel at the strength of 
history, "real" history rather than mere legend, of 
hegemony, of place, and, simultaneously, I marvel at the 
possibility for and incidence of resistance.
Here is that mythical "Southern Lady," "Southern 
Belle," that "steel magnolia":
Ann could see herself merging from girlhood into 
the great lady of the plantation legend. She
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could do it, not everybody could. A great lady 
was music and moonshine, but she was also hard 
as steel. She was too frail to put on her own 
shoes and stockings but she bore ten children 
quietly; she had never an idea in her lovely 
head but she could make a hundred not 
necessarily congenial guests coalesce into a 
pleasant unit; she must always be sent upstairs 
to rest before the ordeal of getting dressed for 
a ball but she could dance till sunrise once she 
got there; she turned faint at the sight of 
blood from a cut finger but she could ride to 
hounds and be in at the kill (pp.90-1).
Bristow assures us that, for Ann, this was the natural
order. Ann's position could be read through Benjamin's
psychoanalytic theory of domination (1988). Such a
reaction to difference as exhibited by wealthy white
planters can be justified by them only as they see their
separation from the "others" as complete. This, however,
calls up a contradiction for them in that they require
recognition from those others— recognition of their
existence as masters, superiors— which creates a
dependency that exposes as illusion their absolute
separation. Cruelty functions as an attempt to assert and
reinforce separation, independence, dominance, and has the
effect of reifying those ideas. Indeed, when it comes to
social class— "old money," "cultural capital," "poor white
trash"— Bristow seems to recognize the illusions of
naturalness to social class relations (excluding where
such relations involve race) and employs strategies to
point this out.
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Corrie May is confused at how the wealthy resolve
their exploitative cruelty toward the poor with their
ethic of tenderness and gentility at home.
For all her glimpses of rich people at Ardeith, 
she had never made it clear in her mind how they 
could be so ineffably cruel and at the same time 
so very kind. There was a woman in Rattletrap 
Square [Corrie May's neighborhood] whose husband 
had been killed in a fall from a scaffolding, 
and she had been turned into the street with 
four children because she could not pay her rent 
to the St. Clairs, and yet the very next day Mr. 
Bertram St. Clair came to dinner at Ardeith with 
his mother, and he was so attentive to the old 
lady that he might have been held up as a model 
of devotion. It was all very puzzling (p. Ill).
Many other examples of this phenomenon are scattered
throughout the book making clear the notion that the
wealthy assumed their station in life above poor and black
to be, perhaps, divinely ordained— natural— and thus
justifying a double (or even triple) standard of ethics.
Legends survive through double-binds, through
contradiction repressed, through the "illiterate
imagination" (Harris, 1989), in short, through a kind of
stupidity.
Ann (Corrie May's employer at the time) and Corrie 
May each think the other is stupid, and somewhere they are 
both right, of course. Ann falls for Corrie May's "low 
profile" around the plantation when she is working for 
Ann.
She's a funny little thing, Ann thought with 
irrelevant amusement. So quiet; she doesn't seem
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to notice very much. Very likely she's a bit 
stupid. I suppose she's had a hard life, but 
then she's used to it. People like that don't 
expect much in the world (1938, p. 90).
Then when Ann asked Corrie May to teach her how to knit in
order to support the "war effort,"
Corrie May set about giving her a lesson. In 
about thirty minutes she was so exasperated she 
had difficulty keeping her temper. She had never 
in all her born days seen anybody so stupid as 
Ann. Those dainty white fingers of hers seemed 
utterly unable to perform any task at all, even 
one so simple as throwing thread over a needle.
. . . And what was worse, she didn't seem to 
know how to give her attention to what she was 
doing. In the middle of an explanation she 
looked out of the window and said how pretty the 
moon was as it came up (pp. 108-9).
Both Corrie May and Ann are unable to recognize forms of
intelligence in one another— they both assume a natural
stupidity in the other. This is exposed by Bristow as she
repeatedly points out the differing perceptions.
Corrie May gets involved with a carpetbagger after
the war, and she discusses with him why, even though these
people, the deposed master class, are now poorer than he
is, they still carry themselves with superiority. She
explains to him in her way the notions of cultural capital
and the belief by the wealthy in manifest destiny— what
she later calls "that magnificent confidence of birth" (p.
285) .
Corrie May hesitated, but she remembered that 
everybody was equal now and she could say what 
she pleased, so she continued, "Mr. Gilday, you 
ain't really going to get at them people till
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you hit them in the place where they keep a 
little private contract with their private God 
that they're better than other folks. They got 
education and manners and I ain't saying them 
things ain't fine to have, I wish I had some, 
but them Larnes and Sheramys and their sort, 
they honestly think the reason they're like that 
and you and me ain't is that the Lord God made 
them out of a different kind of dust from us. It 
ain't never been in the back side of their mind 
that if you and me had been started off like 
them the day we were born we'd be elegant as 
them now" (p. 183).
Ann, struggling to pay Corrie May's carpetbagger the 
taxes on her plantation after the war, is humiliated by 
the man and Corrie May when she is short ten dollars out 
of one hundred ninety eight owed. Their snide and haughty 
behavior toward her is bewildering. "Why do they hate me?" 
she asks. This historical and interpersonal naivete, is 
not unlike my own experience of racial relations in 
Ruston, Louisiana. Certain that I was not racist, I could 
not understand why I sensed hostility from African- 
American people or why I felt guilt about that. Nor could 
I understand why I felt shame, a sort of vague personal 
responsibility, in the face of African-American deference 
toward me, as in the case when a woman of color who was 
baby-sitting my sisters and I offered to us a biblical 
justification for the subordination of dark-skinned 
people. Did she believe this, really? It seemed so. Or was 
she saying this only for our benefit? Did I want to 
believe her? Did she read my desire and play to it? And,
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if so, was her intent kindness or cruelty? I told her that
I did not believe it. Did she believe me?
Corrie May wakes up abruptly to some of the material
realities and the social construction of social class
differences before the Civil War. She watches her thirty-
five year old mother who looks twenty years older and
registers that picture alongside her image of Ann Sheramy
who would still look "exquisite" in twenty years, and then
recalls her subconscious-turned-conscious hearing of her
father's front porch neighborhood rantings.
Then, all of a sudden, she heard some of the 
words Pa had been shooting off as she came down 
the alley. She had hardly heard them then, she 
had only felt mad that Pa talked all the time 
instead of doing a job of work. But they must 
have gone into her ears and stuck in her head, 
for now she heard them.In the whole South, seven 
million white people owning all the slaves. So—  
if you counted out the slaveowners' families—  
six million white people who owned no slaves.
Six million white people who owned nothing at 
all. She was not so stupid as not to know that 
those who owned slaves owned everything else.
The first sign of a man's rise in the world was 
his buying himself a nigger. "Jesus," said 
Corrie May aloud (p. 11).
Examples of Corrie May's awarenesses of social class 
privilege and difference are numerous throughout the book, 
even including a passage where she notices how much easier 
it is for a rich couple to make amends after an argument 
than for a poor couple (because the rich can get away from 
each other, buy each other consolation gifts, and not have 
to perform hard labor while angry). Still, race is ever
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pitted against class in this novel, with the persistent
insistence even that slave women were better off than poor
white women.
The mulatto girl Bertha, Napoleon's wife, who 
expected a baby about the same time as Ann, was 
appointed for the honor of wet-nursing the heir; 
she was moved from the quarters to a room in the 
big house and coddled with as many luxuries as 
the mistress. Corrie may thought if it were 
herself she would have felt like a milch-cow 
being petted for the parish fair, but Bertha, a 
smart young woman of elegant speech and manners, 
put on a multitude of airs. . . . She thought of 
the slave-women at Ardeith, carefully tended 
during their pregnancies because a little Negro was 
worth a hundred dollars the day it was born (pp.
80-1).
Even though it was mentioned that Bertha was mulatto, 
the reader is apparently not supposed to wonder what this 
means (if she is a naive fourteen-year-old). Or, if she 
knows what it means, what the conditions were under which 
it came about. While Bristow graphically depicts the mob 
beating of Corrie May for publicly expressing her 
sentiments about the poor white man being conscripted to 
fight the rich white man's war (who was not required to 
fight) in order to insure their respective economic 
statuses— that is, poor white man "worse off than the 
slave"— she never mentions the beatings, murders, and 
rapes suffered by black slaves who did not have the option 
to just quit their jobs. (This is not to say that it was, 
in perhaps most cases, not much of an option for poor
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whites, just that there was no such option for slaves, and 
no legal protection.)
Although Bristow states at the outset that she is 
writing this from the perspective of the poor whites 
because most other literature on the antebellum South is 
either from the perspective of rich white or slave black,
I find these kinds of omissions and distortions notable 
given the presence, albeit somewhat muted presence, of 
challenges to the social order in terms of social class.
It is difficult to imagine why the black story remains so 
marginal, in spite of available information on the 
subject, unless Bristow is so absolutely "other" to black 
people (a reasonable speculation for 1938 in Louisiana) 
that they are almost non-existent for her— Ralph Ellison's 
"invisible" people. Indeed, although Bristow expressed 
awareness of her privileging of the poor white story over 
others, a story of the wealthy white emerges through 
Corrie May's relations to them. The same cannot be said 
for her relations to African-American people in the novel. 
Whether or not Bristow employed a conscious strategy for 
racial representation, her manner of representation 
demonstrates a very real distance— an exoticising— of 
black from white that permeated (and permeates) white 
consciousness.
Clearly the amount and accuracy of primary sources 
about black slaves was (and is) sorely lacking compared to 
the multitudes of diaries, journals, newspaper accounts of 
whites from the same period. According to Elizabeth Fox- 
Genovese, many of the slave narratives in existence were 
dictated to white interviewers who either had difficulty 
with "dialect" or simply censored what they heard, or both 
(1988, p.33). Thus the slave narratives that possibly were 
available to Bristow may have presented a skewed image of 
the lives of slaves. Also, she was writing from the 
perspective of women, and to find primary sources from 
black women is apparently even more difficult than from 
black men. Fox-Genovese says: "Few slave women wrote 
journals, diaries, and letters. As a group, they did not 
enjoy even the precarious access to the world of published 
writings enjoyed by white women and former slave men"
(P .33). Still, it is doubtful that there was much, if any, 
more material available by or about poor white women. The 
character of Corrie May was technically illiterate.
Indeed, the New Orleans woman who inspired Bristow to 
create this character and this book could not write her 
own name. (Bristow worked as a journalist for the Times 
Picayune in New Orleans where she discovered the model for 
her novel in the obituaries [Bristow, 1941].)
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After-Words. After-Thoughts: Autobiography and Cultural 
Studies
In re-reading I can begin to reconstruct an 
adolescent girl who read this (twenty-two years ago) 
through locating some of her ignorance— as Shoshana Felman 
writes, the sites of her "resistance to knowledge" (1987, 
p. 80). I was not prepared, as a southern teen-aged girl, 
to relinquish a belief in the romance of the South. Though 
this novel provided some sense of the inequities and 
contradictions, it did so without seriously challenging 
the ahistoricism of Southern romance. Given the mythic 
characterization of white Southern women as "steel 
magnolias" which, like myth generally, bears some relation 
to real people, points of departure from myth and from 
cliche were few for my adolescent reading as I remember 
it. Notions of race were as enshrouded in a shimmery 
vagueness in my re-reading of the book as they are for my 
memories of specific relations to race at fourteen. I 
sense that race was a kind of undercurrent that beckoned 
my attention at the same time it was foreboding. It was 
exoticised, in much the manner it seems to be for Bristow.
I do not presume to be setting forth some direct 
cause and effect between my adolescent reading of this 
novel and what or who I became or was. The value of this 
re-reading and re-writing for me was more in its
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suggestion of the possibility of reconstructing a place 
(historically, psychologically, geographically) through 
which I might examine my present relations to others, to 
myself, to "place"— relations that have a direct bearing 
on my teaching and notions of knowledge. It has raised for 
me issues around desire, guilt, privilege, and domination- 
-issues that never cease to concern me in the classroom, 
in my relations to my students. Indeed, the whole of this 
study is one outgrowth of my re-reading as I initially re­
read Bristow before I embarked upon this project. As 
Morrison and Ellison demonstrate, the process Morrison has 
called rememory is difficult and even painful, but 
necessary for avoiding existential death. To be 
existentially dead— caught in the fictional register of 
identity formation?— is to be in no position to 
learn/teach. It is to be stupid.
In doing work such as this one is "doing" a form of 
cultural studies. One is also employing a fundamental 
approach to cultural studies more generally and, in this 
case, ultimately applying it to problems of pedagogy in 
teacher education. As Richard Johnson writes in "What is 
Cultural Studies Anyway?,"
the problems [for approaches which focus on 
"lived culture"] is how to grasp the more 
concrete and private moments of cultural 
circulation. . . .  Of course, students of 
culture have access to private forms through 
their own experiences and social worlds. This is
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a continuous resource, the more so if it is 
consciously specified and if its relativity is 
recognised. Indeed, a cultural self-criticism of 
this kind is the indispensable condition for 
avoiding the more grossly ideological forms of 
cultural study (1986-7, p. 69).
Yet the work of autobiography, as with (and along with)
literary reading, is necessarily intertextual and inter-
subjective.
In arguing the need for a "theory of subjectivity"
(p. 63) for cultural studies that takes seriously "the 
notion of a discursive self-production of subjects, 
especially in the form of histories and memories" (p. 69), 
Johnson is also stressing the significance of "readers in 
texts; readers in society" (p. 65). Moving between 
readers in texts and readers in societies involves, for 
Johnson, an intertextual and an interdiscursive 
competence.
In disciplinary terms we move from a ground 
usually covered by literary approaches to one 
more familiar to historical or sociological 
competences, but the common new element here is 
the ability to handle a mass of co-existing 
determinations, operating at many different 
levels. . . .  In everyday life, textual 
materials are complex, multiple, overlapping, 
co-existent, juxta-posed, in a word, "inter­
textual." If we use a more agile category like 
discourse, indicating elements that cut across 
different texts, we can say that all readings 
are also "inter-discursive" (pp. 66-67).
Autobiography as cultural studies— roughly, studies
of means and ends of self-representation— operates by
raising and dynamically responding to the following
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question: To what extent does a person's constructions of 
self through narratives about her or his life and reading 
of texts (especially, here, literary texts) produce new 
relations and orientations to "culture," and to what 
extent do these constructions re-produce certain relations 
and orientations within culture(s)? The self as 
problematic, inter-subjective and perpetual process and 
project invites us to learn and to nurture a "cross- 
cultural imagination" or "literacy of the imagination" 
(Harris, 1989).
Student Autobiographies
The course I taught in which the following 
autobiographical work was done involved theoretical 
readings loosely centered around sociology and history or 
education for the first half of the semester. After some 
whole-class lecture and discussion each class period, 
students worked together in small groups of five to six 
where they were to deal with issues raised in the readings 
and discussions, often arguing with one another, getting 
to know one another a bit more intimately that the larger 
group (about 35 students) allowed. The last portion of 
each class involved whole-class discussions again in which 
spokespersons from each group would share their group's 
ideas with the rest of the class. Occasionally, class
would begin with, instead of my lecture, presentations on 
readings by students individually to the entire class on 
the readings, and in which the student brought in at least 
one relevant outside reading. During group time I 
circulated among groups, not always making it to each 
group each time, where I listened, offered suggestions, 
and participated in discussions. For the second half of 
the semester we began reading literary autobiographical 
writings by Maya Angelou and Annie Dillard. Along with 
these readings students were to do brief interactive (with 
the texts) autobiographical writings over three general 
themes that they selected, in part, from a list of 
possible themes. At this time group work involved sharing 
their concerns and ideas about the readings and writings, 
receiving critique from their group members if they so 
chose. Finally, students were required to share one (in 
part or in whole) of their writings (their choice) with 
the entire class. Clearly, such an assignment was 
frightening for many students at first. I attempted to 
relieve their sense of vulnerability in a number of ways: 
first, autobiography was broadly defined to include a 
number of possible forms such as poetry and 
autobiographical fiction; second, there were ground rules 
for the class regarding confidentiality and judgmental ism; 
third, I began by sharing some of my own work and
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third, I began by sharing some of my own work and 
periodically did so throughout.
In this class students did receive grades for their 
autobiographical work. That work was judged, however, 
primarily on whether or not assignments were done and 
"attended to"— that is, I asked the question "Does she or 
he seem engaged with it?" Something as simple as length of 
writing can begin to tell me of at least one sort of 
engagement. But that is clearly insufficient. Was the tone 
of the writing glib? Did they rely on cliches? Even if 
they did rely on cliches, sometimes that was not an 
indication of insincerity or non-engagement so much as 
inexperience and repression. For this reason and others I 
was glad that I had waited, as planned, until mid-term to 
begin this work, a time after which I knew my students 
better than at the beginning, and had gained a sense of 
certain kinds of "limitations." Indeed, it seemed that 
many apparent limitations were overcome— students went 
"beyond themselves"— with the autobiographical work.
Beyond this it is not easy to articulate specific criteria 
for judging, but I can say that I found very few students 
who did not get taken in by the project, sometimes in 
spite of themselves. I say "in spite of themselves" 
because there was resistance to the idea at first. I know 
this from signals given in class, but also, more
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concretely, from voluntary, anonymous written evaluations 
given to me at the end of the semester. Still, the 
greatest difficulty I have found so far is in finding ways 
to discourage students from producing something like 
"Muzak" versions of their lives. Though some of them did 
succumb to this in at least some of their writings, 
clearly, many of them avoided it.
Love and the pedagogical imperative.
Trish (a pseudonym) wrote about her reading self. She
loves to read and learned to love it from, she believes,
one high school teacher in particular. She writes:
I don't remember much about Mr. Thibodaux before 
the day I fell head over heels in love with him. He 
was my eleventh grade English teacher. Incredibly 
calm and peaceful, he was the epitome of patience. 
Rumor had it that he had once been a monk. This 
offered a possible explanation for the endearing way 
he folded his hands in front of his waist as if they 
were in the sleeve of an imaginary habit.
English had always been my favorite subject and 
I was doing quite well in his class. He made the 
literature seem lively and interesting and his rapid 
fire discussions went over well. One day he asked me 
to stay after class. He said that he had liked my
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report on The Catcher in the Rve and asked if I would 
be interested in doing some extra reading. Until that 
time I had only read what was assigned in school. In 
fact, I remember thinking that he was offering me 
extra credit. But what he offered was a stack of his 
own books that he'd had when he was my age. I didn't 
think I would be interested in all this extra 
"work." But, always anxious to please the 
teacher, I took them.
A strange thing happened as I delved into Harper 
Lee and Mark Twain, I constantly thought about Mr. 
Thibodaux. What did he think about the story and the 
characters? Had he laughed and cried at the same 
places I had? I hungrily read everything he suggested 
in preparation for the "big moment." That was once a 
week when after class he would fold his hands, tilt 
his head, and ask, "Well, what have you been 
reading?" I had developed a huge crush on him and 
this was the only time he spoke to me on any kind of 
personal level. Needless to say, I lived for this 
moment and was always sure to be well prepared for 
the ensuing discussion.
Trish then writes of returning to her high school 
after four years— four years of "reading like a madman"—  
to visit Mr. Thibodaux. She was shocked at the profound
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difference in her earlier impression of his physical 
appearance and what she saw now. The prior obsession, she 
now realized, was based in a kind of transference love 
(though she did not call it that) that her high school 
self was unable to disentangle from feelings of romantic 
love. Indeed, as discussed earlier, such love cannot be 
viewed as in clear distinction.
In private conversation Trish told me that she still 
falls in love with good teachers though not with the same 
illusions. She was concerned about this and asked me if I 
understood— if I did the same thing. She was particularly 
distressed over the fact that this most often occurred for 
her with her male professors. Reminding her that probably 
most of her professors are male I did offer the suggestion 
that she give this some thought by writing about it in the 
context of her current readings for the class.
Indeed, in her next writing she asked herself the 
question, "Why are most of the teachers I loved male?" She 
writes:
I don't think that most of the teachers I've 
"loved" have to do with that kind of crush/romantic 
love as in the case of Mr. Thibodaux. I think that in 
my feelings for the good teachers there is a 
determinable amount of respect. But in trying to find
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examples of really good female teachers I can only 
come up with two . . .
She then initiates an exploration of her different 
expectations for male and female teachers with a quote 
from Annie Dillard's An American Childhood: "They [boys] 
had been learning self-control. We [girls] had failed to 
develop any selves worth controlling" (1987, p. 91). Trish 
writes:
What a scary, scary passage. Does it really 
start that young? How many things must be undone to 
expose this conditioning that is begun so early? Is 
it possible? I know that this feeling exists in me 
and I reject it to the point of meanness. This is not 
a good solution! So what can be done about something 
that is so prevalent in our society?
Trish's "meanness" is, she discovers, in that her 
female teachers must work much harder than her male ones 
to win her respect. Female teachers that she had liked as 
an elementary and high school student had been likable 
because they were "sweet," but all too often this 
sweetness was manifested in low expectations for students, 
particularly girl students. Trish, it seems, resented this 
as she grew older and discovered her own mind. That 
resentment resulted in pre-judgment for female teachers, 
and a kind of subconscious requirement that they work
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harder now, for atonement. Trish is deeply disturbed at 
her own complicity in patriarchy implicit in this 
attitude.
I am not suggesting that Trish necessarily came to 
some deep psychoanalytic understanding of notions of 
desire and transference, nor that this is necessary. 
However, I do think it possible that she has been set on a 
trajectory of discovery of sorts with her new way of 
reading both texts and herself. My own interpretation of 
her writing and our conversations is that Trish has 
encountered a "surprise of otherness" in her recognition, 
through reading and writing, of some of the cultural 
foundations of her reactions to male and female teachers, 
as well as the possibilities for departures from cultural 
"scripts." She has encountered the significance of 
otherness not only in her reconstructed perceptions of Mr. 
Thibidaux and her female teachers, but also within 
herself.
Transformations and difference (past and present).
At the end of the semester Donna (pseudonym) writes: 
I've tried and tried to title this writing, but 
I just can't find one that is suitable. So, I'll just 
jump straight into what I want to say. This is a 
combination of me, Donna, trying to explain both to
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myself, and to you, my teacher, what this class has 
taught me about "otherness," and how it has changed 
my vision of myself as a teacher.
I have always been a very prejudiced person, 
although that is something I never would have 
admitted, perhaps even to myself, before this course. 
My prejudices, although they include racial ones, are 
certainly not exclusive to them. I have grown up with 
the belief that I was better than "others." "Others," 
in my life, were people who looked different, acted 
different, wore the wrong kind of clothes, drove the 
wrong car, held the wrong job, had a poor ACT score, 
a bad perm, a strange accent. The list is almost 
endless. I would certainly never have voiced my 
opinion; that would be tacky, cruel. No one that 
knows me would ever accuse me of being unkind, stuck- 
up, or even prejudiced. But in my mind, these 
feelings lived.
When I made the decision to teach, I began to 
see the potential conflict between my desire to be a 
good teacher, and the intolerance I felt. In this day 
and age, such biases are easy to justify, but I 
wasn't fooling myself. This wasn't right, and it 
wasn't the person I wanted to be. How could I be a 
good teacher, change students' lives, be someone they
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respected and hold on to these beliefs. I couldn't.
The early readings in this course began to give 
me something concrete to think about. These things 
made sense! As a teacher, it was important for me to 
alienate no one, to show no favoritism or bias. All 
of these children deserve the best education I could 
give them, and I knew that "hiding" my biases would 
not work.
Maya Angelou's I Know Whv the Caged Bird Sinas 
spoke more directly to my heart. This was a 
wonderful, brilliant child. A child with questions 
and feelings very much like I would have, had I been 
in her situation. But society has not treated me like 
it treated her, like it treats so many children. That 
was the only real difference between me and Maya. I 
read Maya Angelou's book twice; I couldn't get enough 
of it the first time. I began to look at the people 
around me differently. Why did I have so little 
patience with others? Wasn't that why I wanted to 
teach, to bring something to someone who did not have 
it before? How could I expect everyone to be like me? 
They could easily ask the same of me!
I also have had to face up to why this class was 
so difficult for me to engage in throughout the 
semester. This was trying ground for me to cover, new
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ground. These were questions I had not yet resolved 
for myself, and I was hesitant to deal with these 
things in a large group of people. However, this 
class has gone a long way toward helping me to answer 
my questions about myself. I have begun to resolve 
the inner struggles that my desire to teach has 
generated. I'm glad that I have chosen a future and a 
profession that is making me into a better person, a 
person that I can respect.
Note: This is the last essay that I actually 
wrote. Although it deals with a topic for the first 
week, in my mind and heart, it ties together what 
this semester has meant to me.
This writing brings to the fore a number of 
questions. Was Donna writing just what she thought I 
wanted to hear? Of course, I have no way of answering this 
definitively, but given the intensity of her writing, to 
answer it in the affirmative seems an act of distrust. She 
was a very quiet student, as her writing might indicate, 
and I had no idea until this time that she felt as she did 
about the class. Her grades had all been high as well—  
there was no need to attempt to please me on that account.
More importantly for me is the question of how or if 
this differs, in result or in apparent goal, from those 
"human relations" approaches to, and models for,
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multicultural education that I have criticized and wished 
to go beyond. Certainly, it seems clear that Donna has 
experienced a change in attitude toward cultural 
differences— the primary stated goal of human relations 
multicultural education. But I want to make the argument 
that her change has been toward the very idea of 
difference, and that this constitutes, for Donna, a new 
way of reading— of reading, similar to Trish, for the 
surprise of otherness.
This can be discussed by looking at a few key 
sentences in her writing. Some of her statements are 
problematic in the context of this project. For example 
she writes, "But society has not treated me like it 
treated her, like it treats so many children. That was the 
only real difference between me and Maya." This urge to 
collapse very real differences between herself and Angelou 
may be a necessary step in her construction of herself, 
much like Pinar advises with his thermostatic notion of an 
"architecture of the self." We build it according to what 
needs attending for the moment. Plans can always be 
changed later. Donna's sense of herself as utterly 
separate from "others" may need addressing before concerns 
about "fusion." That she will stop with this construction 
is in no way implied by her particular reading.
Then, in the same paragraph, she writes: "How could I 
expect everyone to be like me? They could easily ask the 
same of me!" Is this merely a "human relations" gesture? I 
think it probably encompasses that but I do not think it 
is merely that. Through certain literary works it is 
possible for students to learn a new way to read . . .  a 
new assemblage is constructed. That is more than mere 
change in attitude as it is typically framed in the goals 
of "human relations" multicultural curricula— curricula 
which sought to generate harmony across difference without 
ever interrogating the historical and cultural sources of 
genuine conflict. Finally, I am talking about "human 
relations." But not about the sort of human relations that 
ignores larger contexts of the social, the cultural, the 
historical, and the political. My students, in these 
examples, I believe, are discovering the ways in which 
culture is made at both macro and micro levels. They 
discover the fallacy of viewing tradition as a 
monocultural commodity rather than a dynamic 
transformation produced by encounters between and among 
cultures. We are produced not only by what we "do to" 
others, but also by their responses to that and vice 
versa. To read "tradition" as "common culture" pure and 
simple becomes absurd from this perspective.
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It is not my intention to set these examples up as 
some sort of "proof" that ideas in this writing have been 
tested and found to "work." I believe that, in fact, these 
examples are contradictory enough to point to the need for 
further study (in terms of possible uses) in the context 
of teacher education classrooms. For these same reasons, 
although I have many more examples of student 
autobiographical writing, I will not include more writings 
here. To do so would only serve to dominate the chapter 
with embryonic "data," and to undermine my purpose in 
writing it.
Conclusion
The self-reflective writing that has been done in and 
for my classroom and by myself, as well as the type of 
student and teacher work I am suggesting in this study 
through theoretical explorations calls for a 
reconceptualization of multicultural teacher education and 
curriculum. This reconceptualization involves attending to 
the historical and current development of cultural studies 
as well as to the politics of identity. Literary and 
autobiographical studies glimpsed through a cultural 
studies lens are interdisciplinary and intertextual. The 
approaches I envision and have attempted to describe 
operate through awareness of what Geertz has called
"blurred genres" (1983)— another phrase for studies being 
approached within and through other disciplines, and 
particularly through "textual" approaches. Students 
reading and writing about literature in conversation with 
self through awareness of social and cultural theory as 
well as the philosophical and psychological underpinnings 
of such theory are learning to read difference and 
otherness at a depth not typically available to students 
of multicultural teacher education. This is, indeed, a 
tall order. I am not suggesting that the job could be 
completed in this class from which I have drawn examples. 
To the contrary, it is just a beginning. Such a "liberal" 
intellectual approach requires not a course or two on 
multicultural education and self-reflective reading and 
writing, but an entire curriculum of study in which 
educational studies are envisioned as inherently 
multicultural, personal and, in significant senses, as a 
"liberal arts discipline" (Beyer, Feinberg, Whitson, and 
Pagano, 1991). The particular way in which Beyer, et al. 
frame their conception of educational studies as liberal 
art is indeed interdisciplinary and one which echoes many 
of the concerns of cultural studies.
CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion
You are born at the same time with a lot of 
other people, all mixed up with them, like 
trying to, having to, move your arms and legs 
with strings only the same strings are hitched 
to all the other arms and legs and the others 
all trying and they dont know why either except 
that the strings are all in one another's way 
like five or six people all trying to make a rug 
on the same loom only each one wants to weave 
his own pattern into the rug (Faulkner, Absalom. 
Absalom!. 1936, p. 127).
This passage seems an apt description of the way 
problems get served up in daily living, and those that I 
have attempted to explicate in this writing are no 
exception. One might feel that such an image is echoed in 
poststructuralist theorizing whereby nothing is ever 
certain, stable, unified, or closed, but always in some 
sort of turbulent process. Particular and engaging 
literature presents itself to us somewhere inbetween daily 
life and theory. Yet at the same time, "theory is here 
often the straight man whose precarious rectitude and 
hidden visibility, passion, and pathos are precisely what 
literature has somehow already foreseen" (Johnson, B., 
1980, p. xii).
If literature is comedian to theory's straight man, 
then poststructuralist theory must surely be a kind of 
literature to other kinds of theory. Through 
poststructuralist theory we have been taught the ways in
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which deconstruction can avoid some of the constraints of 
dialectical thinking, and how it is possible to let go of 
some of the certainty we have sometimes so desperately, so 
obsessively, and at times so oppressively clawed after. 
Poststructuralist theorizing seem to be looking into (or 
listening into?) creating an environment in which living 
can be sufficiently playful, loving, adventurous, and so 
on. But this theorizing sometimes appears to want to skip 
over the step of obliterating overt physically/materially 
manifested oppressions— to pretend that they have already 
been taken care of, and that we can move on now. At worst 
these theories are oblivious to their own conservatism, 
caught in denial and repression, presenting no serious 
challenge to whatever is.
Structuralist materialist theorizing, on the other 
hand, holds another set of potential traps and 
contradictions. The primacy of the material that supports 
human need— its availability, control, and movement— is a 
fundamental presupposition of materialist theories. As 
such these theories are logically first and foremost 
social class-based theories. What this has meant 
historically is that class concerns have been privileged 
over others such as race and gender, "because, we are 
told, it [class] is more fundamental than any other 
interests or forms of social power" (Young, 1990, p. 4) .
As I have labored to explain, any discourse which 
polarizes, posing the one as good and the other as evil, 
or one as primary and the other as merely secondary, is 
suspect in terms of its own capacity for violence and 
totalization. Although I make efforts to avoid this, my 
discourse is no exception. Most differences, however, are 
matters of degree and not matters of distinction. The very 
difficulty of avoiding such polarization can be 
appreciated, and degrees of failure forgiven, once we 
glimpse the dazzling complexity of human (and other) 
existence and relationships. Hence, I must say, 
materialism as an informing system cannot be ignored in 
this circuit. Indeed, contradictions among "the ruling 
class" over issues of culture in the present configuration 
are material (structural) as well as psychosocial or 
discursive. For example, with well known demographic 
trends toward a "majority minority," manifestations of a 
fear of falling from the center (fears of, primarily, 
white male academics) are often operating in direct 
opposition to corporate movements in their visions of 
future marketing and employment needs. In this respect it 
could be that "capitalism, out of self-interest, [will] 
facilitate our entrance into a new stage of race 
relations" (Martinez, 1991, p. 130). However, it is 
difficult to predict what shape this "stage" may take
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given the still strongly entrenched underlying ideological 
construction of white supremacy.
This is where educational institutions might be able 
to provide critical intervention. However, the sort of 
intervention I envision— one which seriously interrogates 
the politics of identity and culture— is difficult to 
impossible if the discourse of white supremacy is allowed 
to remain invisible and extra-topical in academic debates. 
This discourse plays itself out in many particular ways 
and forms: popular culture and media, policies of the 
state, institutional practices, academic theories, and so 
on. All of these discursive forms contribute to the 
psychosocial climate that produces subjectivities and 
notions of identity. Such a discursive field also takes 
particular shapes and textures according to the particular 
cultural ecologies in which it is functioning. Educational 
interventions that do not take such particularities into 
account amount to a kind of intellectual tourism (Roman, 
cited in McCarthy 1988b)— tourism that is unable to 
challenge dominant ideologies of white supremacy and 
patriarchy.
Intellectual tourism results when scholars refuse to 
figure particular cultural forms, subjectivities, and 
agencies into their theoretical formulations and, rather, 
to subsume all of these under singular, totalizing social
theories such as with liberal and radical theories of 
social class, as well as conservative and neo-conservative 
theories of cultural deprivation (McCarthy, 1988b). Within 
such a paradigm "third world" subjects become objects as 
do marginalized groups in the "first world." Likewise, one 
can learn to read like a tourist (as do students within 
such systems)— a learned illiteracy— reading oneself into 
everything, one-way translation that reads others only 
through the lenses of a singularly conceptualized, 
dominant culture, reading that literally precedes itself 
in exotic fantasizing. I mean by "precedes itself" that it 
is pre-figured; (re)interpretation is unnecessary. It is 
the type of reading Mariah and her husband did of Lucy (in 
Kincaid's Lucy) whereby Lucy's pedagogical attitude was 
interpreted as her way of expressing to them what a "hard 
life" she (and "her people") had had.
My own efforts here and in my classroom are to expose 
that "will to ignore" that leads to critical illiteracy so 
that a new condition of reading is possible. This is 
reading that discloses to the reader her or his own desire 
to ignore, to repress, to seek "bottom line" closure 
everywhere. Once again, it is reading that "encounters and 
propagates the surprise of otherness" (Johnson, B., 1987, 
p. 15). Reading for the surprise of otherness, like 
identity formation across Taubman's three registers, is
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always reading via someone/something else. This someone 
else is not only, in part, other than the reader, it is 
also, in part, other than the author. It is translation 
without a master.
Like the impossibility of escaping the metaphysics of 
presence, this goal or outcome, is unrealizable in any 
absolute sense. The process of working toward this is what 
is significant. However, process does not imply method. As 
Johnson explains, "No methodology can be relied on to 
generate surprise. On the contrary, it is usually surprise 
that engenders methodology" (p. 15). This "literacy of the 
imagination" (Harris, 1989) is a literacy that does not 
answer to the notion of an "excellence" (in education) 
that exists above and apart from notions of "equity." It 
is, I believe, a move toward the same literacy that 
Whitson refers to when he writes, "the point is that 
literacy requires the dialogue that bigotry prevents, so 
that the bigot is and must be a bad reader" (1988, p.
294). One cannot "see" (or hear) the familiar until it is 
made strange. Western culture is best understood in the 
context of studies of other cultures, including the ways 
in which these cultures encounter and transform one 
another. And this reading of the world necessarily takes 
place in the context of reading the self.
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Cultural Studies Toward a Politics of Identity
Literature and Identity
"Listening to the non-synchronous voices from the
periphery," (McCarthy, 1988b, p. 17) Faulkner's gaze might
become Ellison's (musical) hearing. Theoretical voices
from the periphery are still grossly under-represented,
even in the literature of cultural studies. Even when
theory written by the marginalized has been included it
has been highly derivative of Anglo or European theory.
For example, no one would guess from Stuart Hall's earlier
work that he is an African-Caribbean immigrant to England.
More often, voices from the periphery that generate "otic"
theories— theories of listening— are literary voices. The
gazing "ocular" "abstractions of western sociology . . .
that negate the specific histories of third world people"
(p. 18) and other marginalized groups demand a response
that only a "literature of resistance" (p. 18) can
provide. McCarthy offers an eloquent plea:
I argue for a genuine, interdisciplinary 
encounter between third world and New World 
literature and popular cultural forms and Old 
World derived sociology of education as the 
basis of an alternative radical discourse that 
would render audible the heterogeneous voices of 
oppressed raced, classed, and gendered third 
world subjects (p. 18).
The power of such literature becomes most evident 
when measured next to the stridency and shrillness of 
conservative attacks against it— attacks intended to
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conserve what is thought to be western cultural tradition 
as embodied in canonical literature. When cultural studies 
scholars insist to traditionalists ("canonizers") that 
they do not wish to eliminate canonical works, 
traditionalist arguments proceed through a different tack. 
What was the a-historical becomes the anti-historical.
Literature becomes canonized presumably because it is 
great as proven, in part, by "the test of time." It is 
great and enduring, so the argument often goes, because it 
contains universal truths— verities. But "universal 
truths" or values are hard to pin down because the 
contexts in which these texts are read is ever-shifting.
To assert the existence of universal truths is to assert a 
kind of final interpretation— an a-historical stance. 
Currently, in critiques of multiculturalism, 
traditionalists are frequently going further than just to 
say the "great works" should always be taught. Now they 
are more insistent about the way they should be taught. 
Particular readings of canonical texts that take into 
consideration social/historical contexts that may include 
uncovering racism or sexism for example, are under attack 
for "reducing literature to 'ideology'" (Berube, 1991, p. 
37). Complaints about "ideological" readings of texts are 
often really complaints about historical readings. It is 
in this sense that what was the ahistorical becomes now
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the anti-historical. So who, Berube asks, is being 
reductive?
In these debates attacks against "political 
correctness" are often veiled attacks against cultural 
studies as well as exhibitions of profound insecurities 
over national identity. "Multiculturalists," cultural 
studies scholars, the so-called politically correct, do 
need to pay attention to these expressions of fear and 
desire. The Left academics, some of whom are scholars of 
the politics of culture, who are accused of this 
intolerance, have been steadily losing advocates because 
of a failure to acknowledge particular problems of 
identity— perhaps especially those problems of the 
autobiographical register (in spite of the fact the 
ostensible arguments are over national identity). People 
who might wish to be social activists but feel 
demoralized, in need of emotional support at a time when 
there are few social rewards for activism, have been 
accused of being self-indulgent. Consequently, support 
groups with names like "adult children" or "recovering 
addicts" are getting the commitments from people who might 
otherwise be peace or civil rights activists, for example 
(Herman, 1991, pp. 42-46). "No one, of course, should have 
to make the impossible choice between personal and social 
change" (p. 46).
The problems with this move to embrace psychological
health to the exclusion of commitment to social health are
obvious. Once again, identity is "lived" as if it operates
out of a single register, only this way it is the
autobiographical rather than the communal. The fallacy of
such a uni-dimensional approach to identity is evident,
for example, in the ways in which some psychological
practitioners have historically supported politically
repressive goals through such moves as offering
"incontrovertible evidence of homosexual psychopathology,
and design[ing] propaganda to efficiently destroy radical
organizations" (p. 46). Clearly, when identity problems
are relinquished to such practitioners the social and
political problems are multiplied. As Herman suggests,
progressive change is predicated on rejection of "the
dualism between internal and external transformation" (p.
46). A politics of culture and identity approached through
literature can perhaps provide a reparation.
The anxiety over "eternal truths" in canonical
literature could be read as a search for a kind of
consolation. Italo Calvino wrote in The Uses of Literature
of the fallacy of seeing literature merely as
an assortment of eternal human sentiments, as 
the truth of a human language that politics 
tends to overlook. . . . Behind this way of 
thinking is the notion of a set of established 
values that literature is responsible for 
preserving, the classical and immobile idea of
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literature as the depository of a given truth.
If it agrees to take on this role, literature 
confines itself to a function of consolation, 
preservation, and regression (cited in Goodman,
1991, p. 124).
Calvino offers an alternative way to view literature. It
becomes most useful
when it gives a voice to whatever is without a 
voice, when it gives a name to what as yet has 
no name, especially to what the language of 
politics excludes or attempts to exclude (p.
124) .
Voices from the periphery, to be heard, require a cultural 
studies of listening, an "otic" theory. For me, good 
literature is written work which engages readers by 
appealing to similarities at the same time it provides 
glimpses at and avenues of escape into difference, 
marginality, otherness. To do this literature itself has 
to listen. Literature, then, often begins in the mundane 
but takes a "line of flight," in Deleuze's sense of that 
phrase, out of the mundane. It is a frontier of sorts 
(Deleuze and Parnet, 1987, pp. 36-51).
Autobiography and Identity
But what about the "ocular" character of 
autobiography whereby a "specular structure" presents 
itself the moment a writer "declares himself the subject 
of his own understanding" (de Man cited in Smith, 1988, p. 
103)? Specular is as self-reflection— reflection that can
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be trapped in infinite regress, a hall of mirrors. How is
this reconciled to the call for theorizing that undermines
"the gaze?" Self gazing upon self gives way to listening
as soon as that self recognizes its own division, its
relational necessity, its very definition in dynamic
relationality, and its (non-neurotic) instability. It is
difficult to see something that always moves away, but
movement is essential for creating sound, for hearing.
With autobiography that asserts itself only in relation
(in relation to margins), particular, regional and
repressed histories can be recovered as they are with
literature of the margins.
The self that is not in mastery of itself (or of
anyone) recognizes its own division. That division is, in
part, about race. As Deleuze and Guattari remind us,
there is no race but inferior, minoritarian, 
there is no dominant race, a race is not defined 
by its purity but rather by the impurity 
conferred upon it by a system of domination.
Bastard and mixed blood are the true names of 
race (1990, p. 12).
Susie Phipps has heard this story. Recall what Paul Smith
writes about paranoia: "the 'subject' thus endows the
external world with what it takes to be its own worst
tendencies and qualities" (1988, p. 95). The "subject"
projects its own pessimistic inner concoctions onto the
world it "sees." Theories of the visual are analogous to
the paranoid— a kind of "metaparanoia11 (p. 97) . As in
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Faulkner's Rosa and Ellison's Brotherhood, and as Halpin 
points out (1990), those ocular theories (theorists) 
presume to see all but believe that they themselves cannot 
be seen and indeed work to cover over their own 
visibility. Within this "metaparanoia," "The division of 
the 'subject' (the division it makes and the division it 
is) is thus hidden for the purposes of a mastery" (p. 97, 
italics added).
That instability that is "self," that is not 
neurotic, not divided against itself, can be "seen" 
through a new "vision" of a non-visual approach to 
theorizing. Literature and autobiography are crucial to 
that project. Because the exhilaration and significance of 
reading/writing and writing/reading literature lie 
somewhere between the tentative naming of oneself and 
plunging into difference, I encourage students and 
teachers to think about directing their writing toward 
such "discoveries" (inventions?).
The stories we create about ourselves are, in part, 
what determines our perceptions of ourselves and, as such, 
influence what we become to ourselves and others. The self 
is constructed by the writing, but not as a static, final 
self. Rather, it becomes a self-in-motion, reading and 
writing in such a way as to recognize the fictional, 
communal, and autobiographical registers of identity as
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interpenetrating and deconstructing one another. Yet, the 
larger questions for this study have become: What is a 
better way to come to "know" difference, both cultural and 
individual? How can we work to understand both cultural 
and individual difference both intra- and inter­
sub jectively?
Many argue that the best way to understand cultural 
difference is through immersion. But even were this to be 
a possible, practical, approach for (multicultural) 
teacher education, it still requires of the participant a 
suspension of resistance to difference that living within 
a different culture does not necessarily insure. Certain 
literary works can provide a kind of "practical" 
immersion, while autobiographical work done alongside 
literary readings can serve as a medium for suspending 
resistance to difference by placing the self positively 
within that difference, as in the case, for example, of my 
student, Donna. At the same time, readings from the 
cultural studies traditions can provide the tools for 
deepening such an approach, for thinking through social, 
cultural and literary theories as they inform inter- 
textual readings of literary works of different times and 
cultures, and thereby remind us of the truly multi­
cultural encounters that create and sustain us.
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Final Remarks 
It is clear that British Cultural Studies holds no 
monopoly on those ideas that inspired and sustained it, 
such as the ideas of studies that challenge disciplinary 
boundaries and that dare to work from the academic margins 
in order to avoid appropriation by the dominant political 
order(s). Many disciplines of the traditional liberal arts 
and social sciences are increasingly viewing themselves as 
actors through such scholarly approaches— for example, in 
anthropology Geertz proclaims the necessary acknowledgment 
of "blurred genres" (1983); in philosophy, post­
structuralists proclaim the primacy of literary texts as 
philosophical texts (e.g., Guattari, 1990); literature, 
philosophy and autobiography are bound together for the 
purpose of psychotherapy (White & Epston, 1990); and these 
same elements are employed in the service of 
historiography (Portelli, 1991). Nevertheless, "cultural 
studies" as a movement that provided much of the early 
labor for these others must be acknowledged and their 
struggles remembered lest the difficulties be 
unnecessarily repeated. Its history and labors have as yet 
informed the work of multicultural education scholars only 
marginally. It is as though we have believed that our 
teacher education students cannot be troubled with such a 
heavy intellectual burden. Such a belief is not justified
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by my own experiences through approaches described in this
study— approaches that have now been shared with both
undergraduate and graduate students of education.
However, a difficulty remains for me with the
autobiographical work over which there must never be
complacency. The fact that many students may respond to
autobiographical assignments with such an intensity as to
indicate that they want, indeed are hungry, to tell their
tales does not absolve me of the responsibility of
questioning my rights to ask for them and my ways of
asking for them. People often want what is not in their
best interests, as is so often exemplified by economically
deprived parents of children attending economically
deprived schools who insist that they want for their
children lock-step, rote and "discipline." The question of
whether or not to proceed this way comes back to me always
as an uneasy one at best. With Grumet I feel that:
if my work permits the teachers I work with to 
examine their own work with a seeing that is 
more inclusive, that surveys an ever widening 
surround, that is a search I would gladly join.
But if my work certifies me as an agent of the 
state to peer into what is hidden from public 
view, if it is my look that discovers and 
appraises, then I might as well approach the 
classroom with bloodhound as well as briefcase, 
and they ought to demand to see my warrant 
before they let me in (1991, p. 71).
Finally, I cannot justify what I do beyond what I see (or
think I see), and have attempted to describe and explain
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here, as a growth of love. And I write this word (love) in 
hopes that it will not be read as a regressively 
sentimental idea, full of sweetness and harmony, but 
rather in the context of the ways it has been written and 
thought in earlier chapters.
Finally, it is love that brings together literature, 
marginality, and curriculum. As Daignault pointed out 
(1989) to me (and as I later found for myself with 
excursions through English language etymological 
dictionaries), the Latin infinitive for religion, 
religere, means to re-read and to care. (Negligere is its 
Latin opposite and means negligence). Curare, different 
but similar in sound and spelling to currere, also means 
to care. Cultus (culture) means care; worship. And love is 
related in my own text to both care and to religion (in 
the sense of spirituality) as well as desire. "Leave is 
the offspring of yet another Indo-European root, leubh- 
'to care, to desire; to love'" (Partridge, 1982, p. 189). 
And this leaves us with crisis, Greek krisis (a 
separating, decision, discrimination); Latin discrimen 
(interval, intervening space, turning point, difference, 
risk). The risk of loving— caring, deciding, 
discriminating, and finally leaving (in any number of 
senses)— is common to the educational enterprise and to 
literature. And it is living in the midst of this risk
256
(crisis) that marks the margins in all its layers. I leave 
you with this.
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